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Kansas Open Books Foreword

In his carefully titled A Preface to American Political Theory, Donald S.
Lutz makes clear at the outset that his principal aim is to encourage
the creation of a genuine academic “discipline” called “American Political Theory.” “A discipline,” he writes, “is a joint enterprise”—what
Stanley Fish might call an “interpretive community”—of a number of
people, most of them, presumably, academics and scholars, “who have
undergone a certain intellectual formation so that they understand the
FRPPRQTXHVWLRQVGHÀQLQJWKHHQWHUSULVH>DQG@KDYHDFRPSUHKHQVLYH
familiarity with the relevant literature and materials.” In addition they
must know “how to use the methodologies”—and the use of the plural
is crucial—“appropriate for advancing the literature” (2).
Still, the crucial question is exactly what a student of American political theory, as distinguished, say, from “Americanists” or “political
theorists” more generally, should focus on. The answer appears to lie
in both the recognition and a Whitman-like embrace of “the mélange”
(112) revealed by the genuine complexity of American political life.
This includes real-time diagnoses of our political situations and various
suggestions as cures for what are deemed social or political ills. When
Lutz writes that “it would seem perverse to focus American political
theory upon a study of writings by a tiny elite” (152), he is not only
making a profound methodological point but also indicating his almost
-HͿHUVRQLDQEHOLHIWKDW´KHUHWKHSHRSOH>VKRXOG@UXOHµ7KLVPHDQVWKDW
one must therefore understand the contributions that all sorts of people
have made, for good and for ill, to politics in America. To be sure, one
might well discover that much nonelite thought is a harsh critique of
WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK YDULRXV HOLWHV ZKHWKHU GHÀQHG LQ WHUPV RI FODVV
gender, or race—or, most likely, the intersection of all three—in fact
dominate the actual decision-making process. That does not, however,
mean that it is not a necessary (and proper) part of the discipline of
American political theory.
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Moving to the current moment, almost thirty years after Lutz
wrote his book, we might wonder whether Senator Bernie Sanders is
a card-carrying member of “the American elite.” But it would be hard
to understand contemporary American politics without paying attention to his constant reminders that the system is “rigged” against the
American working class in favor of elites. Consider also, though, the
possibility that any serious contemporary course on American political
WKHRU\VKRXOGDOVRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWVXFKÀJXUHVDV6WHYH%DQQRQDQG
other architects of the Trumpian moment in American politics, even if
not necessarily any purported writings (or even tweets) of Donald J.
Trump himself. At the same time, Lutz seems to suggest, perhaps we
need not pay so much attention to, say, John Rawls or Robert Nozick,
even though, by any measure, they are more serious “political theorists” (and Americans to boot) than are the other abovementioned people. Why is this so?
7KH DQVZHU LV WKDW$PHULFDQ SROLWLFDO WKHRU\ DV D ÀHOG VKRXOG QRW
concentrate on those questions that in some ways constitute the canon
going back to Plato: What is the meaning of justice, for example, or
what, exactly, constitutes legitimate political rule? These are universal
questions. Their answers might apply to the United States but are not,
essentially, about the United States. Lutz, however, explicitly indicates
that the discipline he wants to bring more clearly into being involves
systematic study of the actual reality of politics in America. This means
paying attention to concrete political events and movements and the
ways that they are understood by a wide variety of engaged Americans attempting to comprehend their situations. This also means, paradoxically or not, that “American political theory is not simply political
theory written by Americans” (27). His paradigm example is de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, ZKLFKLVRIFRXUVHWKHUHÁHFWLRQVRIDQ
unusually observant and analytically oriented Frenchman who made a
notable trip to the United States in the 1830s and thought it important
to convey the larger implications of what he saw.
Lutz’s central assertion is that “American political theory has at its
center a tradition of constitutionalism” (28). It is crucial, though, that
he is not really referring to “constitutionalism” in general, which might
counsel beginning with Aristotle and moving on, breathlessly, to the
ODWHVWZRUNVLQFRPSDUDWLYHFRQVWLWXWLRQDODQDO\VLVE\VXFKÀJXUHVDV
the late Walter Murphy or the very much alive Gary Jacobsohn, Tom
*LQVEXUJRU5DQ+LUVFKO7KH\GLͿHUIURP/XW]LQIROGLQJWKHSDUWLFXlarities of “American constitutionalism” into a far broader picture that
requires equal familiarity with a host of other countries and their “tra-
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GLWLRQ>V@ RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPµ ZKLFK PLJKW GLͿHU LQ LQWHUHVWLQJ DQG
important respects from the American one. Life is short and we have
WRFRQFHQWUDWHZKLFKPHDQVLQHͿHFWWKDW/XW]ZDVDQHDUO\DGRSWHU
of the centrality of what has come to be called American constitutional
development. This requires mastery of vast domains of American history,
LQFOXGLQJ NQRZOHGJH RI WKH ZULWLQJV DQG VSHHFKHV RI PDQ\ GLͿHUHQW
ÀJXUHVLQDZLGHYDULHW\RIFRQWH[WVDVH[HPSOLÀHGLQWKHZRUNRIVXFK
scholars as Stephen Skowronek, Keith Whittington, or Mark Graber.
One must also appreciate the actualities of American institutions, some
of them quite unusual or even “exceptional” when compared to those
of other countries or systems.
And incidentally, one should underline what Lutz himself readily acknowledges, that “American constitutionalism” must not be restricted
to the study of the single Constitution of the United States or of the national political system. As John Dinan demonstrated in his aptly named
The American State Constitutional Tradition, there are at present 51 constitutions within the United States, and over our 235-year history there
have been literally dozens more—each state has had just short of three
FRQVWLWXWLRQVGXULQJWKLVSHULRG³DQGWKH\GLͿHUIURPHDFKRWKHUDQG
MXVWDVVLJQLÀFDQWO\WKH86&RQVWLWXWLRQLQYLWDOZD\V-DPHV0DGLVRQ
proudly wrote in Federalist, no. 63 that the US Constitution he helped
to write excluded the people—whatever might be thought by reading
WKHÀUVWZRUGVRIWKH3UHDPEOH³IURPDQ\UROHLQDFWXDOJRYHUQDQFH
That all-important task was to be carried out exclusively by representatives. Yet if one looks at state constitutions from Maine to California,
DQGWR+DZDLLLQWKHPLG3DFLÀFRQHZLOOGLVFRYHUWKDWDQLPSUHVVLYH
number of states include procedures for “direct democracy” that serve,
for better or worse, to allow electorates to do end-runs around their
perhaps sclerotic representatives. As Dinan demonstrates, adoption
of the “initiative and referendum” was much debated at many state
constitutional conventions, as was the possibility of “instructed” representatives in the eighteenth century. Students of American political
theory have a duty to be familiar with these debates and the exceedLQJO\GLͿHUHQWYLVLRQVRI$PHULFDQGHPRFUDF\³RUZKDWWKHQDWLRQDO
Constitution calls a “Republican Form of Government”—instantiated
in these debates.
These debates might not meet the level of “high theory” under stanGDUG DFDGHPLF GHÀQLWLRQV %XW /XW] DOVR HPSKDVL]HV WKH LPSRUWDQFH
of studying American constitutional debate in all its forms. For Lutz,
the opinions of the US Supreme Court or the Federalist essays are not
dispositive sources of the true meaning of American constitutionalism.
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One should recognize the degree to which Martin Van Buren is a major
architect of the American constitutional order inasmuch as it was he,
PRUHWKDQDQ\VLQJOHSHUVRQZKRFRGLÀHGDVLWZHUHWKHH[SODQDWLRQ
for the vital importance of what we today call partisan political parties
to replace the older vision (instantiated in Federalist) of a polity led by
“virtuous” and nonpartisan elites. He was, perhaps not coincidentally,
also a primary architect of what Don Fehrenbacher called “The SlaveRZQHUV5HSXEOLFµVRWKDW9DQ%XUHQ·V'HPRFUDWLF3DUW\ZDVGHÀQHG
very much by its commitment to white supremacy and the exclusion
even of almost all free blacks from participation in American politics. So
one must be aware—and accept the importance—of “the Constitution
outside the courts”; this also extends to constitutional arguments made
by nonlawyers and nonelites. One way that the book perhaps reveals
LWVDJHLVLQ/XW]·VUHODWLYHIDLOXUHWRPHQWLRQLQVXFKFRQWH[WVÀJXUHV
like Frederick Douglass, Martin Luther King, or Susan B. Anthony, to
PHQWLRQRQO\WKUHHREYLRXVH[DPSOHVRIÀJXUHVZKRHVSHFLDOO\GHVHUYH
to be part of the subject matter of Lutz’s discipline of “American political theory.” Or one might certainly want to add the leaders of Christian
temperance movements who developed important constitutional arguments along the way (and ultimately prevailed, at least for a decade
RUVRLQWKHSURSRVDODQGUDWLÀFDWLRQRIWKH(LJKWHHQWK$PHQGPHQW 
Or perhaps one might even need to add unabashed defenders of white
supremacy or highly restrictive immigration laws inasmuch as no one
can understand the actual contours of American politics without taking
them into account, however regrettable their presence may be.
%XWIRUWXQDWHO\HQWU\RIWKHVHDQGRWKHUVLPLODUÀJXUHVGRHVQRWLQ
the least contradict Lutz’s central message or require vast revision of
his argument. “American political theory,” he writes, “is distinguished
from European political theory precisely because it rests upon the work
of the political class and not on the writings of an intellectual elite.” In
IDFW KH GHÀQHV DV ´WKH HQWLUH SRLQW RI$PHULFDQ SROLWLFDO WKHRU\µ LWV
replacement of “elite dominance with popular control, to ground politics directly in human experience rather than in philosophical utopias.”
One should understand the “behavior patterns” of actual Americans in
terms of the actual results of “the political process rather than to force
the political process into conformity with an abstraction” (110). “European political theory”—including the works of Rawls or Nozick—“is
FRGLÀHG LQ ERRNV ZULWWHQ E\ PHQ ZKR HVVHQWLDOO\ VWRRG RXWVLGH WKH
political process.” American political theory, in contrast, is produced
by members of “the politically active class” (111), whoever they might
be, both in what they might write down or inscribe by virtue of their
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actions, such as civil disobedience. Discovering who actually is within
the “political class” at a particular time and place requires sensitivity
ERWKWRKLVWRULFDOO\QXDQFHGDQDO\VLVDQGRIWHQTXLWHUHÀQHGHPSLULFDO
methods.
'RQDOG /XW] LQ VRPH ZD\V RͿHUV XV D EDVLF V\OODEXV IRU XQGHUstanding American political theory, and many readers will no doubt
share my own chagrin at not (yet) having read someone Lutz considers important. That is a contribution in itself. But equally important, of
course, is the fact that Lutz raises a host of questions about how best to
understand American politics and its formative ideas; these questions
provide the basis for stimulating argument, whether in the classroom
or the privacy of our own studies or homes.
Sanford Levinson
Austin, Texas
April 2020
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Introduction

What follows is a book aimed at the student or researcher who is
about to begin disciplined study of American political theory. Considerable emphasis is placed on clarifying the core of that discipline and its attendant methodologies, so that it will be clearly distinguishable from other intellectual enterprises. Such clarification
is essential if we are to emancipate American political theorists
from dominance by either an antitheoretical empiricism or by European methodologies and theories that are inappropriate to the
American context. Such emancipation requires a more distinct and
coherent identity for American political theory than it has now, but
the task of clarifying its identity is complicated because that identity includes parts of those very approaches from which it is to be
distinguished. For example, American political theory must be distinguished from narrow empiricism, yet systematic empirical
study is an essential part of American political theory. Indeed, the
very essence of American political theory, that which identifies its
core and differentiates it from other branches of study, is the insistence on yoking together intellectual traditions and modes of
study-normative, empirical, and analytic-that have tended to
drift apart into camps characterized by either antagonism or mutual indifference.
If successful, what follows will help rescue American political
theory from the undeserved status of a very subordinate subfield
of political theory. This subordination results from the tendency of
people in other areas of inquiry to claim the entire enterprise as
their own and either to apply narrow criteria from their respective
approaches, against which American political theory fails to mea-
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sure up, or to use methodologies that intrude upon a balanced
study and skew the results. American political theory from these
various points of view is theoretically derivative, nonphilosophical, merely ideological, or empirically incoherent. That is, the tendency of scholars to treat American political theory in an offhanded manner largely reaffirms the status of the field as an
intellectual backwater. The solution is to create a standard of scholarship against which these intrusions will be seen for what they
are. Such a standard of scholarship requires us to define a body of
material to be mastered, to learn a set of relevant methodologies
and their proper usage, and to think through more carefully the
mental stance the material and its study require us to adopt. In
sum, this book is an introduction to the mental discipline required
of students of American political theory who will set the standards
for inquiry in the future .

Chapter 1

What Is American
Political Theory?

The Status of the Discipline
American political theory, as a discipline, is waiting to be born. Its
various pieces are floating free of each other in different academic
departments and among several subfields within political science.
What, one might ask, can those scholars who study political philosophy, voting behavior, legal history, philosophy, social history, legislative roll calls, public law, the history of ideas, economic theory, political sociology, and American literature have in common? One answer
is that people from each of these intellectual pursuits have made and
continue to make contributions to American political theory. The
problem does not lie in the diversity of backgrounds but in an unsystematic focus, in the failure to ask what we are doing when we engage in the study of a subject called American political theory.
A kind of quiet modus vivendi has resulted from a common
target of inquiry-the American founding. The importance of this
event in human history and for the American experience has made
the founding era a magnet for American academics of every description, and the common focus has served as an anchor. Yet the
moment we seek the roots of this founding or ask how the founding relates to political thinking and activities that come later, conflicting assumptions and methodologies drive apart the various
pieces that make up American political theory. Furthermore, this
modus vivendi has led to the tendency to assume that nothing of
consequence for American political theory came before the founding era and that nothing of much consequence happened afterward. The nineteenth century in America is generally ignored as a
1

2
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wasteland of political theory, and political theory in the twentieth
century, including current approaches, is usually seen as unconnected to the issues of the founding era.
The creation of a discipline called American political theory does
not require that we break off from other approaches to the study of
politics. Instead, I argue that the discipline of our enterprise must assume the ability systematically to learn, use, and sometimes merge
the approaches of these various other viewpoints. This in turn requires that we think more carefully about what it is we are doing
when we engage in American political theory, that we become more
self-conscious about our aims, assumptions, and methods.
A discipline necessarily implies a certain level of intellectual
rigor, a set of important and difficult questions that serve as the focus of inquiry, and a methodology appropriate to the study of
these questions that is both effective and sophisticated. Such an
activity requires that those scholars engaged in it should have undergone an intellectual formation, a disciplining of the mind, that
prepared them. A discipline, in other words, is a joint enterprise
engaged in by a number of people who have undergone a certain
intellectual formation so that they understand the common questions defining the enterprise, have a comprehensive familiarity
with the relevant literature and materials, and know how to use the
methodologies appropriate for advancing that literature.
"Discipline" is not used here in the loose academic sense to
identify heterogeneous conglomerates of scholars gathered in a
specific university department, such as the "discipline" of political
science. Political science is currently more of an academic profession composed of several disciplines linked by a modus vivendi.
There is, for example, a discipline within the profession built
around the close textual analysis of a well-defined canon of great
books, which requires both the mastery of the contents of these
works and the techniques of textual analysis with which to study
them. Another discipline requires mastery of a literature based
upon the empirical study of political phenomena as well as upon
the statistical, inferential, and research-design techniques required
to evaluate and extend such research. We can identify other disciplines within political science, such as those built around formal
mathematics or around a foreign language, but the main point to
be grasped here is that within the profession of political science
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there are several disciplines, each requiring that the person practicing it be formed and developed in a certain way.
A "discipline" is defined by a specific, rigorous intellectual formation; a "profession" is a body of persons that has licensed or
publicly certified that its members have attained a certain minimal
level of proficiency in the delivery of a service. Presumably, since a
profession is usually deemed to require some form of advanced
training, one must successfully undergo a discipline in order to be
licensed as a professional. Therefore a discipline refers to a process
that is open in the sense that it never ends, either in its development or in its application, and anyone can decide to enter it, even
amateurs; a profession refers to a status that is by definition
closed-both in the sense that the status is closed to those who
have not been licensed and in the sense that once the status is attained, no further development is required to retain the status.
The current idea of a professional contains two interesting ambiguities. First, we speak of someone who engages in a specific activity for a livelihood as a professional (a professional writer, for example), but at the same time the essence of a profession is that
"though men enter it for the sake of a livelihood, the measure of
their success is the service they perform not the gains which they
amass. " 1 In other words, professionals do not "keep score" by the
amount of money they make but by some professional standard,
such as the number and quality of their publications, discoveries,
patents, cures, or successful court cases and the recognition given
these "scores" through various forms of nonmonetary awards and
honors. A second ambiguity relates to the need for a professional
to "profess" something as true-in the old days one professed a
faith-and at the same time to follow inherent professional stand. ards of neutrality and universal applicability. Essentially a professional professes a high level of standards in the delivery of a service, but he or she also professes that a certain discipline will be
most likely to produce that high level of service. For this reason a
profession requires a licensing system, both to ensure standards
and to keep out those who have not undergone a proper
discipline.
Every profession, although it licenses for a common, minimal
discipline, still contains within itself a variety of disciplines that
have developed above and beyond that common discipline. For ex-
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ample, medicine requires a common American Medical Association license as a minimum before a person can be called "doctor,"
but the discipline of a surgeon is not the same as that of a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, or an ophthalmologist, each of which requires
substantial training beyond medical school. Of course, each branch
of medicine has its more advanced and specialized certification,
but pediatrics is a specialty and medicine is the profession. In the
same way political science is a profession that defines a minimum,
common certification but that contains a number of specialties defined by a more advanced discipline. Unlike medical schools, however, where each specialty is organized in a separate department,
political science combines its various disciplines in a single
department.
On the one hand, the presence of several disciplines within a
single university department tends to divide those scholars who
are ultimately studying the same subject or set of phenomena.
This diversity has required over the past century an almost continuous accommodation among disciplines within political science
departments, an accommodation that has often been acrimonious
since the wedge that divides the parties is much more than methodological diversity. On the other hand, the presence of several
disciplines in the same department has had the beneficial effect of
continuously reinforcing in everyone's mind those features that the
various parties do share-a common interest in the study of politics and a common dedication to the highest level of disciplined inquiry. The competition and the mutual opposition have led proponents of each discipline to shore up and improve their respective
positions, not to the point where the uneasy accommodation is
based upon mutual agreement, but to the extent that each advocate at least recognizes that the others do impose a training, an orderly and difficult set of standards, upon themselves and their students, which constitutes disciplined political inquiry. They
sometimes see in each other patterns of inquiry that are misguided
and fruitless, but the accommodation tends to be based upon a
quiet acknowledgment that the others do pursue a recognizable
discipline of the mind.
To a certain extent this recognition is manifested through the
publication of scholarly books and articles. No matter how little regard one discipline might receive and despite some striking differ-
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ences in opinion over the preferred publication pattern, three characteristics together create the operational definition of a successful
political scientist: (1) a systematic inquiry more or less guided by
rigorous methodology, (2) the development from that inquiry of a
sustained analysis and argument that proceeds according to recognizable canons of logic, and (3) success in passing a refereed evaluation by a group of one's peers to produce a publication in a respected forum. Put another way, the tendency in political science
is to define a discipline as the combination of systematic inquiry,
logical exposition, and successful "marketplace" (i.e., neutral)
evaluation-with all three combining to discipline the work of an
individual.
This publication-based modus vivendi among the various disciplines within political science has had some generally beneficial
effects beyond reinforcing a recognition of shared interests and
dedication. A primary benefit has been an advance in sophistication by almost all of the disciplines in the profession as a result of
the stimulation produced by deep, mutual critiques. Another has
been the tendency to continue the exposure of doctoral students in
their formal training to several political science disciplines (except
in those relatively rare and unfortunate instances where one discipline or another has "captured" a department), which has the
result of internalizing the disciplinary tensions within individuals
in a way that often produces a useful self-critique, quiet though it
maybe.
In the context of this divided yet accommodated profession
called political science, American political theory has an unusual
place that is presently anomalous but potentially important. American political theory is not yet a discipline since those who say they
are engaged in the enterprise offer several competing versions,
none of which is adequate as a discipline because each is partialpartial in the double sense of being incomplete in its definition of
the project and of favoring or being biased toward one of the other
relevant disciplines in political science. This partiality is a result of
the history of political science in America.
Born as an American profession in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century (although the systematic study of politics
was born twenty-five hundred years ago in Greece), political science was at first heavily oriented toward the theoretical discussion

6

Chapter One

of American politics and political institutions.2 One could almost
say that the field we currently tend to call American political theory was in the beginning the core of American academic discourse
about politics. As the profession was gradually fragmented into
specializations, pieces of the total enterprise pulled away from this
core and developed distinct identities within the profession, often
defined by their own methodologies as well as by more narrowly
focused research. As a result, over the years American political theory has become almost a residual category, that which remains after everyone else has left.
The peculiar position of American political theory within political science can be illustrated in several ways. The American Political Science Association publishes a yearly membership directory
that lists its approximately ten thousand members in a variety of
ways, including by specialty. The association recognizes twenty-six
fields of interest, but American political theory is not one of them. 3
Still, virtually every political science department has someone
teaching American political theory, sometimes more than one person, and American political theory is usually part of the standard
introductory American government course. Yet the job listings almost never have ads recruiting scholars in American political theory. Instead, there is usually a sentence that lists American political
theory as one of several possibilities for ancillary interest in addition to the area or specialty for which the person will be hired.4 As
a result, those teaching American political theory tend to come to it
through the back door and lack a common disciplinary base.
Once, at a conference attended by nineteen well-published
scholars in American political theory, I asked the participants what
subjects they had been originally hired to teach. The responses included: American political theory (two), history of political
thought (two), public policy, political behavior, international relations, medieval political thought, methodology, constitutional law,
voting behavior, the presidency and congress, urban politics, public administration, public law, statistics, modem political theory,
state politics, and public choice. Although this sample was hardly
random, the phenomenon of teachers of American political theory
coming to the task from another part of the profession is familiar
enough to those of us involved that the sample is recognizable as
reasonably representative.
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Nor is this necessarily an unhealthy phenomenon; there is
much to be said for making American political theory the meeting
place of the discipline. Furthermore, the nature of American political theory is such that as an enterprise it must draw upon and relate to many or most of the specializations that have withdrawn
from it. Earlier reference was made to the critical potential of
American political theory, and this potential lies in using its natural
connectedness to the various disciplines within political science to
aid the development of a comprehensive, coherent study of political phenomena that moves beyond the current minimally accommodating, mutually suspicious, haphazardly reinforcing divided
activity.
One major purpose of this book is to offer a vision of a discipline called American political theory and its requirements from
its practitioners in terms of common preparation. The book is in
this sense a preface to a discipline, an invitation to an explicit, orderly discussion about what those of us who teach, think about,
and write in American political theory are doing and should do.
The intent, however, is not to erect fences within political science,
to create an orthodoxy, or to develop criteria for licensing practitioners in American political theory. Rather, anyone who is interested in pursuing the study of American political theory, those
scholars in another discipline (in the sense of a departmentalized
profession such as history or philosophy), other academics elsewhere in political science, or anyone outside of the academywhether they are students by matriculation, amateur interest, or
cross-disciplinary research-all are invited to view this book as an
aid to study, as an introduction to the topic, as a preface to a discipline struggling to be born.
What is American Political Theory?
The first step in our analysis is to reach a provisional understanding of the three terms that define the enterprise-American, political, and theory. Each term has multiple usages and meanings that
are confused and confounded, and therefore we must draw some
important distinctions. My strategy here is to lay out the major alternative understandings of each term and then to suggest which

8

Chapter One

of these apply most appropriately to the pursuit of American political theory. The discussion is designed to be useful and evocative
rather than to resolve the ambiguity and contradictions. If the discussion is successful, those readers who disagree with my position
will know precisely where the disagreement lies.
The term "theory" has in various contexts been used interchangeably with a number of other terms such as "philosophy,"
"thought," "ideology," and "hypothesis." For example, in everyday, ordinary language we often use the term in reference to a single statement that is contingent or hypothetical in nature. The classical formulation "If A, then B" is frequently termed a theory.
Certainly a hypothesis is a theoretical statement, but a theory worthy of the name comprises a number of logically linked statements,
not just one proposition. Implicit in such usage is the assumption
that a theory is something not yet proven or for which there is not
yet strong evidence. Perhaps this assumption results from the appropriation of the term from the physical sciences, where any
statement, even if supported by evidence, is still considered falsifiable and therefore contingent rather than demonstrably true. Yet
even in science, where all statements are to some extent contingent, "theory" is usually used in reference to a logically linked set
of propositions that has significant empirical support. That is, a
theory is both far more complex than a hypothesis because it is
composed of many statements and less contingent than a hypothesis because its propositions are former hypotheses that have been
to a greater or lesser extent supported by systematically gathered
evidence. For these two reasons it is improper to use "theory'' as
equivalent to "hypothesis"; one cannot speak sensibly of "American political hypotheses" as an enterprise.
One can speak of "American political thought," however, and
this is the phrase most commonly used in the titles of books that
supposedly introduce the subject. Certainly theoretical thinking is
the attempt to be thoughtful in the sense of seeking to be serious in
purpose, careful in reasoning, and cautious in reaching conclusions; moreover, "thought" does refer to the process of conceiving
ideas and of reflecting upon them or to the ideas that result from
reasoning. But theory is not the same thing as thought. Thought
encompasses the processes and results of spiritual meditation,
imaginative and creative invention, stream-of-consciousness ran-
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domness, conditioned cognitive responses, opinions based upon
prejudice, and untested or untestable common-sense propositions.
Theory, on the other hand, implies a careful, considered, logically
structured explanation for an event or events that is susceptible to
modification or rejection on the basis of further systematically presented information-either through empirical research (science) or
through the rigorous explication of implications (philosophy).
An examination of the prominent textbooks with American
political thought in the title shows that they typically contain either
partial texts by a large number of people expressing a wide range of
opinion or that they discuss a wide range of thinkers in some kind
of historical context. 5 In the case of edited collections, because the
arguments are usually just a part of a person's position, a complete
theory cannot be laid out. Not even the tenth essay of The Federalist
constitutes a reasonably complete theory. Thus, political thoughts
are presented that can encompass anything in the way of thought
just outlined. In the case of the history of ideas, the tendency is to
sacrifice the explication and discussion of theory and to replace it
with summaries of the changes in dominant patterns of political
thought. Such an approach also usually attempts to explain the
factors that caused the changes in the patterns of thought shared
by Americans at a given time.
A more careful examination of such books shows that they do
not claim to present political theory but to represent or describe the
ideas, principles, and opinions prevalent at a given time, among a
given people, in a given place. In short, these books offer purportedly representative thoughts of certain groups or certain eras of
American history or both. Such representations can be significant
and are useful in a basic descriptive sense, but they do not constitute theory. The editors of such volumes, in the selection of their titles, tend to be very straightforward and honest about their goal,
but the implications of such an introduction to American political
theory are not helpful.
First, to use a book on political thought as an introduction to
American political theory implies either that there is no difference
between theory and thought or that there is no such thing as political theory. Second, such a presentation implies that the thoughts
of all those writers in the book somehow have equal or equivalent
theoretical status. Third, by implication theoretical importance is
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reduced to or confounded with its impact on the popular thought
of an era, thus suggesting that ideas in general are rooted in and
relevant only to particular historical circumstances. Let us consider
each implication briefly in tum.
If no difference exists between theory and thought, then on
what grounds are we to urge our students to seek deeper levels of
understanding and more rigorous logical explanations? If teachers
using such books do not point out the superior reasoning in one
piece compared with another, regardless of the position being defended, then we might just as well let students go home, utter anything they wish, and mail them a degree. If there is no theory, then
not only can there be no philosophical discourse about politics,
there can be no science of politics either.
Nor is it helpful to suggest to students that all political
thoughts have equivalent theoretical status. It is one thing for
teachers to be patient with students who in their attempts at learning utter the silly or the banal; it is another thing to hold up to
these students as a model of political discourse an amorphous melange that mixes the good with the bad and the ugly. Theory is
built around an exploration of deeper, more fundamantal issues,
and mixing theory with superficial political expostulations will understandably lead a student to conclude that the political correctness of a thought is more important than the reasoning that
led to it.
The view that all thoughts on politics are equivalent in value is
related to the confusion caused by confounding the importance of
a theory with its impact on a given historical period. Any theory
worthy of the name is a claim for some truth that transcends not
only its historical era but also its culture and the intent of its discoverer. Good theory can be used by people of different ideologies,
from different nations, and for opposing interests. For example,
empirical theories about the impact of different electoral systems
on party systems or the relative merits of congressional and parliamentary modes of organizing the legislature can be used by people
on any continent in any year. Likewise, theories linking political institutions with preferred political outcomes can transcend the historical era and its place of origin. For an interesting example, one
could compare John C. Calhoun's theory of the concurrent majority from the 1840s with the theory of black power enunciated in the
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1960s. A striking similarity exists between a theory devised in support of slavery in the American south and a much later theory devised to advance the control of African Americans over their destiny. The point here is not to claim that Stokely Carmichael got his
idea for black power from Calhoun; rather, it is to argue that
Calhoun's theory could be used by others of a completely different
persuasion because this transcendence is vital to good theory. It is
one thing to ask about the historical impact of an idea or a theory at
a particular time at a particular place and an entirely different thing
to ask for the meaning and implications of a theory that is not necessarily bounded by time, place, or interest.
Failure to distinguish the meaning of a theory from its immediate historical impact is partly responsible for the tendency-now
common among historians and political scientists-to confuse theory with ideology. 6 This confusion is based upon two premises:
first, that all human ideas are conditioned by some aspect of the
human environment, and second, that ideological thinking differs
from nonideological thinking primarily by being more coherent in
its logical structuring.
In its broad form the first premise holds that ideas do not have
an independent existence but are reflections of processes and
events in the material world. In its narrow form it holds that political theories are only ideas devised to protect, advance, and justify
specific political interests at a particular time in history. For now it
is sufficient to suggest that even if all political thinking is initially at
the service of historical interests (a highly debatable presumption),
political theory refers to political thinking that has a content and
structure that allows it to be used by different, even opposing, interests at different points in history. If there is such a phenomenon,
then political theory describes it, and a theory is distinguishable
from an ideology-with the latter term reserved to describe the
phenomenon of political thinking that is only in the service of a
particular interest at a particular time.
This notion of particularity, of course, is the minimal basis for
distinction. One might want to argue for a more definite distinction on the grounds that even though much or most political thinking is in the service of particular historical interests, some of this
thinking may be of such a content and a structure that it can be
used in a variety of historical settings by people with a variety of
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interests. Furthermore, it is perfectly possible that some political
thinking can be devised that neither originates from narrow political interests nor is used directly in support of specific political interests. Put another way, political theory of some types may be so
inherently opposed to supporting specific interests that it cannot
be used for historically conditioned purposes. For now we will simply leave open this possibility, if for no other reason than that its
status is one of the fundamental problems addressed by American
political theory.
The second premise underlying the confusion between theory
and ideology is descriptively correct but is often the basis for a
faulty deduction. Ideologies do in fact have a logical structure that
is similar to and often indistinguishable from that of theory. Political scientists speak of ideologies as being belief systems whose
propositions are constrained or linked by an often elaborate logic.
For example, in the study of voting behavior those voters who can
give an explanation for their vote in terms of a set of propositions
that are structured by a coherent, recognizable logic are termed
"ideological voters." 7 These ideologies are recognizable to most
students as "isms," such as liberalism, conservativism, communism, and so forth. Since these ideologies have internal structures
the same as or similar to theories and since these ideologies usually can be attributed in origin to some well-known political theorist such as John Locke, Edmund Burke, or Karl Marx, the straightforward deduction emerges that ideologies are theories, and thus
theories must be ideologies.
Undoubtedly theories can be used as ideologies, but are theories automatically ideologies? The confusion results from comparing the internal structures of theories and ideologies instead of
considering the purpose and the psychological status of each. Another line of study has determined that one key attribute of an ideology is the tendency of its holder to use it for psychological protection. 8 That is, ideologies are elaborate rationalizations that help
protect the individual's ego by helping that person deal with a
complicated, changing world, by assisting in the creation and
maintenance of a self-image, and by aiding in the processing of
new, unfamiliar information. In short, ideologies are simply a
more elaborate form of rationalization arising not from the need to
protect one's objective interests but from psychological needs not
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necessarily tied to one's objective interests. Ideologies, from this
point of view, arise from irrational needs.
This contrasting view of ideology serves to drive another
wedge between ideology and theory. On the one hand, ideology is
seen as the rational inclination to protect one's material interests;
on the other hand, ideologies are viewed as serving one's irrational
psychological needs, even at the expense of material interests. In
this second view ideologies are used to filter out information that
conflicts with the already existing view of the world, the self, and
the place of the self in the world. Once formed, ideologies are resistant to change since the ego is so heavily invested in the existing
belief system. This strong tendency for ideology to be resistant to
factual information or to reasoned argument or to both really defines the phenomenon. Political theory provides a logical explanation for political events and processes that is by definition susceptible to change or to rejection on the basis of facts or arguments or
both; ideology is a theory or theory-like belief system (that is, a
structured argument) that is used for psychological protection such
that it is resistant to alteration by facts or by reasoned argument.
Political theories may be used as ideologies, but they are not
automatically ideologies. Part of the problem for theory that arises
from the behavioral literature of political science results from the
quite proper conclusion by behaviorists that since natural science
proceeds on the basis of observables and since we can observe behavior but not motives, we cannot attribute a motive to an individual with any degree of scientific certainty. Thus we cannot behaviorally distinguish a structured argument that is being used to
justify a material interest from one being used to defend the ego or
distinguish either of these from one being used to seek truth. A
problem arises from using the term ideology to describe voters
with apparent theories: It simultaneously attributes them with two
contradictory views of ideology, rational interest-seeking versus irrational ego protection, but leaves no room for truth-seeking. Unless the possibility of truth-seeking, and thus of theory, is allowed,
however, one must attribute the same ideological purpose to behavioral research, in which case the work of empirical political science must either be viewed as in the service of some material interest of the behaviorists or else be seen as serving to satisfy some
irrational need of the researcher.
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The relationship of theory to ideology is thus such that a theory can be used as an ideology, but theory and ideology are not the
same since theory is in some sense always truth-seeking, something that by definition ideology cannot be (although an ideology
could be correct or true by accident). A final, important distinction
remains to be made between theory and philosophy, a distinction
that raises some serious questions for American political theory as
a discipline.
It is a matter of more than passing interest that one never
reads or hears of American political philosophy. The phrase seems
somehow pretentious or inappropriate, but the unwillingness to
use it has serious implications. It is standard in the political science
literature to look upon the activities of political philosophers as being essentially normative; their concern is with moral, ethical, or
value judgments.9 This view distinguishes political philosophy
from the empirical tasks of describing and explaining political phenomena, termed political science. Since the most prominent
American political theorists include men like James Madison,
Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams-who were directly involved
in some aspect of our nation's founding-any refusal to call them
political philosophers implies that the founding of our political
system did not involve normative considerations, that our political
system was not designed to be "good," and also that no one since
then has been concerned with the manner and extent to which our
political system might be considered good. Obviously this is not
true. Thus to the extent that American political thought has included concern for matters like virtue, the goodness or badness of
public policy, and the justice or worth of our national political institutions and processes, American political theory is open to the
possibility of concerning itself with political philosophy.
Some scholars would argue that although they are willing to
include normative concerns under the term American political theory, the absence in American political thinking of architectonic political philosophies of the kind associated with Plato, Aristotle,
Locke, Marx, or Mill justifies our not using American political philosophy as the description of our enterprise. This softened position is open to two criticisms, however. First, Plato, Aristotle, and
other recognized philosophers did not argue that the creation of
large, complicated theories was needed before the term "philoso-
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phy'' could be applied to the effort. Instead, philosophy has always been viewed as a process of seeking the truth, not as the production of grandiose texts. Second, this position begs one of the
critical questions that American political theory must considerthe extent to which American politics has been guided by normative concerns, the extent to which it should be so governed, and by
what values. In sum, even if there are no identifiable individuals in
American history with the philosophical stature of a Plato or an
Aristotle, the possibility still obtains that this book should more
properly be entitled A Preface to American Political Philosophy.
Political philosophy properly understood is not opposed to the
empirical study of politics; instead, political philosophy includes
political science. This can be illustrated by considering the various
questions that a student of politics might ask. First, one might ask
for a description of how current political institutions and processes
work; a response would involve a descriptive task that falls under
empirical political science. One could then ask how change in political institutions occurs, including how and why our current ones
came into being. These are also empirical questions, but they require an explanatory rather than a descriptive response.
Humans engage in science primarily because they prefer to
understand their situation rather than to remain ignorant. Furthermore, humans developed language, culture, social systems, and
institutions for making collective decisions. Language allowed the
creation of culture through which to pass knowledge from generation to generation. Culture, over time, permitted the creation of
large, stable societies, which required institutions to maintain and
to give them direction. This in tum required making choices, and
politics was developed to replace choice imposed by force and violence with choice based upon persuasion.
The art of persuasion is known as rhetoric; political rhetoric
aims at winning the arguments about which direction a society
should take. In classical Greece rhetoric spawned a competitor that
sought not merely to win the argument but to provide an understanding of which direction society should take. Political philosophy was based upon the search for the good political system. Rhetoric was intended to teach individuals how to be persuasive in
support of their narrow interests, but political philosophy was intended to teach them how to be persuasive in support of broader,

16

Chapter One

shared human ends. Indeed, the belief that all humans had vital
ends that they shared was the ground from which political philosophy arose.
Political philosophy required that a distinction be made between people's real needs and what they thought they wanted
without proper reflection. It also required that we understand the
nature of politics, its institutions and processes, and the range of
possibilities open to humans on an imperfect earth. Aristotle organized political questions in a way that can be illustrated by a continuum representing an infinite number of possible-states-of-affairs merging into one another and arranged by their relative
closeness to an ideal.
B
A
C
- - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - + IDEAL

Aristotle argues that first one must have a standard by which to
evaluate the present, and it seems reasonable to use the best standard, the ideal. The first task, then, is to analyze the implication of
the ideal and to determine why the ideal is worth pursuing. The
former is an analytical undertaking; the latter is a normative one.
The ideal defines the end of the continuum, but the nature of the
human situation is such that it is not possible to have the ideal in the
real world as opposed to the world of ideas. The question, then, is to
ask how closely the ideal can be approached in the real world (represented by point A). The answer involves a prudential calculation
based upon the best empirical information available and a clear understanding of the goals and ideals relevant to the decision. For example, if our ideal is justice, to approach it too closely might entail
serious compromise with respect to the ideals of equality or stability.
That is, since no one ideal, and thus no one continuum, can encompass all that is of value to humans, a highly developed sense of the
normative must be brought to bear on the available information in
order to answer this question.
Point B represents our place on the continuum at the moment.
lliis determination must be made empirically, but note that without a normative context, the continuum to define the situation,
this empirical question cannot be sensibly answered. Point C represents the point where we wish to go next, in part because it is
closer to the ideal and in part because we wish to test what hap-
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pens when we move closer to the ideal. Empirical political science
has as one of its aims the ability to tell us how to adjust institutions
in order to move from B to C, but the reasons that we might want
to do so belong more properly in the realm that some call critical
theory, which is a manifestation of normative theory. 10
Thus, in Aristotle's conceptualization, empirical political science is a part of the total analysis encompassed by political philosophy, rather than being in opposition to it. Political theory cannot
be isolated from political philosophy, since its three forms-empirical theory, analytic theory, and normative theory-are each subparts of the general philosophical program. Political philosophy
can be called the enterprise that encompasses, indeed requires, all
three forms of theory. Political theory can thus be used as a linguistic alternative to political philosophy, even though the latter is a
whole and the former implies parts of the same whole.
The word "theory" in the book's title is intended not only to
signal the possibility of there being an American political philosophy or philosophies but also to imply that the enterprise includes
all three forms of theoretical discourse.

What Is American Political Theory?
American political theory as a discipline should be defined by the
systematic, cumulative activities of scholars engaged in the common enterprise of studying American politics theoretically. Yet
even this seemingly tautological description hides a serious ambiguity that prevents American political theory from becoming a true
discipline. The ambiguity results from the widely noted lack of a
definition for politics to use as a focus for the common enterprise .11
There has been a varied response to this lack of a common definition. Some scholars turn it into a virtue by arguing that any attempt to define politics is a waste of time and energy at best and is
probably dangerous because it prematurely limits the scope of
study.12 Most scholars working in political science or American political theory probably accept this position or its variant, that because of continued definitional diversity the best we can do is to
define political science as the field that political scientists study,
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and thus politics is whatever those who study it say it is.13 Still, despite the general belief that a definition is dangerous or unnecessary, most scholars writing theoretically about politics feel compelled to associate themselves with some definition, perhaps in
uneasy agreement with E.E. Schattschneider's caution that
there is something strange about the feeling of scholars that a
definition [of politics] is not necessary. Inevitably there is a
lack of focus in the discipline because it is difficult to see
things that are undefined. People who cannot define the object of their studies do not know what they are looking for, and
if they do not know what they are looking for, how can they
tell when they have found it?
Schattschneider then compares political science without a definition of politics to "a mountain of data surrounding a vacuum." 14
Schattschneider is probably correct in his intuition that a definition is needed but too demanding in his expectations for that
definition. Certainly any definition should permit us in general to
distinguish the political from the nonpolitical, but it is not clear
that the definition needs to be so precise that it allows no room for
argument. Indeed, more explicit argument about the nature of politics should be allowed by any definition since such arguments are
the essence of politics. With this in mind, we shall briefly examine
a number of prominent definitions, develop a characterization of
politics from them that quietly informs contemporary political science, and then show how American political theory has an implicit
operational definition of politics that is both consistent with this
characterization and less problematic in its provisions for distinguishing the political from the nonpolitical.
Let us begin by considering a number of characterizations that
have been advanced by prominent students of politics.15 The first is
representative of a more traditional approach to the study of
American politics that predominated before the mid-1950s. "The
central point of attention in American political science . . . is that
part of the affairs of the state which centers in government, and
that kind or part of government which speaks through law''
(Charles S. Hyneman).16 Hyneman's characterization emphasizes
the importance of laws and institutions to politics, although his
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first four words allow for much more to be included on the periphery of attention. Still, critics of such a view argue for a definition
that allows more prominent inclusion of processes that are less formally, less directly part of governmental institutions. Initially such
critics were especially interested in adding political parties, interest
groups, and bureaucratic decision making to the central framework
of American political theory; a decision-making approach seemed
most useful toward this end.
"Politics or the political includes the events that happen
around the decision-making centers of government" (Alfred de
Grazia). 17 De Grazia's characterization retains the link between politics and governmental institutions but opens up the political to include events that might affect governmental decision making. Economic and social processes that impinge on decision making thus
become fair game, or fairer game since it is not clear that Hyneman's definition excludes such considerations beyond denying
their centrality for study. A decision-making approach has a number of other virtues, not the least of which is its more explicit introduction of the study of conflict and cooperation into political analysis. In sum, a decision-making definition of politics is broader and
more inclusive than a definition that emphasizes governmental institutions and introduces more explicitly the notions of social process, conflict, and cooperation into the study of politics.
For a long while, however, some scholars had been concerned
that a definition that limited politics to the governmental was unduly narrow for political scientists who wanted to study a broader
range of phenomena. For example, it was argued, political scientists might encounter tribal societies that lacked formal governmental institutions, but they should be free to study such societies.
In retrospect this example offered a strange basis upon which to argue for a definition of politics that denied the centrality of governmental institutions for politics. By the time political science became
a profession in the twentieth century the number of people living
in a tribal condition was extremely small and rapidly disappearing.
Political scientists tend to have cognate fields of study toward
which their research opens, whether it be history, sociology, philosophy, psychology, or anthropology, and sometimes political scientists will find a need to enter this cognate field completely in
their research. Why could not those studying tribal societies admit
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that they were in effect anthropologists studying prepolitical phenomena? Their insistence upon a definition of politics that included a form of social organization that once had been profoundly
important and interesting but that now had become largely
ephemeral did not advance the study of tribal forms very much; instead it led to a view of politics that could no longer be used to distinguish the political from the nonpolitical. Whatever the extent to
which the anthropological view rested upon the study of tribal society, the virtual disappearance of pure tribal organization into settings conditioned by governmental institutions has rendered this
anthropological need for a noninstitutional definition of politics,
indeed the entire approach, moribund.
A more lasting and coherent position in favor of a broad definition of politics views human behavior as constituting a seamless
web that can be analyzed in all its parts, using relatively few concepts. Since political scientists are greatly interested in power,
some have argued that power is the essence of the political.
"The political process is the shaping, distribution, and exercise of power. . . . Political science is concerned with power in general" (Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan). 18 Lasswell and Kaplan's definition is intuitively appealing, and it really is difficult to
think of a political decision, process, or situation that does not involve power. Yet it is possible to think of many situations involving
power that are not political. Throwing a shot-put involves power,
but if throwing the put is also political then we have lost all ability
to distinguish the political from the nonpolitical, and we no longer
have a useful, functioning definition. The example, some readers
will say, is unfair since it confuses physical power with political
power, but Lasswell and Kaplan's definition does not make such a
distinction. Nor does their definition distinguish between being
robbed at gunpoint and serving on a jury or between the use of
military force and the Supreme Court's applying the U.S. Bill of
Rights against the states. All are included as political phenomena
so that it is now perfectly sensible to speak of the "politics of the
family." Some political scientists may be happy with a definition
that supports acts of professional imperialism whenever it strikes
our fancy, but the word "politics" is inherited from Greek origins
that made such distinctions precisely because politics was the replacement of force with persuasion and because politics involved
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the marriage or blending of justice with power. The definition of
politics as simply powe~ then, is analytically useless since it cannot distinguish the political from the nonpolitical, linguistically
barbarous since it empties an old term of its normal meaning, and
empirically problematic since we are unable to apply the term
without solving the analytic and linguistic problems.
Perhaps for these reasons, except for a general agreement that
politics always includes power, today relatively few political scientists equate politics with power. William Bluhm's definition of politics is interesting since it includes power as part of a broader decision-making approach: "Reduced to its universal elements, then,
politics is a social process characterized by activity involving rivalry
and cooperation in the exercise of power, and culminating in the
making of decisions for a group. " 19
Although Lasswell and Kaplan's definition is not used much
anymore, David Easton's definition is widely accepted and used by
political scientists: "Political life consists of those actions related to
the authoritative allocation of values for a society. "1D The term "values" refers to anything upon which humans place a value,
whether material, spiritual, or symbolic, and thus the definition
looks at first like an inclusive one; however, the key operative word
would appear to be "authoritative." If power refers to the ability of
A to get B to do something B would otherwise not do, authority refers to the exercise of power by A that is viewed by B as legitimate. 21
Thus, a robber does not legitimately take my money, but under
properly political conditions the tax man legitimately does so. It is
difficult to see how authority can exist apart from governmental institutions if one is allocating values in such a way that the allocation is viewed as legitimate by an entire society, and thus Easton's
definition does not really differ much from Hyneman's in its
breadth or in its implications.
In any case, the easy affinity between Hyneman's and Easton's
definitions is illustrated in other definitions generated by political
scientists in an attempt to understand the object of their study.
Alan C. Isaak offers a good example: "Politics has something to do
with the use of power to reconcile conflicts over the distribution of
goods and values. Typically, this is done through the institutions
of government." 22 Note that most of the language from the decision-making approach is also present in Isaak's definition, al-
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though the use of "distribution'' here, just as the use of "allocation" in Easton's definition, has some troubling implications.
Primarily, the implication is that politics somehow works from the
. top down, going from the authorities to those below them; in contrast, a pure decision-making language implies that a group of
people in a horizontal relationship can reach a collective decision
on their own without reference to a hierarchy. Also, many decisions, such as electing people to office, amending a constitution,
and deciding whether a person is guilty of a crime, are made by an
electorate or a jury and are not distributions or allocations of values
as much as they are the defining of, the exercising of, and the imposing of values from below. Since much of politics in America depends upon these "values from below," a definition of politics useful for American political theory might be better served by
decision-making language.
Also missing from these definitions are the two notions that
politics is at minimum the substitution of persuasion for force and
that in its complete sense politics is the process of seeking the good
life, or eudaemonia. Theorists such as Christian Bay update this second notion of Aristotle's by arguing that politics involves the building of a just community based upon fundam~ntal human needs
that are both material and spiritual. 23
One can see in Isaak the straining toward a definition that on
the one hand includes everything that needs to be included and on
the other excludes what needs to be excluded. Politics has "something to do'' with power and conflict, and "typically" governmental institutions are involved. That most recent definitions of politics
contain such strained construction does not reflect the lack of consensus among political scientists about the constitution of politics;
rather, it reflects the difficulty of precisely defining anything so
amorphous. Nor does the difficulty suggest that we should do
without a definition, since, for example, research on American politics does not require a definition that can cover tribal society. Indeed, any useful definition in the American context will describe
politics as we practice it.
David W. Minar correctly notes that the American political system is above all constitutional, which explains why so many books
on American political theory contain "constitution'' in their titles
and why American political theory seems naturally to gravitate to-
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ward an analysis that includes discussion of the founding era.
Though Minar's definition is not entirely felicitous, it points us in
an interesting direction: "By politics we mean a process for the
seeking of authoritative solutions to social problems, by constitution, a generalized guide to this process. " 24
The cramped prose reflects an attempt to include the basics of
Easton's definition, a sign of its hold on mainstream political science. Yet if we consider Easton's phrase "authoritative allocation of
value" and ask what aspect of American politics makes anything
authoritative, the answer has to be popular consent as embodied
in a constitution.
American political theory has always worked implicitly from
an operational definition of politics based on constitutionalism;
that is, politics consists of processes conditioned by a written constitution. In other words, in order for something to be considered
political, it must be brought under the description of the constitution. Obviously this means that institutions described in the constitution are political, but so are processes that are related to the
operation of those institutions. Thus, political parties are political
because they operate in the context of elections, and elections are
constitutionally conditioned. Without the constitution, there
would be no elections and thus no parties. Interest groups operate
in the context of elections or of the branches of government created
by the constitution. Bureaucratic processes are political if the bureaucracy belongs to an executive branch created by a constitution
and charged with the task of carrying out legislation passed by another constitutional creation-the legislature.
Our federal structure creates national, state, and local constitutions so that we have politics in all of these arenas. Until and unless an issue is brought under the constitutional umbrella, until it
is brought into the public realm, it remains in the private or nonpolitical realm. Congress can appropriate an issue to the public, constitutional realm by passing legislation affecting that activity, or it
can move the issue back into the private sphere. In the same way
the Supreme Court can interpret the Constitution so as to include
or remove an issue from the political realm. Much constitutional
controversy, including matters of rights, occurs in debate over
whether issues should be defined as political rather than as
private.
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The use of constitutionalism to define politics in America is
also an efficient and effective way of including issues that most political scientists wish to include as political phenomena while at the
same time denoting the nonpolitical with reasonable clarity. In another context I laid out the purposes for which Americans write
constitutions; in this context these purposes serve to define the
core of the political for American political theory. 25 Any American
constitution worthy of the name will
1. Define a way of life-the values, major principles, and definition of justice toward which a people aim
2. Create and/or define the people of the community so
directed
3. Define the political institutions, the process of collective decision making, to be instrumental in achieving the way of lifein other words, define a form of government
4. Define the regime, the public, and citizenship
5. Establish the basis for the authority of the regime
6. Distribute political power
7. Structure conflict so it can be managed
8. Limit governmental power.
Here we have a summary of the meaning of politics. Matters
that most political scientists want to include are here included-if
not explicitly, then by direct implication. Any behavior relevant to
the definition of politics contained in a constitution is political behavior. Questions of philosophy or of theory relevant to this definition of politics are part of political philosophy or political theory.
State and urban politics, intergovernmental relations, presidential
and legislative studies, parties and pressure groups, elections and
public opinion, constitutional law and judicial process, public policy and public administration-everything now considered part of
the study of American politics is included. The definition is also
flexible because constitutions can be amended or replaced to include new institutions, include different values, redistribute political power, or alter the understanding of citizenship so that, for example, matters of race, gender, ethnicity, morals, or economics that
were not before considered part of politics become political and
thus part of the material that political scientists study.
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Ultimately, the empirical study of politics boils down to the
search for patterns or regularities in human behavior. We conduct
such a search because we wish to understand the grounding for
such behavior but also because we hope to use our understanding
of these patterns and regularities for prediction. In political science
prediction proceeds at several levels. At the most superficial level
we wish to predict the outcome of specific historical events, such as
elections, legislative roll calls, or judicial decisions, to name just a
few examples. As social scientists we have deeper, more important
goals, however-predicting across several events to define the
probable consequences of a policy and predicting across an even
wider range of events to define the probable operation and consequences of institutions and political processes. This last level is
that of constitutionalism and constitutional design.
As we move from more specific to more general problems of
prediction, a sound political science is likely to be more helpful because it is not necessary that prediction go beyond the most general, statistical level, which means that a fruitful empirical political
science can be of much greater assistance for those interested in
constitutional design than for those interested in winning a given
election.
The link between the empirical study of politics and constitutional design has three interesting potential consequences. First,
the relative importance of an empirical study can be gauged by the
possibility that it can contribute to our understanding of policy or
of institutional outcomes, which may help winnow the wheat from
the chaff in our major journals. The more a particular study helps
us understand and predict policy and institutional consequences,
the more useful it is for constitutionalism.26
Second, such a link argues for more attention to the integrative
study of empirical research already completed. There is a myriad
of research that remains largely unconnected with respect to major
theoretical implications. The time may have come to give more
weight and journal space to studies that "clean up" the literature,
with a view to developing useful generalizations rather than new
findings; this will in tum suggest key areas for further empirical research. '1:J Such analysis is likely to be improved by using a constitutional approach.
Third, to the extent that constitutional design requires that we
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make choices about the ends or consequences that are worth pursuing, we can put empirical research in the context of normative
concerns without either denigrating or warping the empirical enterprise itself. In short, the use of constitutionalism to define the
political has deeply integrative functions.
One peculiar strength of using constitutionalism to define the
political is that instead of imposing an analytic scheme upon empirical data, constitutionalism works from an empirical base. That
is, no one has sat down and abstracted a definition to which the
real world must then conform. Rather, constitutions are historical
facts that rest upon and encode generations of behavior. Although
the basics of constitutionalism are now well understood, actual
constitutions will vary in content from place to place and from time
to time. Thus, the composition of the political is always changing
at the margin as constitutional political systems operate. Business
corporations come to be, for a time, protected by the due process
clause, and then the protection is withdrawn. Constitutionalism
has not changed, but the constitution has, and political controversy over such issues becomes the very definition of politics.
What Is American Political Theory?
If our intent is to elaborate a discipline that addresses a peculiarly
American approach to the theoretical study of politics, it quickly
becomes apparent why the birth will be a struggle. American political theory is not just the theoretical study of American politics but
is also the study of American theory with its distinctive premises,
questions, and methods. This is an important distinction because
one premise underlying the argument here is that American political theory is not the simple application of European political theory
to the study of American phenomena. Rather, there is a recognizable American political theory, or set of theories, with which European thought overlaps but does not determine. American political
theory has a basis that is to a significant degree independent of European antecedents, and this independent base, among other reasons, to a large extent explains why Americans have attempted to
develop a functioning science of politics while the Europeans have
not. 28
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The hypothesis of American particularism is not currently
popular among historians, and it certainly smacks of an ethnocentrism that provokes phobic reactions among most intellectuals
these days; but in the long run we diminish neither ourselves nor
others by attempting to understand what we have done and are
doing as Americans. Indeed, understanding ourselves is as important for understanding others as understanding others is for understanding ourselves. The danger of developing a self-satisfied
smugness is not the major source of difficulty inherent in the thesis of American particularism, however. Rather, we must avoid the
twin but opposite dangers of seeing no significance of American
political theory for politics elsewhere or of failing to note the limits
of applying American political theory to other peoples in different
circumstances. In short, American particularism results in historically original and important contributions by American political
theory, but those contributions have limited although definite application elsewhere.
American political theory is not simply political theory written
by Americans. For example, one of the most interesting theoretical
treatments of American politics was written by a FrenchmanAlexis de Tocqueville's two-volume work Democracy in America. Few
texts of this type in American political theory are written by Americans or non-Americans; indeed, one might argue that there are no
great texts in American political theory equivalent in sweep and
depth to the works of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau, Marx, or Mill. 29 There are, instead,
many small texts written by many hands, and a good number of
the most important are the products of committees. Moreover, a
major portion of American political theory is contained in public
documents that speak institutionally rather than philosophically.
In the classification of intellectual endeavors, American political
theory is a distinct genus within the phylum of political philosophy. Perhaps it would be better to term it a genre, since the kinds
of texts that define American political theory differ as a genre from
the other texts used in political theory in general.
American political theory can also be viewed as our discourse
over a set of institutions and processes that are historically distinctive and important. To this day the British, from whom we split off,
do not understand the institution of federalism that we developed
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as a functioning institution and gave to the world. Americans also
invented the institutionalized separation of powers and the mechanistic system of checks and balances. Americans invented the written constitution, modem bills of rights, and declarations of independence. The presidential system, nonparliamentary legislatures,
an independent judiciary, popular sovereignty, universal suffrage,
mass political parties, organized interest groups, and the constitutional amendment process are just a few more examples of institutions and processes that define American politics, and the discourse about such processes could be seen as defining American
political theory.
The American genus might also be defined by a set of values,
questions, and issues that underlies, informs, and directs discussion in the texts surrounding our distinctive political institutions
and processes. Or it might be defined as an approach to political
discourse, an instinctive American preference for reliance upon experience, a pragmatic preference for that which solves problems
over that which is merely logical, and an inclination to empiricism
coupled with a sense of mastery over our collective destiny that
makes political science a natural and persistent goal for American
political theory.
Whether defined as a set of texts, a set of institutions, a set of
values and issues, or as a distinctive approach to political discourse, American political theory has at its center a tradition of
constitutionalism; and this core is both a strength and a weakness.
It is a strength, in part, because we are clearer about the limits of
political discourse and the nature of politics. It is a weakness because its diffuse, multifaceted character and the large number of
texts by which it is carried make it impossible to readily insert
American political theory into the broader enterprise of political
thought of the world at large. We are partially insulated, some
would say distanced, from the rest of the world by our particularism; and at the same time passing this diffuse, demanding tradition on to our children grows more and more difficult.
This preface to a discipline is intended to help ease these problems, to make our tradition of political discourse more accessible to
ourselves and to others. The various lists, especially those of texts,
are intended to introduce American political theory rather than to
close off discussion about material that should be included. Above
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all, unlike other books that serve as introductions to American political theory, this one is more properly a preface since it discusses a
subject that is often improperly taken for granted but that must be
consciously brought to the fore if we are to make headway in defining and passing on a discipline of American political theory.
That discipline can now be provisionally defined as the normative, analytic, and empirical study of American texts, institutions, processes, issues, and values derived from and defined by its
constitutional tradition. American political theory thus embraces
the various types of theory, a variety of phenomena for study, and
several quite different methodologies. The mental discipline includes not only becoming competent in these different areas but
also the willingness and ability to refuse any temptation to disregard relevant work because it uses a different methodology or focuses upon a different type of data. Ultimately American political
theory must strive to be integrative, and perhaps part of the mental
discipline it requires is the willingness and ability to take abuse
from the several quarters where it intrudes.
The interlocking network of American national and state constitutions as it evolves over time defines the boundary of American
political theory. As a result these constitutions serve as the place
where we must begin. The study of elections, parties, the presidency, legislatures, public opinion, and so on are part of American
political science precisely because our constitutions create a political system that includes, requires, or allows them. Constitutions
serve the double purpose of embodying and codifying what we
have learned from past behavioral regularities in political behavior,
and at the same time the summary of preferred or expected behavior contained in these constitutions helps structure and explain future political behavior. Thus, American political theory must start
with the texts of American constitutional documents and the explanatory texts written around these documents, of which The Federalist is a prime example.
Certain problems are inherent in the study of American political texts, however, some resulting from the nature of texts in general and others from the nature of American political texts in particular. The next step in exploring a preface to American political
theory, therefore, involves a discussion of textual analysis.

Chapter 2

American Political Texts
and Their Analysis

Political theory begins with the analysis of texts, and American political theory has a series of peculiar problems because of the texts
upon which it is based. First, constitutionalism defines American
political theory at its core, and American constitutional documents
are therefore among its central texts. These documents cannot be
analyzed in the same way as philosophical texts, however.
Philosophical writing usually aims at pushing thinking and
understanding to higher levels or into unexplored regions, and
new words or concepts are frequently developed to describe or explain ideas for which our old vocabulary is inadequate; the reasoning is often subtle, complex, and somewhat at odds with currently
accepted modes of thought. When we read the philosophical texts
from the past that are considered to be outstanding works or
"great books," their greatness may affect us to the extent that their
contents become part of our present thinking, but there is still a
singularity, an originality to the texts that leads us to associate certain ideas or perspectives with specific thinkers. Yet we continue to
read these outstanding philosophical works not only to familiarize
new generations with the important, distinctive ideas they contain
but also because the authors are such good exemplars of how to
apply theoretical analysis; their thinking is so profound that we
hope to learn even more than we did on our last reading. These
thinkers are distinguished by such deep patterns of thought that
we can find in their works meaning that seems almost bottomless,
and sometimes we rightly conclude that the deeper meanings,
which we uncover in a text only after an arduous analysis on our
part, were intended by the author to be found only by careful read30
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ers. That is, philosophical texts have deeper structures of meaning
that are not accessible to casual readers, and elaborate theories of
textual analysis have been developed to aid us in finding these
deeper meanings. 1
Viewed as texts, political documents differ from philosophical
ones in almost every respect. Political documents in a constitutional tradition by definition are aimed at a broad public, a readership composed of the general citizenry, rather than at a relative few
people who are skilled at careful reading. Furthermore, these documentary texts are not primarily supposed to create and present
new ideas, although sometimes this is part of their purpose, but to
summarize, encapsulate, codify, interpret, reinterpret, modify, extend, or merely celebrate ideas and concepts that are already generally understood and accepted by most citizens. The great texts of
American constitutionalism, for example, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the national Bill of Rights, are
great, not because of their originality but because they successfully
summarize important ideas and concepts that were the widely accepted core of American political thinking at the time they were
drawn up. 2 Therefore the language used in these documents is not
usually new or original in meaning but unexceptional and part of
the ordinary language of the time. Constitutional documents must
be tied to ordinary language because by definition they rest upon
the consent of the citizens. If such documents cannot be understood by the citizens, if they contain secret or hidden meaning,
then the citizens cannot be said to have given their consent to the
texts, and thus the documents are not constitutional. That is, their
status as texts rests upon popular acceptance, and anything that
seriously interferes with this consent renders the texts politically
meaningless.
Furthermore, citizens can approve a political text without seeing all of its possible consequences-consequences that may have
been intended as well as unforeseen. For example, not all Americans at the time of ratification anticipated the doctrine of "implied
powers" that would be derived from Article 1, Section 8, paragraph
18 of the U.S. Constitution. Despite Antifederalist warnings, many
did not understand the "spirit of consolidation" in the Constitution's design. Still, whatever was intended, the words "necessary
and proper'' could be interpreted in several different ways, and
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whichever interpretation won was a function of political struggle
and not of some hidden meaning. That is, the victory of one reading over another did not rest upon a meaning that an average person could not see as possible, given an ordinary understanding of
the language.
In sum, in a constitutional tradition such as ours, political texts
that form the core around which our theoretical thinking is built
must be read for their commonly understood surface meaning,
tend to contain currently accepted modes of thought rather than
ideas original for the time, may be singular in the power or efficiency of their expression but cannot be idiosyncratic, are aimed at
a general public rather than at a select few, frequently are important to us not because of their depth or excellent expression but because they have been ratified by popular consent, and inevitably
have been composed by groups or committees rather than by single authors.
A given document subjected to textual analysis usually expresses only a portion of a coherent theory rather than a theoretical
position that is worked out comprehensively. American political
theory moreover generally lacks the great philosophical tracts associated with European political theory; instead, we have several assembled and partial texts such as The Federalist that not only require
a somewhat different form of textual analysis but also require that
we face the question of what constitutes a complete text. Finally,
texts in American political theory frequently borrow from European texts, but Americans, working from their particularistic circumstances, have tended to use European texts selectively and in
piecemeal fashion.
The inclination of Americans to appropriate pieces of European political thinking and to make them part of American political theory raises some interesting questions for textual analysis.
When we approach the great European thinkers and try to relate
them to American political thought, to what extent should we read
the European writings in their own terms as freestanding texts,
and to what extent should we read these works in the context
of those who originally appropriated and blended them with our
tradition?
Americans have written a large number of theoretical books,
especially in this century, that derive from empirical or analytic ba-
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ses or both and either analyze American politics or provide "middle-range theories" that are considered relevant to theoretical discourse about American politics. Textual analysis in these instances
requires a grounding in techniques of formal analysis or in techniques of data-based research. Because these books are relevant to
American political theory and have been written by Americans
they are part of our list of texts to be analyzed, but they force us to
enter yet another style of textual analysis.
We can tentatively identify several different kinds of texts relevant to American political theory, each with its own appropriate
rules for analysis.
1. Public documents such as the U.S. Constitution that rest
upon popular consent for their status as texts
2. Public documents such as Supreme Court decisions that do
not rest upon consent for their status as texts but that are still
dependent upon public understanding
3. Public writings such as the papers in The Federalist, Madison's notes on the Federal Convention, reprinted sermons,
and other political pamphlets that explain or critique aspects
of American political theory but that are partial or incomplete and must be assembled or incorporated into larger
texts for coherence
4. Historical documents such as newspaper editorials, the Jefferson/Adams correspondence, probate-court records in
Massachusetts, or voting records that must be analyzed using one of several methodologies not relevant for analyzing
books
5. Histories of American political thought such as Forrest McDonald's Novus Ordo Seclorum, Gordon Wood's The Creation
of the American Republic, and Andrew C. McLaughlin's Foundations of American Constitutionalism-or more general American histories such as James Truslow Adams's The Epic of
America, Charles M. Andrews's The Colonial Period of American History, and Charles and Mary Beard's The Rise of American Civilization-that use techniques of history to assemble
meaning from many documents
6. Theoretical works such as John C. Calhoun's Disquisition on
Government, Herbert Croly's The Promise of American Life, Jo-
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8.
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seph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy and
Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice that are offered as original
and complete texts, including those in philosophy and
theology
European texts such as John Locke's, Second Treatise on Government that have been appropriated to American political
theory, at least in part, by earlier generations or whose relevance is such that we continue to relate them to American
political theory today
Literary works and biographies that speak directly or by implication to American political life, such as The Education of
Henry Adams, Eldridge Cleaver's Soul on Ice, Melville's Moby
Dick, and Robert Penn Warren's All the King's Men
Empirical analyses of American politics such as Theodore
Lowi's The End of Liberalism, Donald Campbell et al., The
American Voter, and Robert Dahl's Who Governs? that build
theory on an analysis of data
Analytical books by Americans such as James Buchanan and
Gordon Tulloch's The Calculus of Consent, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, and Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation that discuss politics in general rather than American politics in particular but that also offer theoretical analyses,
which are obviously of particular relevance to American
politics.

Not only does the unusual nature of American political theory require its students to become familiar with a large number of texts
with widely varying characteristics, it also requires that they think
through their actions as they subject these various texts to analysis.
Before these issues can be explored fruitfully, however, we must
first understand a bit more systematically the process of textual
analysis.

What Is a Text?
When we analyze texts, we are interested in understanding them,
in extracting meaning. The meaning of a text is tied to a number of
factors, including
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1. the denotation and connotation of words,
2. the structured relationship between words produced by the
application of rules of grammar,
3. the overall argument or logical progression of implications
produced by such meaning and structure over an entire text,
4. the context in which the text was written,
5. the questions we bring to the text. 3
In order to advance our discussion of textual analysis in American
political theory, it is necessary to consider a bit more carefully the
first, fourth, and fifth aspects of textual meaning.
Denotation refers to the direct, explicit meaning or reference of
a word; connotation refers to the suggested ideas associated with a
word or phrase in addition to this explicit meaning. For example,
"mother" denotes a female parent, but it also connotes love, care,
tenderness, security, and so on. Most words denote more than one
kind of meaning, and Hanna Pitkin made this point most exquisitely when she wrote a substantial book that laid out the surprisingly numerous kinds of actions and institutions denoted by "representation. " 4 Connotation is even more problematic. Take, for
example, the word "red"; it denotes a color with which we are all
familiar, a color that can be defined simply by pointing at certain
objects such as red delicious apples, fresh blood, and the like. But
consider the sentence "She is very red." A literal textual analysis
would require that the person signified have skin and hair the
color of a ripe red delicious apple, an unlikely meaning. The sentence could connote the equivalent of "She is embarrassed," or
"She is a communist." To unravel the denotation and connotation
of words and sentences we must consider the broader context of
the entire paragraph or even the entire piece of writing. It would
also help to know when it was written and who the intended audience was.
If the sample sentence is found in a text written before Karl
Marx was born, its connotation of communism could easily be
eliminated. Thus, the context in which the text was written may
provide much of the information that we will need to understand
its meaning. Denotations and connotations will vary over time and
from place to place. Take once again the sentence "She is very
red." Unless we are sensitive to the use of words at a given time in
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history, we would miss the connotation familiar to readers of
Shakespeare, "Let us make incision for your love, I To prove
whose blood is reddest, his or mine," or to readers of Sir Walter
Scott, "His blood was too red to be spared when that sort of paint
was in request. " 5 In these instances "red" implies superior quality
or value.
It is especially important when analyzing a text from an earlier
historical period, such as from the American founding era, to avoid
committing an anachronism-to read back into a text a meaning
that was not yet in use or information that could not have been
known to the writer or his contemporary reader since the event
had not yet occurred. The apparent continuity in American history, largely devoid of the sudden, radical transformations more
commonly found during the equivalent span of European history,
may sometimes lull us into ignoring the shifts in denotation and
connotation that have occurred. To say that linguistic changes have
occurred in American political expression is not to imply that earlier meanings cannot be recovered or that ideas expressed with different words might not be fundamentally the same. Yet when we
are analyzing American political texts from an earlier era it is essential that we steep ourselves in the writing from that era and remain sensitive to the denotations and connotations of the time
rather than cast our own meanings back. 6
Meaning is not limited to denotation and connotation but also
depends upon a broader context with several levels, including how
a text was read at the time it was written as well as the questions
we might bring to it today. For example, in the United States Constitution we find the following statement in Article 1, Section 8:
"The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debt and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States." Presumably the
words "shall have" imply that Congress has these powers but does
not necessarily have to exercise them. Congress, however, has historically chosen to exercise all the powers listed to the extent that
today we expect Congress to exercise them. Indeed, we now read
the passage as requiring Congress to exercise these powers as part
of their duties.
In this current context, we can then come to this part of Article
1, Section 8, with a variety of questions, including (1) What did the
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framers mean by "general welfare"? (2) What does the phrase
"general welfare" imply for current American public policy? and
(3) Is there anything in the Constitution that can be used to justify
the creation of a welfare system?
If one asks the third question under the current assumption
that Congress has a duty to exercise these powers and if one applies the current usage of welfare, then it is possible to conclude
that Congress has a simple duty to create a welfare system. Suppose, however, we answer question one first, and it turns out that
"general welfare" was at the time of the founding a linguistic alternative for "common good." Suppose also that the phrase common
good was viewed as implying that public policy should seek to
benefit the entire population rather than just a part of it, that all
parts of the population should have their vital concerns protected,
and that the effects on unborn generations should be considered.7
The answer to the first question would thus imply an answer to the
second one insofar as the first answer entails the duty of Congress
to frame legislation that attempts to meet these policy criteria. The
answer to question one also implies an answer to question three
that varies from the answer obtained through a "naive" textual
analysis that superimposed today's meanings for words.
The answer would now seem to be that Congress has a duty to
exercise its power to protect the vital interests of all parts of the
population, which implies the need for a welfare system for those
whose vital needs cannot be met through their own efforts. But it
also implies the need for a welfare system grounded in the needs
of other parts of the population so that it does not threaten productivity by soaking up too much capital, so that it benefits the rest of
the population by making welfare recipients more economically
self-reliant in the long run and thus more productive to the general
economy, so that it not be funded in such a way and to such an extent that it puts a disproportionate debt load upon some of the
young and unborn or consigns some of the young and unborn to
poverty, and so that it not demoralize the rest of the population either by seeming to benefit those who are not needy or by seeming
to neglect those who are truly needy.
An important principle of textual analysis in reading a political
document is that the document be taken as a whole rather than
read in isolated pieces, but an examination of this piece of the Con-
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stitution is still useful for illustrating the way in which the various
components of textual meaning interact to produce a complete understanding of the text. The questions we ask, the original denotations and connotations of words, the context in which the text was
written and first read, the current context in which the text is read
after many intervening political events and decisions since its writing-these aspects interact to help produce understanding.
Textual analysis in American political theory operates essentially in the realm of common sense and experience. A fundamental premise of American political theory is that politics is accessible
to the many and that an understanding of the texts defining American politics is attainable for the many. The kind of textual analysis
called for here does not require specialists or pedants but individuals who are experienced enough in the reading of American political texts and in the operation of American politics that they recognize the common sense of the situation. Indeed, textual analysis in
American political theory requires that we move beyond the written word alone and supply the common understandings that any
active citizen should possess.
Cognitive psychologists have long pointed out that much of
human understanding proceeds in this common-sense manner.
For example, consider the following text: "Mary heard the icecream truck coming down the street. She remembered her birthday money and ran into the house." Psychologists have found that
most adults and children immediately understand that Mary is a
little girl, that she wants ice cream upon hearing the truck, and
that she is going into the house to get money so she can buy some.
Interestingly none of this information is stated in the text; rather,
we understand the text based upon our own experience. 8 In the
same way American political texts can be read by ordinary people
using their experience as citizens. Frequently those individuals
who wrote American political texts assumed, even relied upon, a
common-sense reading by citizens. Certain words or phrases were
common coin of the citizen's realm and were used to elicit a certain
response in readers who were also experienced citizens. In applying close textual analysis to readings in American political theory,
then, it is important to consider the responses that the authors assumed would be supplied by the reader. In order to develop a
sense of the response a text's readers might be supplying, it is im-
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portant to immerse oneself in the total political writing of the period surrounding the text under analysis.
Underlying the discussion thus far is the intended meaning of
the author or authors. Presumably the entire point of textual analysis is to elicit the author's meaning; otherwise, we could save time
by writing our own texts and reading them instead. Generally, the
meaning of a text appears to be a function of interplay between the
author's intended meaning, the words as written, and the reader's
appropriation. Each of these three entities plays a role in establishing the meaning of a text, both at the denotative and the connotative levels, and it is not misleading to say that a text is really a combination of the three. Unraveling the relationship between the
author, the written words, and the reader is essential if we are to
understand fully the makeup of a text and thus the constitution of
a complete text.

Ideal, Complete, and Timeless Texts
The purpose we bring to a text carries with it certain implicit questions that the reader hopes to have answered by the written words.
A reader may want to determine an author's intended meaning; or
a reader may be seeking further insight into a concept, regardless
of the author's position on the matter; or a reader may be seeking
some understanding or insight into the context surrounding the
the writing and thus will read it along with many other writings
from the period; or the reader may be seeking the genesis of some
current concept, event, or policy as well as a justification for it.
The reader's role in defining a complete text, then, is considerable. The reader's purpose leads to the selection of one piece of
writing for analysis rather than another because it seems appropriate and possibly adequate for meeting that purpose. For example,
the reader may want to understand the theoretical structure of
John C. Calhoun's A Disquisition on Government, and thus reading
this piece of writing instead of his "Fort Hill Address" would seem
to make sense. The reader's purpose thus leads to an initial, provisional closure on the concept of a complete text; if that person's
purpose is met successfully by that piece of writing, then the text is
complete for that reader's purpose. Suppose, however, that one is
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seeking to understand the manner and extent to which Calhoun's
Disquisition contributed to southern secessionist ideology;
Calhoun's book then becomes only one of many pieces of writing
needed to define a complete text. Finally, some readers will be
more experienced at textual analysis or know more about the topic
under investigation than someone else and may therefore need to
read less writing than another in order to meet their purposes.
Thus the amount of writing that defines a complete text may be
less for one person than for another with the same purpose.
The author also defines a complete text by writing a work that
has a beginning and an end. Presumably a book, with its defining
covers, satisfies the author's purpose and is thus a complete text
from the writer's point of view. Of course, an author might indicate
in a given piece of writing that another piece of writing is assumed
or contains important parts of the argument and thus identify a
complete text that extends beyond one piece of writing. We can
speak, then, of an ideal text, one in which the author's intended
meaning is always found in the words by any reader. There is perfect singularity and congruence both at the denotative and the connotative levels of meaning between the author and every reader.
The piece of writing is a faultless transmitter, and the author is the
dominant part of the author/writing/reader trio. The author not
only dominates meaning but also dominates or has foreseen the
contexts in which the text can be read, the purposes for which it
can be read, the questions that will be asked by the reader, and
thus the composition of the complete text.
Even though such an ideal text could never exist, some readers
may assume this model as they approach a text. The text is a given,
and uncovering the author's intended meaning is the only reason
for studying the text. One indication that such a model is being
used in textual analysis is that the analyst, or reade~ treats the author with obvious and continual reverence. Our point is not to reject the ideal-text model; rather, it is
• to show that the ideal-text model is only one way to approach a
text,
• to lay bare the assumptions underlying the ideal-text approach,
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• to argue that even if the ideal-text approach is used, the ideal
text can only be approximated, and
• to alert us to the dangers of assuming a model of textual analysis that may not always be useful, appropriate, or even possible when analyzing a document such as a constitution.
Any given reader may have a single purpose, but over any set of
possible readers the odds that they will share the same purpose
approach zero. The piece of writing mediates between the author
and the reader, carrying a singular meaning from the author's
point of view but simultaneously having to stand the scrutiny of a
potential set of readers with a set of purposes quite beyond the
ability of the author to predict. Unable to predict the possible purposes to be brought to the text in the future, the author cannot create closure for the text by responding ahead of time to these potential questions.
A further problem is that we can know the author's intended
meaning only with probability, a result of the inevitable equivocation inherent in language and of the uncertain context in which the
author wrote. Anyone whose purpose is to determine an author's
meaning must carefully examine the use of words as well as the
linguistic-social-political-historical context. At the very least, a
careful study of the words in a text must involve the meanings in
use when the text was written. Still, we must assume that the author's logical presentation of the argument is sufficiently careful
that it cannot be construed in too many ways. With care, the set of
possible intended meanings can gradually and confidently be reduced by readers to a fairly narrow range of alternatives.
Do these apparently imposing strictures rule out the possibility that a timeless meaning can be extracted from a text? Certainly
not. Many texts will, over time, continue to have a stable meaning,
and some will tum out to contain timeless truths of deep importance so that generation after generation returns to them. Trmelessness must be established empirically by many readers; only the
continued return of readers to the same reading over a long period
of time with approximately the same understanding and continued affirmation of its truth will confirm timelessness. In textual
analysis neither truth nor timelessness can be established by one
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reader any more than an author can cause a piece of writing to become timeless through an act of will.
Once again we are led to conclude that a text is a confluence of
three elements: an author or authors, a piece of writing, and a
reader or readers. The reader defines a text for his or her purpose
and thus, by implication, the definition of a complete text; the author also attempts to define. The author's text and the reader's text
will probably differ unless the questions they ask are the same and
unless the reader's purpose is to uncover the author's probable intended meaning, guided by the author's purpose.

Assembled and Incomplete Political Texts
It is frequently assumed that the United States Constitution is an
ideal, complete, and timeless text; but it is not, and was probably
not expected to be, a faultless transmitter of the authors' intentions
to future readers. For one thing, the Constitution required considerable explanation by Publius and other Federalists using supplemental texts. For another, the document was written by a committee and reflected a number of compromises needed to obtain
committee consensus. Some of these compromises resulted in the
deliberate use of ambiguous language; others resulted in contradictory textual messages. But most important, the Constitution is
not an ideal text because it is an incomplete one.
Although federalism, the division of power among different
legislatures, is never mentioned by name in the U.S. Constitution,
it is a central organizing principle in the document. Federalism had
an important effect on the text; the states are referred to explicitly
or by direct implication fifty times in forty-two separate sections of
the Constitution. Anyone attempting a close textual analysis of the
document is driven time and again to the state constitutions to determine the meaning or implication of the national Constitution.
We can therefore say that the national document is an incomplete
text without the addition of at least the state documents.
The partial text of the U.S. Constitution requires the addition
of other pieces of writing to assemble a complete, or a more complete, text. The components that constitute a complete text depend
upon the question that is being brought to it. If we are attempting
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to puzzle out the intention of the founders on some matter, then
the Bill of Rights, the records of state ratifying conventions, the assembled text of eighty-five newspaper articles known as The Federalist, other articles and pamphlets written by Federalists and Antifederalists, the notes by Madison and others on the Federal
Convention, the Declaration of Independence, correspondence
among key actors, and many other sources may be needed in some
combination to answer the question brought to the text. At a minimum, the federalism that informs the Constitution makes it an incomplete text, which alerts us to the possibility that incomplete
and assembled texts are an important part of American political
theory.
The assembled text of The Federalist should have alerted us to
this possibility long ago, and the texts recently assembled by
Bernard Bailyn and Herbert Storing should have made the point
obvious.9 And yet there is another sense, one both more profound
and more interesting, in which the U.S. Constitution is an incomplete text. One of the most important passages involving the states
describes an amendment procedure. The concept of formal
amendment can arise only after the invention of a written constitution to be amended. The idea of an amendment procedure is not
only an innovation of great historical importance, it also conveys to
a reader of the Constitution the unmistakable message that the
Constitution is not yet finished, is not yet complete.
Alexander Hamilton wrote on the first page of the first essay in
The Federalist that the American political system is an experiment in
government conducted by a free people using reflection and choice
as opposed to accident and force. Thomas Jefferson said that each
generation must add its page to the unfolding story and that the
ability of each generation to do so is part of the story's historical
significance. At the very least, it was expected that the formal institutions of decision making would require some future adjustment,
for it is in the nature of an experiment that one learns from the mistakes that become apparent during its operation.
The United States Constitution would appear, as part of the
intent of its authors, to be incomplete. Its lack of completeness is
not merely textual, however, because the text will reflect the result
of political activity by future American citizens. The incompleteness, in other words, stems not from any theory of textual analysis
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or from any characteristic of texts in general but from the nature of
American political texts grounded in continuing consent. That is,
political documents in a constitutional system, since they rest
upon the consent of the people, must in principle always reflect
the openness and incompleteness of the political process itself.
Unlike texts in literature and philosophy, constitutional texts and
the political texts generated by the political system created by the
constitution are tied to ongoing, unending, political activity. In
America, constitutions are permanently incomplete, and unless
we are attempting to define the founders' intentions, we are always
forced in constitutional analysis to include court cases, legislation,
and executive actions from a two-hundred-year political process.
Constitutional texts therefore cannot be analyzed separately from
the political process that they define and reflect. This more profound sense in which constitutional and constitutionally conditioned political texts are incomplete requires that we treat them differently from literary or philosophical texts.
Incomplete texts require that we assemble texts. Perhaps using
the assembled text of The Federalist as our model, we think nothing
of assembling Supreme Court decisions into case books; of combining documents, essays, speeches, and other writings from a
wide variety of sources into anthologies, grouped by historical era,
for use in American political-theory courses; or of bringing together essays and journal articles from every possible source into
an edited book, as long as the writings deal with the same general
topic. The assembled text is an American invention, one for which
Americans have a peculiar propensity-a propensity we exercised
first and most frequently in American political theory. The danger
inherent in such assembling is all too apparent in collections
where, for instance, bills of rights from any era and both sides of
the Atlantic are printed together, ripped from the constitutions of
which they are usually a part, and deprived of their meaningful
context; or where only portions of essays and pamphlets are
printed in collections, perhaps to contrast a Federalist position to
an Antifederalist position, each represented by a text only a few
paragraphs to a few pages long; or where passages of only a few
pages from a book, essay, or tract written by people of every possible ideological shading and description are brought together as
representative of American political thinking.
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Any undertaking, no matter how basically sound in principle
or noble in intention, can be handled badly. We are forced in American political theory to assemble texts, but we should discipline
ourselves to use complete writings as parts of the assembled text
and to err on the side of inclusion. For example, if we are going to
read pamphlets from a certain era or on a specific topic, we should
read most if not all of them. The need to assemble texts in our discipline perhaps excuses our doing so, but we have no excuse for
not making them reasonably complete.

Constitutional Texts and Political Behavior
The inherent incompleteness of constitutional texts has a number
of important, straightforward implications, but before discussing
these it is necessary to examine some of the assumptions underlying constitutionalism. As an approach to politics, constitutionalism assumes that humans can, as Hamilton wrote, use reflection
and choice in governing themselves instead of relying upon accident and force. Hamilton's position assumes that there is a quality
that we usually call free will, that free people can engage in reasoned, reflective discourse as the basis for deciding on their actions
in common, and that in the absence of reflection and choice politics will revert to a process dominated by accident or force or both.
Constitutiortalism also assumes that humans can design a political
process, based upon their continuing, mutual consent, that can effectively structure human behavior in a way that a reasoned, reflective people can predict and approve. In other words, unless one
believes that the provisions in a constitution can effectively structure human behavior to move it in approved and predicted patterns, one will never bother to write and approve constitutions.
What is meant by accident and force? Force refers to the use of
violence and threatened violence to make humans act in a certain
way. Force may arise from the disproportionate wealth, power, and
greed of the elite, or it may arise from the numbers, combined
strength, and envy of the many. Certainly any form of arbitrary
power backed by violence constitutes the meaning that Hamilton
had in mind. To define "accident" is a more subtle problem; it
probably refers primarily to the accident of birth that gives the elite
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an advantage in politics. It probably also refers to a political system
that only reacts to events and problems, with the result that its policies have an accidental quality to them rather than being guided
by the long-term interests of the people and their posterity. Accident may also refer to politics conducted by a people who remain
unconscious of their common needs and goals and who, because
they remain prepolitical in their lack of participation in politics, are
conditioned by the accidents of their environment rather than by
their own choices.
Let us for the moment define "action'' as singular, conscious,
primarily volitional human conduct and "behavior" as patterned,
secondarily volitional human conduct. Action thus refers to conduct that has the full attention of the person or persons involved;
behavior refers to conduct that lacks the full or conscious attention
of the person or persons involved. Behavior can be viewed as patterned because it is in conformity with previous actions in similar
situations, and individuals might engage in it anyway if they were
paying full attention. In this sense behavior is secondarily volitional; it rests upon prior conscious decisions to act in a certain
way. The first time I drove to work in a new city it was an action,
since it had my full attention and rested upon direct, active decisions. After several years I drive almost mechanically and thus "behave" rather than "act."
In a constitutional context, it is assumed that most people engage in patterned, more or less predictable behavior because of
conscious decisions and actions that they made earlier. The constitutional documents condition what citizens do, not in the sense of
determining their actions but in the sense of making most people
engage in behavior that falls within certain defined limits. Constitutions do not produce such behavior by fiat or by reshaping
people; rather, constitutions create institutions and processes that
use natural human tendencies to produce desired results that are
predictable in a statistical sense. Moreover, the people know or are
supposed to know these results since they consented to them.
With these assumptions it is possible to see how constitutional
texts are fundamentally tied to human action and behavior. Constitutions contain institutions that are based upon hypotheses about
human behavior. "If we act to structure the process in this way we
will produce outcome X in terms of behavioral regularities;
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whereas if we act to structure the process that way we will produce
outcome Y." Subjecting constitutions to textual analysis requires,
in part, that we determine the patterns of political behavior that are
expected to result (in a nonnormative sense) from the institutions
contained in the document and that we determine the causal hypotheses contained in the institutional design. Preambles and bills
of rights also encode preferred patterns of behavior (in a normative
sense), not through institutional design but by enunciating goals,
values, and hopes as standards by which to evaluate political
actions and behavior.
Constitutions never spring de novo from the heads of their authors but are grounded upon and are extensions of political patterns from the past. One can thus view constitutions as summarizing, encapsulating, and codifying patterns of political behavior
that are natural to a given people at a given time. Decoding a constitution through textual analysis thus involves developing the
snapshot it provides of a people and their preferred political patterns. Finally, all texts, like all actions or statements, are themselves
units of action or behavior. Constitutions are complex behavioral
manifestations that can be read and analyzed in the same way a
political scientist can study an election, a legislative roll-call vote,
or a particular policy. A constitution is a behavioral unit, which,
when studied in conjunction with other constitutions, can reveal,
for example, certain regularities of behavior in constitution mal<ing, the links between politics and class structure, the relationship
of culture to criteria of justice, or patterns in the diffusion of institutional innovation.
Yet, constitutions can never be studied simply as behavioral
manifestations. Their entire purpose is to structure a political process, and therefore constitutions inevitably lead us to examine how
successful they are at this task. If the offices defined by a constitution are elective, then the electoral process has a function or set of
functions, and we can study the process to determine its effectiveness in fulfilling the function. If the constitution attempts to define
a legislative-executive relationship, then we should study the actual operation of that relationship in conjunction with the constitution. A constitutional perspective is therefore inherently empirical,
behavioral, and normative.
A constitutional perspective is also inevitably historical. A con-
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stitution does not define a political system for purposes of preventing change; rather, a constitution defines a set of institutions and
processes that are known and consented to by citizens, and the
codified, public nature of a constitution requires any proposal for
change to undergo a public, consent-based process for approval.
Instead of freezing a political system, a constitution institutionalizes change in such a way as to maximize the probability that
change will be accomplished through consent-generating public
discourse rather than through force or fraud. Thus a constitutional
perspective involves the study of constitutional development and
change, and the story of constitutional change is the story of a
people as they act in history. At any given moment a constitution
worthy of the name embodies and is derived from a people's past,
roughly defines their current patterns of behavior, and structures
future change.
We have reached the point where it is fair to ask what writings
a relatively complete, assembled text for American political theory
might include. Since the text is partly a function of the question being asked, there will never be one assemblage that is standard for
American political theory, although it is difficult to think of a question that would not lead us to include the United States Constitution. Since questions concerning the initial American founding are
frequently asked, however, a text that allows us to understand the
terms of that founding would be generally useful. Thus it is time to
begin the assembly of that text and to illustrate the process of assemblage, by looking first at the development of that important
American invention-the Bill of Rights.

Chapter 3

Toward a Complete Text on
the U.S. Bill of Rights

The problem of textual analysis, to recapitulate a bit, is composed
of two related problems. The second and more obvious one lies in
determining the meaning of a text that is sitting in front of us.
Those of us who have engaged in this exercise know that the process of uncovering a text's meaning is deeply satisfying-and far
from easy. The careful reading of a political text is not simply an exercise in the application of a literary theory but an interesting puzzle that requires logic, imagination, attention to the political process, a sense of rhetoric, an inclination toward sleuthing, an open
mind, a dedication to the systematic ordering of evidence, and a
certain skill in what might be called "psychological archaeology'~
the careful uncovering of the levels of awareness and the layers of
experience that might have motivated an author or authors.
When we are in college, someone will hand us a text on which
to practice these skills, but in researching American political theory, there is certainly no one to hand us the text, and usually there
is no ready-made text anyway. This lack means that we must face
the first problem of textual analysis, the part that is usually overlooked or assumed-the identification of the text that is relevant to
the question at hand. Solving this problem involves the same skills
as, and is often indistinguishable from or merges with, the analysis
of the text itself.
The use of bills of rights in our sample textual analysis is not
accidental. If the contention is correct that constitutions define the
core and range of American political theory, then because American bills of rights almost always stand at the beginning of these
constitutions, rights are, in a sense, part of the preface to American
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political theory. Also, it is difficult to overestimate the prominence
of rights in American political consciousness. The idea that Americans have a national set of rights upon which they can call in the
midst of political disputation is a commonplace. Lawyers and citizens alike tend to think of the Bill of Rights first, and too often
only, when the Constitution is mentioned.
Rights consciousness is highly developed in America, and
American political theory must accord rights considerable attention. A logical preface to this large, important topic is to examine
the origin of rights in America, and the method I use here is to ask
the question, What constitutes a reasonably complete text for any
discussion of the origin of rights in America? This method will allow us to ignore the controversies over how to read specific rights
and to focus on the general development of rights, about which
there is less controversy.

Contending Hypotheses on the Origin of
American Rights
Where should we begin? Unlike the U.S. Constitution, in which
internal evidence points us toward the state constitutions as part of
a complete text, no internal evidence in the U.S. Bill of Rights immediately points us in a given direction. In the absence of such direction we might pose four contending hypotheses, each of which
seems to underlie a part of the literature on the U.S. Bill of Rights.
Pursuit of these hypotheses offers one way of generating a complete text on the question.
Hypothesis A: The Bill of Rights was the original product of one
or a few minds and was created without precedent in 1789.
Hypothesis B: The Bill of Rights was an extension of English
common law, and thus the U.S. Bill of Rights
was essentially a descendant of English codifications such as Magna Carta (1215) and the English Bill of Rights (1689).
Hypothesis C: The Bill of Rights was written by James Madison
to contain the common proposals for amend-
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ments made by the state conventions that met to
ratify the U.S. Constitution. Madison did this in
order to satisfy or placate the Antifederalists.
Hypothesis D: The U.S. Bill of Rights summarized the American view of rights that had been developed earlier and codified in the state bills of rights.
We shall explore each of these hypotheses in turn, although the
first two can be taken together since the discovery of any link between the Bill of Rights and English common law nullifies Hypothesis A.
The second hypothesis points us to Magna Carta as the first
common-law document to examine. One way to test the relative influence of Magna Carta on the Bill of Rights is systematically to
count the overlapping provisions. The Bill of Rights has twenty-six
separate rights listed in its ten amendments, and of these twentysix rights only four can be traced to Magna Carta, using the most
generous interpretation of the language in that famous document
(see Table 3.1). Looking at it from the other direction, only four of
the sixty-three provisions in Magna Carta appear in the U.S. Bill of
Rights. The lack of overlap is not surprising since Magna Carta and
the U.S. Bill of Rights had enormously different functions. The
former defined the relationship between a king and his barons; the
latter placed limits on all branches of a government vis-a-vis an entire citizenry.
Despite the enormous historical importance of Magna Carta, it is
only a distant forerunner of the U.S. Bill of Rights in content, form,
and intent. Nor is the overlap with the rest of English common law, although important, that impressive. In addition to the four rights that
can be traced to Magna Carta, another right in the U.S. Bill of Rights
can be traced to the 1628 English Petition of Right and two to the 1689
English Bill of Rights. 1 This brings to seven the number of rights
among the twenty-six in the U.S. Bill of Rights that can be traced to a
major English common-law document, although the highly respected
scholar Bernard Schwartz is willing to make such a connection for only
five of these seven rights.
Writers on the English common law tell us that Magna Carta
had to be continually reconfirmed, at least forty-seven times by
one count, because the document was ignored for long periods of

Table 3.1. First Statement of Each Right in the U.S. Bill of Rights
Bill of Rights
Guarantee

First Document
Protecting

First American
Guarantee

First Constitutional Guarantee

Establishment of
religion

Rights of the colonists

Same
(Boston)

N.J. Constitution, Art. 19

Free exercise of
religion

Md. Act Concerning Religion

Same

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 16

Free speech

Mass. Body of
Liberties, S. 12

Same

Pa. Declaration
of Rights, Art. 12

Free press

Address to Inhabitants of
Quebec

Same

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 12

Assembly

Declaration and
Resolves of the
Continental
Congress

Same

Pa. Declaration
of Rights, Art. 16

Petition

Bill of Rights
(England, 1689)

Declaration of
Rights and
Grievances
(1765), s. 13

Pa. Declaration
of Rights, Art. 16

Right to bear
arms
Quartering soldiers

Bill of Rights
(England, 1689)

Pa. Declaration
of Rights, Art. 12

Same

Petition of Right
(England) S. 6

N. Y. Charter of
Liberties

Del. Declaration
of Rights, S. 21

Searches

Rights of the colonists

Same
(Boston)

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 10

Seizures

Magna Carta
c. 39

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 10

Same

Grand jury

N.Y. Charter of
Liberties

Same

N.C. Declaration
of Rights, Art. 8

Double jeopardy

Mass. Body of
Liberties, S. 42

Same

N.H. Bill of
Rights, Art. 16

Selfincrimination

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 8

Same

Same

Due process

Magna Carta
c. 39

Md. Act for the
Liberties of the
People

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 8

Just compensation

Mass. Body of
Liberties, S. 8

Same

Vt. Declaration
of Rights, Art. 2
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Table 3.1. Continued
Bill of Rights
Guarantee

First Document
Protecting

First American
Guarantee

First Constitutional Guarantee

Speedy trial

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 8

Same

Same

Jury trial

Magna Carta
c. 39

Mass. Body of
Liberties, S. 29

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 8

Cause and nature of accusation

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 8

Same

Same

Witnesses

Pa. Charter of
Privileges, Art. 5

Same

N.J. Constitution, Art. 16

Counsel

Mass. Body of
Liberties, S. 29

Same

N.J. Constitution, Art. 16

Jury trial (civil)

Mass. Body of
Liberties, S. 29

Same

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 11

Bail

Mass. Body of
Liberties, S. 18

Same

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 9

Fines

Magna Carta
Sc. 20-22

Pa. Frame of
Government,
S. 18

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 9

Punishment

Mass. Body of
Liberties, S. 43,
46

Same

Va. Declaration
of Rights, S. 9

Rights retained
by people

Va. Constitution
Proposed
Amendment 17

Same

Ninth Amendment

Reserved powers

Mass. Declaration of Rights,
Art. 4

Same

Same

Source: Based on Bernard Schwartz, The Roots of the Bill of Rights, \bl. 5 (New York:
Chelsea House Publishers, 1980), 1204. Contrary to Schwartz, I attribute more to English common-law documents, the difficulty being that the English version is always
somewhat different in intent and application as well as usually less explicit and sweeping in expression.

time, and its contents were at best honored in the breach. 2 Despite
the written guarantees for certain rights contained in major documents of English common law, at the time of the American Revolution these rights were either not protected at all or were not protected in England at the level that they were in America. 3
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Even in those instances where protection of a right in England approached that in America, a fundamental difference existed in whose actions were limited. Partly for this reason James
Madison said that there were too many differences between common law and the U.S. Bill of Rights to warrant comparison.
[The] truth is, they [the British] have gone no farther than to
raise a barrier against the power of the Crown; the power of
the Legislature is left altogether too indefinite. Although I
know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of
the press, or liberty of conscience, come in question [in Parliament] the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet
their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the
security of those rights, respecting which the people of America are most alarmed . . . those choicest privileges of the
people are unguarded in the British Constitution. But although . . . it may not be thought necessary to provide limits
for the legislative power in that country, yet a different opinion
prevails in the United States. 4
Any investigation of rights in America would need to begin with
Magna Carta (1215), the English Petition of Right (1628), and the
English Bill of Rights (1689) for several reasons. First, some American rights do come explicitly from English common law. Also, it is
useful to read these documents to see how very different they are
from equivalent American documents because of the presence of
an aristocracy and an established church in England. Having a
clear sense of the dissimilarity between the English and American
background helps us to recognize American innovations in rights.
Finally, these documents serve as a useful platform for explaining
the English definition of rights; the English notion was and is different from ours, and familiarity with at least these English documents will make this difference seem less abstract.
At the very least, the attribution of the American Bill of Rights
to English common law and its major documents such as Magna
Carta must be supplemented; thus it is to documents written on
American shores that we must turn if we are to assemble a text sufficient for us to answer the question about the origin of rights in
America. Hypothesis B has enough support for us to reject Hy-
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pothesis A, and there is initial support for Hypothesis D, but before moving to the last proposition we must first examine Hypothesis C.
The U.S. Bill of Rights resulted from Antifederalist insistence
that the U.S. Constitution be amended in certain ways. Seven of
the state ratifying conventions passed resolutions containing suggested amendments, and at a critical point in the ratification debate James Madison promised to lead the fight for a bill of rights if
the Constitution were ratified. True to his word, Madison introduced nine amendments containing forty-two separate rights on
June 8, 1789, and personally carried the proposal through Congress. It is logical to assume that he used the amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions when he produced his
own list. After all, these ratifying conventions had together proposed ninety-seven distinct rights, and Madison needed to address
the opposition to the Constitution represented by these proposed
amendments. Yet the forty-two distinct rights contained in Madison's nine proposed amendments, listed in the order he gave them
as numbers one to forty-two in the table, bear only a modest relation to the rights proposed by the ratifying conventions (see Table
3.2).
Thirty-five of the amendments proposed by the ratifying conventions appeared on Madison's list, but sixty-one did not. Seven
rights proposed by Madison were not suggested by any ratifying
convention, nor was there a "dense" connection between Madison's list and the amendments proposed by the ratifying conventions, as can be illustrated by using a somewhat crude measure of
association. The data on state ratifying conventions in Table 3.2
constitute a matrix that is seven cells wide and ninety-six cells from
top to bottom. If we consider only the top forty-two rows of this
matrix, the more cells that have an X in them the denser the relationship between Madison's list and the conventions' proposals.
Thirty-two percent of the cells are filled(% out of 294 cells), which
does not suggest an especially dense relationship between the ratifying conventions' proposals and Madison's list of rights.
The last conclusion can also be supported by looking at the
proposed amendments made by the ratifying conventions that
most directly addressed the protection of state sovereignty. Numbers thirty-one, thirty-two, and forty-two through fifty-three seem

Table 3.2. Amendments Proposed by State Ratifying Conventions Compared with Madison's Original Proposed Amendments
Mass. Md.
1. Power derived
from the people
2. Government exercised for the commongood
3. Life, liberty, property, and happiness
4. Right of people to
change government
5. No. of representatives
6. Congressional
pay raises
7. Religious freedom
8. Right to a free
conscience
9. Free speech
10. Free to write
11. Free press
12. Assembly
13. Petition and remonstrance
14. Right to bear arms
15. Pacifists need not
bear arms
16. No quartering of
troops in peacetime
17. No quartering
without warrant
18. No double jeopardy
19. No double punishment
20. No selfincrimination
21. Due process of
law guaranteed
22. Compensate for
property taken
23. No excessive bail
or fines

s.c.

N.H. Va. N.Y. N.C. Madison

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

K

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

K

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

K

X

X

X

X
X

K
K
K
X

K

X

X

X

X

X

K

X

X

K
K

X

X

K

Table 3.2. Continued
Mass. Md. S.C. N.H. Va. N.Y. N .C. Madison
24. No cruel or unusual punishment
25 . No unreasonable
search and seizure
26. Speedy and publie trial
27. Told nature of
crime
28. Confronted with
accusers
29. Can call witnesses
for own defense
30. Right to counsel
31. Rights retained by
states or people
32. No implied
powers for Congress
33. No state violate 8,
9, 11, or 26 above
34. Appeal limited by
dollar amount
35. Jury cannot be bypassed
36. Impartial jury
from vicinity
37. Jury unanimity required
38. May challenge
any judicial decision
39. Grand jury indictment required
40. Jury trial for civil
cases
41. Separation of
powers required
42. Powers reserved
to the states
43. Limit national taxing reower
44. No ederal election regulation
45. Free elections
46. No standing army
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Table 3.2. Amendments Proposed by State Ratifying Conventions Compared with Madison's Original Proposed Amendments (continued)
Mass. Md. S.C. N.H. Va. N.Y. N.C. Madison
47. State control of
militia
48. State sovereignty
retained
49. Limits on judicial
power
50. Treaties accord
with state law
51. Concurrent jurisdiction for state
and national
courts
52. No infringing of
state constitutions
53. State courts to be
used as lower federal courts
54. Can appeal Supreme Court decisions
55. Defend oneself in
court
56. Civil control of
military
57. Trial in state crime
occurs
58. Judges hold no
other office
59. Four-year limit on
military service
60. Limit on martial
law
61. No monopolies
62. Reduce jurisdiction of Supreme
Court
63. No titles of nobility
64. Keep a congressional record
65. Publish information on national
use of money
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Table 3.2. Continued
Mass. Md.
66. Two-thirds of
Senate to ratify
commerce treaties
67. Two-thirds of
both houses to
pass commerce
bills
68. Limit on regulation of D.C.
69. Presidential
term-only eight
years
70. President limited
to two terms
71. Add state judges
to impeachment
process
72. Senate does not
impeach senators
73. Limit use of militia out of state
74. Judicial salaries
not changed
75. Add requirements
for being president
76. Two-thirds vote of
both houses
needed to borrow
money
77. Two-thirds vote of
Congress must
declare war
78. Habeas corpus
79. Congressional
sessions to be
open
80. No consecutive
terms in Senate
81. State legislature
must fill vacant
Senate seat
82. Limit on power of
lower federal
courts

s.c. N.H. Va.

N.Y. N.C. Madison
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Table 3.2. Amendments Proposed by State Ratifying Conventions Compared with Madison's Original Proposed Amendments (continued)
Mass. Md. S.C. N.H. Va. N.Y. N.C. Madison
83. Congress may not
assign duties to a
state
84. Congress may not
regulate state paper money
85. No foreign troops
to be used
86. State law used on
military bases
87. No multiple office
holding
88. Limit on bankruptcy laws
89. No presidential
pardon for treason
90. President not the
commander of the
army
91. Official form for
president's acts
92. No poll tax
93. No suspension of
laws by executive
94 . No separate emoluments
95. Judicial system
may not be bypassed
96. Advisory council
for president
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Note: The first forty-two rights are arranged in the order used by Madison in his original version sent to the House of Representatives. Going from left to right, the states
are arranged in the order that their ratifying conventions produced a list of recommended amendments, from earliest to latest. When an X under "Madison" is italicized, it means that the proposed right eventually was included in the U.S. Bill of
Rights.
Sources: The proposed amendments for each state are taken from Merrill Jensen, John
P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino et al., eds. The Documentary History of the Ratification
of the Constitution (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976-); Madison's fortytwo prorosed rights are based upon an examination of the original documents in the
Nationa Archives.
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to be the best candidates, and only three of these fourteen proposals appear on Madison's list. The density for these fourteen
proposals is 46 percent (forty-two out of ninety-one cells), which
makes them one and a half times as likely to be recommended by a
state as those actually picked by Madison, and about the same ratio relative to the table as a whole (201 out of 672 cells = 30 percent)-suggesting a strong interest in state sovereignty from the
ratifying conventions but not from Madison.
The connection between Madison's list of rights and those
rights proposed by the ratifying conventions is thus definite but
weak. Most of the rights on Madison's list appeared somewhere in
the ratifying conventions' proposals but usually on only one or
two lists, and these were generally not the rights most desired by
the Antifederalists. Still, a complete text for our question would
seem to require inclusion of the surviving debates of the ratification conventions, in part to see the manner and extent to which the
wordings and concepts are the same and also to become familiar
with those proposals not included by Madison. 5
Madison apparently wished to avoid most of the amendments
proposed by the ratifying conventions, but he needed to make
some connection with state interests to mollify the Antifederalists.
He fastened upon the tactic of exploiting ambiguities in the Antifederalist position. Americans who argued most vigorously
against the proposed Constitution offered three different kinds of
amendments that were often intertwined and confused. One type
was aimed at checking the power of the national government by
withholding a specific power; examples included prohibitions on
direct taxes, on monopolies, and on borrowing money. A second
type of amendment altered an institution in such a way as to
weaken it significantly, for instance by making senators ineligible
for consecutive terms, by giving state and national courts concurrent jurisdiction, and by requiring a two-thirds vote in both houses
for any bill dealing with navigation or commerce. A third type of
amendment was suitable for a bill of rights as we now understand
it; examples included protection of the rights to speak, write, publish, assemble, and petition (rights that safeguarded the ability of a
people to organize politically) as well as prohibitions on self-incrimination, double punishment, excessive bail, and searches
without a warrant (rights that defined an impartial legal system).
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One can see in Madison's selection process a clear inclination toward the third over the first two kinds of amendments.
In effect, Madison avoided any alteration in the institutions
defined by the Constitution, largely ignored specific prohibitions
on national power, and opted instead for a list of rights that would
connect clearly with the preferences of state governments but that
would not increase state power vis-a-vis the national government
defined in the Constitution. The discussion about powers and
rights was thus subtly shifted to one only about rights.
This finesse upset some Antifederalists who argued that Madison had "thrown a tub to a whale" (that is, he had created a distraction to deflect public attention from the real issue); but it
worked well for one critical reason-Madison used the bills of
rights attached to the state constitutions as his model. The Antifederalists had difficulty opposing Madison's use of this model,
one of their own making, and it was included in their demands.
Madison offered the Antifederalists the "paper barriers" he felt
were ineffective in existing state constitutions, and the Antifederalists had either to accept such amendments as useful or to admit the
truth of Madison's paper-barrier argument.
Therefore, the immediate background for the United States
Bill of Rights was formed by the state bills of rights written between 1776 and 1787. Madison effectively extracted the least common denominator from these state bills of rights, excepting those
rights that might reduce the power of the national government. Almost every one of the twenty-six rights in the U.S. Bill of Rights
could be found in two or three state documents and most of them
in five or more. 6
The state bills of rights typically contained a more extensive
listing than the twenty-six rights that came to be included in the
first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Maryland's 1776
document listed forty-nine rights in forty-two sections, Massachusetts' document listed forty-nine rights in thirty sections, and New
Hampshire listed fifty rights in the thirty-eight sections of its 1784
document.7 Virginia's (1776) forty-two rights and Pennsylvania's
(1776) thirty-five rights came closest to the size but not the content
of the national Bill of Rights. 8
Clearly there is a strong connection between the state bills of
rights and Madison's proposed amendments (see Table 3.3). If we
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look at the matrix formed by the forty-two rights on Madison's list
and the seven state bills of rights, 50 percent of the cells in the matrix are filled (173 out of 294 cells) compared to the 32 percent density between Madison's list and the amendments proposed by the
state ratifying conventions. Remember that these state bills of
rights were written well before the state ratifying conventions
made their recommendations. If we construct a matrix using the
contents of the state bills of rights and the rights on Madison's list
that were eventually ratified as the U.S. Bill of Rights, we find that
the percentage of the matrix filled rises to 60 percent, compared
with a 36 percent filled matrix when comparing the state ratifying
conventions' proposals with the rights actually ratified as part of
the national Bill of Rights.
A final comparison between Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 indicates
another connection between the state and national constitutions.
The listing for the two tables is the same for the first forty-two
rights since in each case these are the rights contained in Madison's
proposed amendments in the order in which he proposed them.
The rights listed after number forty-two vary in the two tables,
however, depending upon the actual content of the documents being examined.
In Table 3.3 rights numbered forty-three through fifty-two
have a high density (73 percent), and they also happen to be addressed successfully in the body of the U.S. Constitution proper,
as are numbers fifty-five, sixty through sixty-five, and eighty-one.
In other words, seventeen provisions commonly found in state
bills of rights had already been addressed in the body of the Constitution and did not need to be included in the national Bill of
Rights. Also, only a few of these provisions from the state bills of
rights are directly contradicted by anything in the Constitution.
The importance of the state constitutions and their bills of rights
for the national Constitution is even stronger than is apparent from
an examination of the Bill of Rights alone. On the other hand, if we
look at the list of proposals from the ratifying conventions, only
eight are addressed in the Constitution proper, and at least twentythree of the remaining proposals are directly contradicted by provisions in the Constitution.
One final comparison should drive the point home. The average state bill of rights contained thirty-five rights, and among these

Table 3.3. Madison's List of Proposed Amendments Compared with Provisions in the Existing State Bills of Rights
Va. Pa. Del. Md. N.C. Mass. N.H. Madison
1. Power derived from
the people
2. Government exercised for the common good
3. Life, liberty, property, and happiness
4. Right of the people
to change government
5. Number of representatives
6. Congressional pay
raises
7. Free exercise of religion
8. Right to a free conscience
9. Free speech
10. Free to write
11. Free press
12. Right to assemble
13. Petition and remonstrance
14. Right to bear arms
15. Pacifists need not
bear arms
16. No quartering of
troops in peacetime
17. No quartering
without warrant
18. No double jeopardy
19. No double punishment
20. No selfincrimination
21. Due process of law
guaranteed
22. Compensate for
property taken
23. No excessive bail
24. No cruel or unusual punishment
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Table 3.3. Continued
Va. Pa. Del. Md. N.C. Mass. N.H. Madison
25. No unreasonable
search and seizure
26. Speedy and public
trial guaranteed
27. Told nature of crime
28. Confronted with
accusers
29. Can call witnesses
in own defense
30. Right to counsel
31. Rights retained by
states or people
32. No implied powers
for Congress
33. No state may violate 8, 11, or 26
above
34. Appeal limited by
dollar amount
35. Jury cannot be bypassed
36. Impartial jury from
vicinity
37. Jury unanimity required
38. May challenge any
judicial decision
39. Grand jury indictment required
40. Jury trial for civil
cases
41. Separation of
powers required
42. Powers reserved to
states or people
43. No taxation without consent
44. Free elections protected
45. Frequent elections
required
46. No standing army
permitted
47. Civil control of military
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Table 3.3. Madison's List of Proposed Amendments Compared with Provisions in the Existing State Bills of Rights (continued)
Va. Pa. Del. Md. N.C. Mass. N.H. Madison
48. No martial law
(suspending law)
49. No compulsion to
bear arms
50. No ex post facto
laws
51. No bills of attainder
52. Habeas corpus
53. Justice not sold
54. Location of trial
convenient
55 . Independent judiciary
56. Recurrence to fundamentals
57. Stake in community to vote
58. Equality is supported
59. Majority rule is
protected
60. Frequent meeting
of legislature
61. Free speech in legislature
62. Convenient location of legislature
63. Public office not
hereditary
64. No title of nobility
65. No emoluments or
privileges
66. No taxing of paupers
67. No monopolies
68. Collective property
right
69. No sanguinary laws
70. Right to common
law
71. Right to migrate
72. No poll tax
73. No infringing of
state constitutions
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Table 3.3. Continued
Va. Pa. Del. Md. N.C. Mass. N.H. Madison
74. No religious test
75. Support of public
worship
76. Attend religious instruction
77. Uniform support of
religion
78. Support of public
teachers
79. Time to prepare legal defense
80. Rotation in executive office
81. No multiple office
holding
82. Proportional punishment
83. Qualified jurors
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Note: The first forty-two rights are those Madison compiled and sent to the House of
Representatives; the order is that used in his list. The rest of the rights are those found
in the state bills of rights but not in Madison's proposed amendments. When an X under "Madison'' is italicized, it means that the proposed right eventually was included
in the U.S. Bill of Rights.
Sources: Madison's list is taken from the original documents in the National Archives;
the rights in the state bills of rights are based on the documents as collected in Francis
N. Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws of the United States, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1907).

there was a common core of twenty-six rights. Nine of these
twenty-six rights were mentioned in at least five state constitutions, four were mentioned in at least six, and thirteen were mentioned in all seven state documents. Every one of these twenty-six
rights in the common core of state bills of rights appeared on Madison's list of proposed rights or had already been addressed in the
body of the U.S. Constitution. The seven ratifying conventions,
however, proposed only seven rights that were common to five or
more of their lists of proposed amendments. Three of these seven
ended up on Madison's list, and none had been addressed in the
U.S. Constitution.
The state constitutions and their respective bills of rights, not
the amendments proposed by state ratifying conventions, are the
immediate source from which the U.S. Bill of Rights was derived.
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A complete text for answering our question therefore must include
the state bills of rights, the U.S. Constitution, and the state constitutions. The sheer number of rights in the body of the U.S. Constitution indicates the degree to which bills of rights and constitutions had been blended, which in turn suggests that the
background to American bills of rights may include earlier constitutional documents as well. This suspicion is strengthened when
we note that both Madison's list of proposed amendments and the
version produced by the House of Representatives were designed
to be placed within the body of the Constitution. It is probable that
the answer to our question, "What is a reasonably complete text
for any discussion of the origin of American rights?" is similar to
that for the question, "What is a reasonably complete text for any
discussion of the origin of the U.S. Constitution?"

The Colonial Background to the State Bills of Rights
Having established the importance of state bills of rights as background to the national Bill of Rights, we might ask about the origins of the state bills of rights. They came from bills of rights written by American colonists. Because of English preoccupation with
internal political disorder from 1640 to 1688 and then with French
competition from 1700 to 1760, the colonists were left with a surprisingly high level of political independence. In addition to writing functional constitutions between 1620 and 1775, the colonists
also wrote many bills of rights, and these colonial documents
stood as background to the state bills of rights. A high degree of
overlap occurs between a state's bill of rights and the documents
written during its respective colonial experience. 9 Examples of such
colonial documents include the New York Charter of Liberties and
Privileges (1683), the Laws and Liberties of New Hampshire (1682),
Penn's Charter of Liberties (1682), the General Laws and Liberties
of Connecticut (1672), the Maryland Toleration Act (1649), the
Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (1647), and the Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641). 10 The last document, adopted a century and a half before the American national Bill of Rights and half
a century before the English Bill of Rights (1689) contained sixteen
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(62 percent) of the twenty-six rights found in the national
document.
Where do the rights in the 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties and in later colonial documents come from? Interestingly,
these colonial documents frequently cite the Bible to justify their
various provisions. There is no more a listing of rights in the Bible
than there is in the writings of Locke, Hume, or Montesquieu, but
the colonists often looked to the Bible for a moral basis upon which
to build political goals and values. Basically, Americans' notions of
rights developed from their own political experience as colonists,
an experience significantly affected by the peculiar and historically
important conditions in which they found themselves. n
Primarily, the colonists were a religious people. In attempting
to lead exemplary lives they were acutely sensitive to human relationships and believed that these relationships should be based
upon God's laws as expressed in the Bible. Furthermore, the religion these people professed emphasized certain values supportive
of rights, not the least of which were the notions of a higher law
against which to measure governmental actions, personal responsibility for actions, and the equality of all people in the eyes of
God.
All humans were viewed as having been made in the image
and likeness of God, and therefore a certain equality in value
should be accorded every person. Those individuals in government were thus not of a different order from those they governed
and did not have inherent prerogatives or rights different from others. A fundamental equality lay in every person's ability to say yes
or no to God's grace; from this came the ability to give or to withhold consent for human laws, and in turn the concept that government should rest upon the consent of those governed was a
straightforward deduction.
These tendencies were reinforced by the belief in the ability of
each individual to read the Bible and to have an independent relationship with God. Not only was there no need for priests to interpret the Bible, but each person was viewed as having an independent will; government could not interfere in this fundamental
independence. And since God's law was accessible to every person's understanding, so should the human law be, which was supposed to be in conformity with God's law. By implication, a class of
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lawyers to interpret earthly law was unnecessary, just as there was
no need for a priestly caste to interpret the divine law in the Bible. 12
The process for making and enforcing human laws was seen as
susceptible to codification that would treat everyone the same and
be understandable to all. These codifications were the first American bills of rights.
In addition to religion, the desperate situation of colonists isolated in pockets scattered along a thousand-mile coastline put a
high premium on cooperation if they were to survive. The earliest
colony, in Virginia, initially tried a military style of organization,
but this soon gave way to a system of eliciting cooperation by treating people well. Moreover, where many of the inhabitants were
stockholders in the joint-stock company that owned the colony,
the privileges normally accorded stockholders in a corporation led
to voting rights and the ability to determine company policy. Since
the "company" in America erected its own government, the jointstock form of organization, where it existed, reinforced the inclinations associated with dissenting Protestantism. Early bills of rights
were an effective and efficient means for producing order, stability,
cooperative behavior, and economic progress.
Finally, the status of American colonies as economic enterprises, especially as seen from England, tended to emphasize economic output rather than political control as the primary consideration. That a loose political control from England produced the
most economic output only enhanced the sense that colonists had
of running their own lives. A confluence of circumstances led
Americans to develop and to expect a set of rights not found in England, a set of rights characterized by a breadth, detail, equality,
fairness, and effectiveness in limiting all branches of government
that distinguished it from English common law.
No one represented the disjunction between English and
American rights better than William Penn, who, because of his
Quaker beliefs, suffered through a trial in England that shocks us
today. When he founded Pennsylvania, Penn granted religious
freedom, which was lacking in England, as part of a bill of rights
grounded in his religion and experiences. He also consulted the existing codes of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, and Virginia, and possibly because of common religious assumptions his
list of rights largely overlapped these earlier codes. His Frame of
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Government (1682) contained 58 percent (fifteen out of twenty-six)
of the U.S. Bill of Rights; the English Bill of Rights seven years later
had only one-third as much overlap (five out of twenty-six-19 percent). English common law did form part of the background to our
bills of rights, but in America the common law was exposed to the
powerful air of equality and independence that transformed it into
a profoundly different American version. 13 The Bill of Rights has a
long historical pedigree, but that pedigree lies substantially in documents written by people on American shores.

Contrasting English and American
Concepts of Rights
The American view of rights was distinguished from that in Britain
by two fundamental conceptual differences; one lay in the way
Americans used bills of rights to express community values, and
the other lay in the English and American notions of liberty.
The first difference stemmed from the religious background
and the tenuous situation of most colonists. When we look at the
earliest colonial documents of political foundation, such as the
Mayflower Compact (1620), the Pilgrim Code of Law (1636), and
the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639), we find that
among other things these documents usually involved the self-creation of a people-in the double sense of forming a new people
and then of establishing the common values, interests, and goals
that bound them as a people.14 These self-defining or self-creating
people were in the habit of providing in later documents updated
versions of their fundamental, shared values; such lists of shared
values evolved into what we now call bills of rights.
It made sense for a religious people to cite the Bible in a bill of
rights. Since the Bible was central to the life they shared, the values
they held could be justified by identifying in the Bible where these
values were enunciated or implied. As the population became
more diverse and less religious, the biblical references might disappear but not the tendency for bills of rights to use admonitory language rather than legally binding terminology. Consider for example the following typical excerpts from state bills of rights :
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That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of
liberty, and therefore ought never to be restrained. 15
That the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other. 16
All elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of this
commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish by their frame of government, have an equal right to elect
officers, and to be elected, for public employments. 17
That a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a
firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry,
and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty and keep government free. 18
These may strike some people as peculiar statements for bills
of rights, yet they are all from such bills and use language that is
typical rather than exceptional. One can see clearly from the use of
"ought" and "should" instead of "shall" and "will" that the language is admonitory rather than legal. One can also easily see how
these bills of rights are statements of shared values and fundamental principles; here we are a long way from common law.
Contending Views of Rights in 1789
In 1789, on the eve of the writing of America's Bill of Rights, the following contending positions obtained in the Anglo-Saxon world
on the nature of rights. One was associated with the common-law
view of liberty derived from medieval society and embodied in
Magna Carta. In this view the Crown was limited by the rights associated with the aristocracy in the feudal hierarchy and was attached to the distribution of property. Even though this was the
stronger of two strains in common law, it was not part of the American notion of rights. 19
A second position on rights was associated with the other
common-law view of liberty-that all English citizens possessed
from their common legal and constitutional past a set of rights that
protected them from an arbitrary Crown, especially in the operation of the court system. This position had been read into Magna
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Carta, most notably by Sir Edward Coke, even though it was not
there; in Coke's view the common law protected all English people
against royal prerogative. Because this view was used primarily by
Parliament in its struggle with the Crown, rights were not seen as
limiting Parliament. Since Americans lacked an aristocracy upon
which to rest the first version of common law, the second version
was dominant in the colonies; this view gave them no basis for resisting Parliament, however, in its attempts to tax the colonies.
Thus Americans were left with the older version of common law,
which the Glorious Revolution in England had rendered anachronistic, or they had to use a different grounding for rights than that
found in the common law.
Fortunately, the colonists had available a view of rights that
they had been using more or less for a century and a half and that
was undergirded by theology and rationalist philosophy. In this
third position all human law had to be judged in terms of its conformity with a higher law; by implication all branches of government, including the legislature, were limited by this higher law.
This premise led to the conclusion that all branches of government
were subject to popular consent and that rights were defined as the
set of guarantees protecting the free and effective operation of that
consent.
Bills of rights, according to this view, were lists of common
commitments that protected the operation of popular consent and
codified the commonly held commitments that popular consent
had already identified. By 1776 the language used to express the
rights position had become thoroughly secular: "That all power
being originally inherent in, and consequently derived from the
people: therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or
executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them. " 20 Preambles to state constitutions frequently had
statements similar to this excerpt from the 1780 Massachusetts document: "The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of
individuals; it is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people,
that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good. " 21
The last two quotations might at first appear to be taken from
John Locke, but such language was used in America long before
Locke's Second Treatise was published. The communitarian, popu-
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lar-consent approach to rights was initially derived from dissenting
Protestant theology as it was applied to the design of political institutions in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century North America.
The popular-consent view emphasized the needs of the community and saw all branches of government as limited in their operation by universally shared, unchanging human rights.
The similarity in language to that used by John Locke, Algernon Sidney, and other English political theorists is a measure of
the extent to which religion and rationalism influenced political
conclusions in late eighteenth-century America. The terms and
concepts of Sidney, Locke, Bolingbroke, Milton, and a host of other
writers were efficiently blended with that of dissenting Protestantism, and thus a complete text on the origin of American notions of
rights must include a number of European thinkers as well.
To illustrate the blend, consider the opening articles in the bills
of rights of two prominent state constitutions.
That all men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst
which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding. 22
All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural,
essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in
fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being . . .
And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his
person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner
and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience.23
The language sounds Lockean, but it was also taken from Algernon Sidney.2• Furthermore, an examination of the writings of
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Thomas Hooker and Roger Williams, published well before Locke
and Sidney wrote, will illustrate the extent to which religious writers in America had already developed the positions outlined in
these quotes and in similar language.
Hooker, Williams, Locke, and Sidney saw all branches of government as limited by rights, a position that was roundly ignored
in England during the eighteenth century. Yet neither the religious
nor the rationalist approaches envisioned having rights legally enforced by the courts rather than by elections, constitutional revision, or armed rebellion. This important step in the development
of American bills of rights was still in the future and to a certain extent would rest upon an accident of history.

Drafting the U.S. Bill of Rights
The American view of rights, derived in part from English common law, undergirded by dissenting Protestant theology, and reinforced by rationalist political philosophy, was essentially developed in the local political arena and codified at the colony-wide
level. After independence in 1776 the articulation, codification,
and protection of rights continued to proceed first at the state and
local levels. It should not surprise us, then, to learn that state and
local leaders, not national political leaders, insisted upon a national
bill of rights.
The United States Constitution, as originally written, contained a number of rights scattered through the document but did
not have a fully articulated bill of rights. The Federalists, including
Madison and Hamilton, believed that a bill of rights at the national
level was unnecessary and perhaps dangerous. 25 They viewed it as
needless for three reasons. First, there were extensive bills of rights
already in existence at the state level. Second, the political process
defined by the national constitution was viewed as so fair, balanced, and limited that it could not impinge upon rights, and if it
did the states could always use their own bills of rights to protect
their respective citizens. Third, bills of rights were appropriate to a
regime in which there was a separation between the people and
their rulers but inapplicable to a republican regime in which the
people are both rulers and ruled. A national bill of rights was po-
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tentially dangerous for two reasons. First, any list was bound to
leave out rights that in the future would be considered important
but by their absence imply that they were not protected. Second,
since bills of rights were statements of commonly held values and
commitments and differences in these values and commitments
obtained from state to state, a national bill of rights would either
have to contain the least common denominator, thus leaving out
rights considered important by many people, or else local and state
diversity would have to be ignored by the imposition of nationwide standards and values that were in fact not held nationwide.
In either case a national bill of rights would be dangerous to rights
and liberty.
These arguments did not convince the opponents of the proposed Constitution, and opposition centered most vociferously
upon the lack of a bill of rights. James Madison initiated the proposal for amending the Constitution, but it was perhaps the most
lukewarm introduction in political history. The Annals of Congress,
the early version of the Congressional Record, show Madison as saying again that a national bill of rights was unnecessary and dangerous, but since he had promised one, here it was.
Madison, mindful of his own words on the dangers of looking
to the least common denominator, nevertheless produced a list of
nine amendments containing forty-two rights that constituted the
core of most state bills of rights. Madison's proposed amendments
were given to a select committee in the House of Representatives,
with one member from each state on the committee. The House
produced a list with seventeen articles, which the Senate reduced
to twelve. A conference committee worked out the differences, and
on October 2, 1789, a proposed bill of rights was sent to the states
for ratification (see Table 3.4).
It was assumed at the outset of congressional action that the
bill of rights would either be placed as a list at the beginning of the
Constitution, as was the case with state bills of rights, or else scattered through the body of the Constitution proper, as Madison
proposed. The Connecticut delegation, however, insisted that the
rights be appended at the end of the document as a set of explicit
amendments to reflect their true status. Placing them in the body
of a document ratified only with great difficulty implied the need
to go through the entire ratification process again, but treating
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them as amendments did not require having to change any wording in the Constitution per se.
Roger Sherman's proposal to place the rights at the end instead of scattering them throughout the document as Madison
wanted turned out to be fateful, since listing the rights together at
the end gave them a prominence and a combined status over time
that otherwise would have been lost. Placing the Bill of Rights at
the end, rather than at the beginning as the states preferred, had
an unnoted yet historically important effect on the language of the
proposed rights.
The lists of rights proposed by the various states in almost every case used the admonitory "ought" and "should" rather than
the legally enforceable "shall" and "will," with which we are now
familiar. Madison, intending to place the rights in the body of the
Constitution, used the constitutionally proper "shall" and "will."
Initially the House of Representatives' version used a mixture of
admonitory and legally enforceable language, but when the House
select committee agreed to accept Sherman's proposal to place the
Bill of Rights at the end as amendments, it was necessary to
change the wording to legally enforceable language since a "shall"
cannot be amended with an "ought."
Without this change in language occasioned by the placement
of the Bill of Rights at the end rather than at the beginning of the
Constitution, it is difficult to see how American rights could have
developed as they did or how the Supreme Court could have
emerged as the definer and protector of legal rights. The change in
wording was due entirely to the placement of the Bill of Rights, not
to any philosophy of American rights theory as of 1789. Later developments in American theories of rights would be heavily affected and conditioned, in short, by a historical accident.
It took two and a half years for the necessary three-fourths of the
states to ratify ten of the twelve proposed amendments to the Constitution, which together are now known as the Bill of Rights. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Georgia did not ratify these amendments until
the sesquicentennial celebration of the Constitution in 1939. That the
process took so long, that it failed to elicit ratification by all the states,
and that two proposed amendments failed to receive the necessary
three-fourths support indicate some controversy in state legislatures.
Much of the controversy stemmed, as Madison had predicted, from

Table 3.4. Madison's Proposed Amendments Compared with Later Versions
Madison's House Senate Sent to Ratified
Version Version Version States
1. Power derived from
people
2. Government exercised
for common good
3. Life, liberty, property,
and happiness
4. Right of people to
change government
5. No. of representatives
6. Congressional raises
7. Religious freedom
8. Right of conscience
9. Free speech
10. Freedom of written expression
11. Free press
12. Assembly
13. Petition and remonstrance
14. Right to bear arms
15. Pacifists-no arms
16. No quartering in peacetime
17. No quartering without
warrant
18. No double jeopardy
19. No double punishment
20. Self-incrimination
21. Due process of law
22. Compensate for property taken
23. Excessive bail or fines
24. No cruel and unusual
punishment
25. No search and seizure
26. Speedy and public trial
27. Told nature of crime
28. Confronted with accusers
29. Witnesses for defense
30. Right to counsel
31. Rights retained by
people

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X
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Table 3.4. Continued
Madison's House Senate Sent to Ratified
Version Version Version States
32. No implied powers for
Congress
33. No state violate 8, 9, 11,
or 26 above
34. Appeal limited by dollar
amount
35. Jury cannot be bypassed
36. Impartial jury from vicinity
37. Jury unanimity
38. Right to challenge judicial decision
39. Grand jury
40. Jury trial for civil cases
41. Separation of powers
42. Powers reserved to
states

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

Note: The rights are arranged in the order used by Madison in his June 8, 1789, version
sent to the Committee of Eleven of the House of Representatives (the committee was
composed of one member from each of the eleven states that had ratified the Constitution by that date).
Source: This table is based upon an examination of the original documents in the National Archives.

different expectations from state to state. Some states wanted more or
different rights; others wanted fewer. Perhaps we should be surprised
that any coherent bill passed at all.
Toward a Complete Text on the Origins
of American Bills of Rights
The discussion on rights could continue at great length, but we
have gone far enough to make a provisional list in answer to our
question, "What constitutes a reasonably complete text for any discussion of the origin of rights in America?" Thus I offer an assembled text of public, political documents that should be addressed,
at a minimum, to deal with this question. 26
Magna Carta (1215)
Letters Patent to Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1573)
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Laws and Orders Concluded by the Virginia General Assembly
(1624)
Petition of Right-England (1628)
Pilgrim Code of Law (1636)
An Act for the Liberties of the People-Maryland (1638)
Maryland Act Concerning Religion (1639)
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639)
Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641)
The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (1647)
Acts and Orders of 1647-Rhode Island
Connecticut Code of Laws (1650)
An Act Concerning Our Liberties-Massachusetts (1661)
The Charter of Connecticut (1662)
The Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663)
General Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (1672)
Habeas Corpus Act-England (1679)
Laws and Liberties of New Hampshire (1682)
Penn's Charter of Liberties (1682)
New York Charter of Liberties (1683)
Bill of Rights-England (1689)
Resolves of the Stamp Act Congress (1765)
Appeal to the Inhabitants of Quebec (1774)
Declaration and Resolves of First Continental Congress (1774)
Rights of the Colonists (1774)
Second Declaration of the Continental Congress (1775)
Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)
Declaration of Independence (1776)
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights (1776)
Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776)
Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776)
North Carolina Declaration of Rights (1776)
Massachusetts Bill of Rights (1780)
New Hampshire Bill of Rights (1784)
Northwest Ordinance (1787)
Constitution of the United States (1787)
Amendments Proposed by Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
(1789)
Amendments Proposed by Massachusetts Ratifying Convention
(1789)
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Amendments Proposed by Maryland Ratifying Convention
(1789)
Amendments Proposed by South Carolina Ratifying Convention
(1789)
Amendments Proposed by New Hampshire Ratifying Convention (1789)
Amendments Proposed by Virginia Ratifying Convention (1789)
Amendments Proposed by New York Ratifying Convention
(1789)
Amendments Proposed by North Carolina Ratifying Convention
(1789)
Madison's Proposed Amendments (June 8, 1789)
Report of the House Committee of Eleven (July 28, 1789)
Amendments Passed by the House (Aug. 24, 1789)
Amendments Passed by the Senate (Sept. 9, 1789)
Amendments Passed by Congress and Sent to States (Sept. 25,
1789)
U.S. Bill of Rights (1791)
The list of relevant documents is impressive although it is not
even close to including all the primary sources. Dozens of major
pamphlets, tracts, and essays were written about rights during the
1780s alone, and these must be consulted to help us understand
how words were used and how intelligent and informed people of
the time actually thought about rights. Then there is a substantial
list of secondary sources covering works from the common law to
discussions of American politics in the 1780s-all of which help us
understand better the Bill of Rights.
One cannot sit down and analyze the meaning of the Bill of
Rights as one can a poem-in splendid isolation. The Bill of Rights
is a partial text because the Constitution that it amends requires
inclusion of the state constitutions to be completed, and this
makes the state bills of rights part of American rights. And, just as
there are many rights in the body of the U.S. Constitution that
must be considered part of the national "rights package," so too
are there many rights in the bodies of the state constitutions that
are part of the total rights package of our founding.
Of special interest is the list of proposed rights that Madison
introduced in Congress since it raises a number of questions
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about the intentions of the founders. Madison's version, like the
state bills of rights and their colonial precursors, seems to say that
the most fundamental right is to be subject only to laws to which
one has consented through participation in a fair political process;
all other rights appear ancillary to this most fundamental right.27
Given such an understanding, the rights in the first amendment
are not simply individual rights in the view of the founding generation but rights that are required for the people to organize themselves to control the political process. The right to communicate
ideas freely, to criticize the government, to communicate through
speech and press for purposes of creating political organizations,
to assemble in groups and in meetings for purposes of organizing,
to communicate the results of meetings, to tell those in government what is expected in the way of legislation-these aspects of
the democratic process require the specific rights of speech, press,
assembly, and petition. These rights are thus not necessarily ends
in themselves but may be the means to an end: the popular control of government.28 Reading a more complete text presents us
with interpretations that would be lost with a naive reading of an
isolated text.
The primary documentary text assembled here is generated
by a particular question, but many questions can be asked about
rights, just as there are many ways to use the works in the text
just assembled. The question we used to generate the list of documents in our text is essentially a historian's question. It is worth
considering how the same list might be approached by nonhistorians sin•ce many of the arguments over rights stem from the differing goals brought to a text.

Attitudes toward Texts on Rights
Spending time on a text for the Bill of Rights allows me to illustrate
a final, crucial aspect of textual analysis-although the question is
the basis for assembling a text, how we treat the resulting text is related to certain attitudes we bring to it. The point will become
clearer after considering the possible meanings that underlie the
word "right." Essentially a right is a claim made by one person or
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group against another person or group. 29 It is a claim that I am entitled to a certain kind of treatment by others.
General Definition: A right is a claim made by A against B. Such a
claim may result in any one of several types of action-for example,
the claim may be that someone owes me a certain positive action,
that someone must do something I ask; or it may be the negative
claim that someone else must not do something I ask. The claim
might be that a person must act toward me in a certain fashion
even if I do not ask. The claim might be that I may act in a certain
way or else that I may be forgiven for not acting in a certain way.
Regardless of the nature of the relationship between A and B
that the right defines, of critical importance is the grounding or
justification for the claim. Historically, a number of grounds have
been advanced for a right.
1. Right as Privilege: the claim that a person or persons must act
in a certain way toward me as a result of a position that I hold
(such as those in a given class, caste, social position, or political post)
2. Right as Duty: the claim that a certain person must act in a certain way toward me as a result of a position that the person
holds (such as parent to child, king to subject, or doctor to
patient)
3. Right as Promise or Contract: the claim that a certain person
must act in a certain way toward me as a result of a mutual
agreement that we have reached
4. Civil Right: the claim that a certain person must act in acertain way toward me as a result of a law, edict, or dispensation
made by a mutually recognized superior that I be so treated
5. Common Law Right: the claim that a certain person must act in
a certain way toward me as a result of our both being English
(or American, or Canadian) with a common legal and political
tradition
6. Natural Right: the claim that a certain person must act in acertain way toward me as a result of our both being human
beings
These are some of the patterns of justification for rights that a
historian would uncover in answer to the question, "How have
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rights been justified in Anglo-American history?" That is, a historian will seek to uncover claims that were actually made, by whom,
against whom, on what grounds, and at what time. The historian
will seek to recreate and to understand the process whereby the
claim came to be made and the subsequent effects these claims
had. All claims are treated as historical artifacts, so the potential
truth of any claim is tied to its congruence with an accurate retelling of events in a defensible sequential ordering.
Thus, the claim that one person has on another as a result of
holding a certain position can be confirmed to the extent that the
historian can verify which people did in fact hold the positions
they said they did and that people of that time and in that culture
did have a set of expectations attached to the respective positions;
but the historian, as historian, has nothing to say about whether
the justification is adequate and worth heeding. The historian can
likewise confirm a promise, a contract, a law, a common nationality, or a common humanity, but history as a discipline cannot affirm or deny the truth of any justification for a rights claim. Historians are free to praise or blame and to extract meaning, but these
activities are human reactions, not the stuff of which historiography is made. In sum, the historian's attitude toward any text is
such that its truth is a function of the facts the record will bear and
nothing more.
Empirical political theorists, or political scientists, have a related attitude toward texts. They will ask what claims were made,
by whom, against whom, on what grounds, and with what effect;
but the -political scientist will go further and examine many instances of rights claims in a search for causal patterns that systematically link circumstances with claims and for systematic, predictable effects that such claims might have on human behavior. All
claims are thus treated as independent or dependent variables,
and the potential truth value any given claim might have is of no
interest. Truth is instead related to adequate empirical evidence for
regularities in human behavior. Political scientists, like historians,
may praise, blame, accept, or reject a given claim, but they cannot
do so on any grounds related to their form of inquiry. For political
scientists, texts contain data, not truth.
A legal scholar will ask about the status of any rights claim in
the context of the relevant laws, cases, and documents. Claims will
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be examined in terms of their connection to precedent, with principles stated in relevant texts, with principles that are logically implied by relevant texts, or with principles of justice that bring order
to widely accepted but diverse principles inherent in the relevant
texts. Rights claims tend to be treated as hypotheses about the order or logic that may be found in the relevant texts, and thus the
truth of a rights claim is discoverable by reference to these texts but
is also limited by their content.
An analytic political theorist will seek out the precise linguistic
meaning of rights claims, the logical sense such claims make, and
the logical implications they entail. An analytically inclined theorist in part analyzes how rights claims are used by those who make
them and by those who study them, with an eye to precision, consistency, usefulness, connotation, and overall coherence. All rights
claims are treated as objects of analysis with greater or lesser utility
but with no inherent truth value. Truth is related to the logical validity of deductions, and utility as a standard of value has no relationship to truth.
Much of the material in this book falls under the heading of
analytic political theory. The title ambiguously implies a concern
with analysis, or with pretheoretical analysis, as Charles Hyneman
called it, rather than with political science or philosophy. Yet the
argument in chapter 1 suggests that the term "political theory" can
stand for a combination of empirical, analytic, and normative theory, and it is on the matter of rights that Americans face most
squarely the need to move to political philosophy.
A political philosopher will explore the sense that rights claims
make in terms of human needs or aspirations, the principles of
morality, and the goals and purposes of political organization.
Such claims will be examined for revelations about human nature,
the good political order, and the adequacy of political institutions.
All rights claims are viewed as having potential truth value, and it
is the truth value upon which analysis focuses.
Our investigation of a text for analyzing American rights has
led us to one of the central and enduring problems in American
political theory-the manner and extent to which the enterprise includes a normative core. Recent debates about the relative importance of "virtue" for the operation of our institutions, both at the
founding and in the current behavior of our legislators, are a mani-
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festation of the issue. Debates over the extent to which the Constitution rests upon "republican'' theory (that is, upon a virtuous
people and even more virtuous leaders) or upon "enlightenment"
principles (that is, upon principles of design that will produce certain political consequences regardless of the virtue of the actors)
are another manifestation. Debates between those who wish to unleash market forces by minimizing governmental interference in
our lives and those who see a need for forming civil behavior
through regulation are to a certain extent replaying the Federalist/
Antifederalist debate.
How we assemble a text, then, is affected by the question we
ask; and both the question and the use we make of the text assembled to answer the question are affected by the attitude we bring to
the text. There is no preferred set of questions, no superior approach. American political theory not only has room for these perspectives on rights just described, in the end the nature of our discipline requires that the various approaches must be used and
integrated. The purpose of the discussion here is not to establish a
litmus test for judging the utility of research but to help those who
engage in American political theory become more conscious of
their assumptions.
The Bill of Rights since 1792
Although this book is only a preface to American political theory
and not a summary of its history, the story of American rights is
ongoing and requires further comment. The narrative does not
have an ending but an expanding and changing horizon.
Passage of the national Bill of Rights did not really bring
change at first; the states were still considered the primary protectors of rights. Only in the early twentieth century, well after the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, did the Supreme Court
begin to use the national Bill of Rights to protect rights in a systematic fashion. One major effect the Bill of Rights did have during the
nineteenth century was to lead drafters of state constitutions to recast the language of their bills of rights into the legally binding
form using "shall" and "will." With their longer lists of rights and
strengthened language, most states were ahead of the national
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government in the development of rights, although nowhere did
the breadth and depth of protection approach current levels.
Two broad developments have occurred during the twentieth
century. The first has been the expansion of national rights, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, to an unprecedented degree. We
have come to take these rights so much for granted that we forget
how recently they have been expanded. The second development
has been the application of the Bill of Rights against the states
through use of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both developments were made possible by the legally enforceable language inserted in the national Bill of Rights in 1789.
Scholarship and publicity surrounding the second broad development left the impression that rights at the state level were not
well protected and that the national government had forged ahead
in rights protection, but this perception was not completely true.
The problem was not that rights lagged in the states but that diversity in rights existed among the states. Many or most states already
protected rights at a level required by the Supreme Court, but ten
to fifteen states clearly trailed behind. The net effect of federal
action has been to establish a "floor" in American rights; that minimum guarantee is still exceeded by many states.
Active expansion of rights by the Supreme Court, as much as it
was needed, had the effect of temporarily eclipsing the development of rights in the states, but that may be changing. In recent
years there has been a trend toward "rediscovering" an independent constitutional law at the state level with respect to rights, especially in those states where state bills of rights are stronger and
broader in definition than the Bill of Rights. 30
We now rely primarily upon the courts to protect rights, not a
bad thing in itself, but it results in the tendency to focus attention
upon court cases and thus upon rights piecemeal instead of upon
bills of rights and the general principles they embody. There is an
advantage in viewing rights as expressions of fundamental commitments by a people, as the grounding for democratic institutions, and thus as an essential part of the total political process in a
constitutional order. 31
Consider how much of the material that has been uncovered
by this discussion of rights in America would not have been uncovered by a textual analysis that worked solely from the text of the

88

Chapter Three

U.S. Bill of Rights. American political theory works from texts that
force us to conside.- explicitly the components of a complete text;
this in tum pushes us into a historical approach to American politics. Just as a preface to American political theory must discuss the
matter of textual analysis, so too must it discuss the use and misuse of history. We turn now to a history of the study of American
political theory during the twentieth century as a means of discussing the complexities of historical analysis.

Chapter4

The Use of History in
American Political Theory

To focus on the Bill of Rights in an attempt to build a complete text
illustrates the importance of historical perspective for textual analysis in American political theory, but at the same time it demonstrates the limits of historical analysis. On the one hand the search
for a complete text requires that we study historical antecedents as
well as the historical and symbolic context surrounding a piece of
writing; on the other hand even when we have constructed a reasonably complete text, history cannot help us much in deciding
what we should do with that text. The latter task would seem to require a tum to philosophy, but professional philosophy over the
past five decades has increasingly tended to avoid normative discourse of the kind that is useful to political theory. To the extent
that philosophy has dealt with political philosophy, historically
grounded discourse has given way to an abstract, logical analysis
with limited application to the texts that might be assembled on
American political theory. 1 Further, when philosophers discuss
normative issues today they either tend toward an analysis of the
possible meanings of words like "good" or else focus narrowly
only on an analysis of single issues, such as abortion or capital
punishment. Even discussions of rights tend to be reduced to analyses of the possible meanings of "rights claims." Such discussions
studiously avoid any language that might imply that rights are actual entities with an existence grounded in human experience. 2
Thus, at the very time that historians and political scientists
working in American political theory have started to create, if not a
convergence in perspective, at least a parallel discourse in which
there is agreement upon the major questions, philosophy offers no
89
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help in dealing with these questions because the intellectual tools
and categories increasingly used by academic philosophers prevent mutual discourse. Historians and political theorists still feel
comfortable speaking to each other because both sides continue to
have an interest in politics. Philosophers, however, persist in
adopting methods and categories that are not only apolitical but increasingly antipolitical.
American history has become increasingly empirical, working
from facts rather than from grand theory, and this trend has made
American historians more interested in politics and more adept at
analyzing politics than their European counterparts. Philosophy,
however, has become more and more "Europeanized" in its methods and aims, with the result that the problems and issues that
students of American political theory must confront are not explored. Politics looks too "messy," too contingent, and too imperfect for American academic philosophers. It has now reached the
point that anyone who studies political philosophy in American
philosophy departments is looked down upon-as engaged in a
not altogether savory enterprise. Graduate students interested in
political philosophy in general, and American political theory in
particular, now either move to political science departments or find
a different interest to pursue in philosophy.
American history, on the other hand, has become increasingly
interesting and helpful to students of American political theory.
Perhaps because American political theory has been so obviously
and continuously connected to ongoing political processes and
discourse, not out of accident but by its very nature, theoretical discourse about American politics seems to have become inherently
inseparable from the study of American history; in contrast, the
study of European political philosophy, centered on great texts
more often than not written by men outside the political process,
can more easily proceed in splendid isolation from history. As
those scholars in political science departments work to advance
American political theory, those who are writing in American history will become more rather than less important to them; therefore, the story of the study of American history over the past half
century is an important part of the preface for understanding the
nature and limitations of the questions that currently dominate
American political theory.
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An Evolving View of the American Founding
Traditional political theory is built upon a close analysis of texts,
which provides its students with the intellectual discipline, insight, and perspective needed to develop a comprehensive, integrated view of politics. Historians, on the other hand, use texts
more as examples of broader intellectual trends and view them as
providing only part of the information required to describe and explain historical events and developments. One branch of history,
the history of ideas, comes closest to traditional political theory in
its approach, but the history of ideas still emphasizes the origin,
elaboration, and diffusion of ideas; political theory focuses upon
the content and implications of the ideas themselves.
American political theory is the one area in which historians
and political theorists still plow common ground and speak regularly to one another. Each discipline brings its own tools and preoccupations, and discussions sometimes produce bewilderment or
irritation, but historians and political scientists regularly read and
review each others' work in American political theory. This connectedness is of interest because since World War II both historians
and political scientists have engaged in a sustained, evolutionary
reevaluation of American political thought that has moved both
sides to a new set of questions that both unites and divides them.
The 1940s found those working on American political thought
in political science departments essentially to reflect the viewpoints of historians, and historians for the most part were using a
curiously nonhistorical framework for discussing the Constitution.
Despite the seminal prewar work by men like Andrew C.
Mclaughlin and Charles M. Andrews, which illustrated the manner and extent to which the Constitution was beholden to colonial
developments, the standard post-war discussion of the Constitution treated it almost as a free-floating phenomenon resulting from
events beginning, at best, around 1763. 3
The literature of the 1940s was dominated by two assumptions
or theses, one of which had been advanced by the progressive historians, who were more interested in explaining the present than
the past. They viewed politics as a process in which legal and philosophical abstractions masked the real forces underlying history
and believed that ideas were secondary to, and the result of, eco-
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nomic and geographical circumstances. Frederick Jackson Turner,
Charles A. Beard, and Vernon L. Parrington were most prominent
in this group. 4 Charles Beard advanced this first thesis most forcefully when he argued that the founders were motivated primarily
by economic considerations, and Parrington softened but generalized Beard's view to cover all of American political thought. The
dominance of the economic interpretation made analysis of colonial contributions seem unnecessary, and historians made slow
progress until the extreme version of Beard's thesis was discredited
in the 1950s. Ironically, with the demise of naive economic determinism, analyses of economic and social influences in American political history flowered and became richer, more concise, and more
convincing. 5
The second thesis or assumption maintained that American
political thought was essentially derived from the philosophy of
John Locke. Carl Becker and Louis Hartz were most prominent in
popularizing the position. Becker was positive in his assessment of
Locke's influence when he argued that Jefferson simply copied
Locke in the Declaration of Independence, but Hartz decried
Locke's domination of American political thought since it resulted
in America's being hopelessly individualistic, materialistic, and
capitalistic.• Agreement on Locke's influence was so widespread
that it crossed ideological lines and became for a time one of the
strongest orthodoxies in American intellectual history.7 A few, like
Vernon Parrington, discussed the possible influence of other European thinkers; but by and large the U.S. Constitution was viewed
either as an economically grounded document that did not flow
from an existing theory or as the result of a wholesale transfer of
Locke's ideas-with Locke used as ideological window dressing or
as a remedy for the lack of any coherent American political
thought.
In addition to the works of Beard, Parrington, Becker, and
Hartz, courses in American political thought in the late 1940s were
also likely to use in some combination the writings of Charles
Mcilwain, Arthur M. Schlesinger, C. Edward Merriam, Max Farrand, Allan Nevins, and Merrill Jensen. 8 Otherwise, courses in
American political thought worked from several collections of primary documents-mainly those of Max Farrand, Jonathan Elliott,
Paul Leicester Ford, and Francis N. Thorpe.9 If any feature distin-
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guished the teaching of American political thought by political scientists as opposed to historians it was the greater inclination by the
former to introduce a strong dose of legalism, usually through the
use of Edward S. Corwin's many books and articles as well as
through a case book of Supreme Court decisions.
The peculiarity in this literature and in the use made of primary documents lay in an almost grim determination to avoid discussion of American political theory as defined in chapter 1. Instead, American political thought, often viewed as ideology, was
surveyed as part of American culture; Vernon L. Parrington's
widely used Main Currents in American Thought was utterly typical.
Note the absence of "political" in its title and the use of "thought"
rather than "theory." Parrington was a professor of English, and
his dedication to American thought rather than to American political theory is illustrated by his encyclopedic survey's having little
discussion of James Madison yet including passages on the satires
of John Trumbull, Francis Hopkinson, and Jonathan Odell as well
as a long final section in Book 3 on "The War of Belles Lettres." Parrington does have a section on Alexander Hamilton drawn from
original documents including The Federalist, but a quotation from
that section will illustrate how he used such material.
In elaborating a system of checks and balances the members of
the convention were influenced by the practical considerations
of economic determinism more than by the theories of Montesquieu. They were realists who followed the teachings of the
greatest political thinkers from Aristotle to Locke in asserting
that the problem of government lay in arranging a stable balance between the economic interests of the major classes. The
revolutionary conception of equalitarianism, that asserted the
rights of man apart from property and superior to property,
did not enter into their thinking as a workable hypothesis. 10
Parrington goes on to cite Madison at some length in a passage
in which Madison presents a series of theoretical propositions giving part of a theory for checks and balances. But Parrington misconstrues Madison's theory as merely an ideologically grounded
attempt to protect the wealthy, ignores the part of the theory that
does not fit an economic or elitist interpretation, and then pro-
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claims that such a "conception of the natural sovereignty of the
landed interest with its stake-in-society theory of political rights
America inherited from England." Edmund S. Morgan is only one
of many scholars who have shown Parrington to be wrong in this
last respect. Morgan convincingly argues that the way in which
Americans view sovereignty, and the way sovereignty is codified in
our constitutions, is one of the fundamental differences between
American and English political thought. 11 Still, in the 1940s it was
assumed that if Americans had a thought during their political history it originated in England. The centerpiece of American political
theory-The Federalist by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay-was typically used in piecemeal fashion to buttress ideological debate instead of as a text in political theory. 12
The 1950s saw a move toward a new perspective. Caroline
Robbins, Clinton Rossiter, and Douglass Adair were prominent in
dissenting from the orthodox view and in pointing out the nonLockean roots of the American political tradition. 13 Robbins published a 1947 article in the William and Mary Quarterly that in hindsight was the opening shot. 14 In her later book, The Eighteenth
Century Commonwealthman, Robbins persuasively argued for the
importance of the English libertarian heritage to colonial and revolutionary Americans. Men such as Harrington, Milton, Sidney,
Neville, Molesworth, and Trenchard and Gordon, she argued, had
a central and continuing influence on early American political
thought. Douglass Adair documented the impact of David Hume
on James Madison's theory of the extended republic, and Clinton
Rossiter took a more sympathetic look at the American founders as
theorists as well as edging away from Locke's dominance.
Simultaneously, the simple economic determinism that underlay discussions of American political thought in the 1940s was being discredited by both Robert E. Brown and Forrest McDonald. 15
Beard's death in 1948 perhaps symbolized the end of the dominance of progressive historians, but it did not immediately result in
a more political and theoretical discussion. Instead, there developed another dominant view that is now termed neoconservative
or "consensus" history; Richard Hofstadter, Daniel J. Boorstin,
and Louis Hartz were prominent figures in this 1950s' development.16
Hofstadter saw a strong continuity in American political
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thought but argued that it began in 1787 since the founders in his
eyes designed original institutions without reference to earlier
events, and this continuity was based on the wholesale adoption of
Locke's political principles. Boorstin did not see continuity in
American political thought as grounded in Locke but in American
circumstance and experience. This "genius of American politics"
explains the continuity, the relative lack of conflict, and the absence of ideology in American political history; it also suggests
that there is no American political theory, or very little, and even
that turns out to be neither significant nor original. Louis Hartz, of
course, continued to inject the dominance-of-Locke perspective despite the growing doubts about this thesis.
Political scientists went through a similar evolution but for reasons related to changes in their own discipline, not as a result of
reading historians. American political science had begun its development toward an empirically oriented social science with the
publication of Arthur F. Bentley's The Process of Government in
1908. 17 Like the historians, Bentley and the political scientists of his
era were deeply influenced by progressivism; indeed Charles
Beard and Arthur Bentley were the most prominent members of
the "realist school." Unlike Beard, however, Bentley continued to
support American exceptionalism insofar as he viewed the United
States as an essentially classless society that had escaped the economic stratification of Europe because of its republican government and its wide economic opportunity. His interest-group analysis was the harbinger of contemporary mainstream political
science, with its emphasis on political processes rather than on institutions, its pluralist stance as opposed to Beard's class analysis,
and its emphasis on the empirical study of contemporary political
phenomena divorced from any analysis of values or of the normative, which he termed "ghosts." If he went back to the founding
period at all it was to find pluralist political theory in the Madisonian model rather than a design with a theoretical grounding and
purpose. For Bentley, American political theory consisted in the
development of empirical theory to explain behavioral regularities
in the present. 18
Bentley's pluralist approach was pushed to the center of the
discipline by Charles E. Merriam; his History of American Political
Theories published in 1903 did not shrink from reviewing the entire
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history of American political theory from the Puritans onward and
seeing in it the continuous march of democratic progress. In this
sense Merriam, like the progressive historians, saw the past mainly
in terms of explaining the present instead of as an era that had to
be recaptured in its own different terms. In 1921 Merriam published an influential article that, like Turner's famous lecture on the
role of the frontier, defined an emerging research agenda for the
future. Merriam argued for a political science that would emphasize method, that would be oriented toward the discovery of political laws that could be used to control public policy, and that would
be sustained by organized professional structures to promote
research. 19
As political scientists pursued an increasingly empirical
agenda, their findings undercut the progressive assumption of
American exceptionalism, and the increasing tension between
these two legacies finally reached a breaking point by the late
1940s, most notably in Joseph A. Schumpeter's widely read Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 20 Schumpeter still defended the pluralist approach begun by Bentley but argued for the concept that
has come to be known as plural elitism. America was not an exception in human history, but because of its democratic institutions
the United States had managed to fragment the elite into competing factions and thus avoid the worst effects of elitist dominance.
In effect, the pluralist approach was used to overlay a class analysis. Schumpeter's analysis and categories became part of the core
theory assumed by mainstream political science. His work was a
contribution to American political theory in its own right, but typical of modern political science it was free-floating and did not require, indeed it eschewed, an examination of earlier American political theory since that earlier theory was not "realistic." It is
interesting, therefore, that Robert A. Dahl, the most famous and
influential exponent of both pluralism and the application of empirical methods to the study of politics, should in 1956 write perhaps the most widely and persistently read book ever written by a
political scientist, A Preface to Democratic Theory, in which he begins
by returning to an analysis of the Madisonian model. 21
Robert Dahl also published a famous empirical study of New
Haven politics, in which he essentially confirmed and refined
Schumpeter's model of democratic elitism. Dahl wrote many
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books and articles in defense of pluralist analysis and was one of
the most prominent exponents for a behaviorally oriented discipline. Yet in 1956 he developed a propositional analysis of Madison's theory in The Federalist that had an unexpected effect; even
though Dahl dismissed Madison's theory as flawed, Dahl's analysis showed to a wide audience the possibility of pursuing American political theory as theory and not simply as ideology. Martin
Diamond in 1959 published a rejoinder to Dahl's analysis that was
itself widely read and highly influential and that also emphasized
the theoretical content of The Federalist. 22 Robert Dahl inadvertently
set off renewed interest in American political theory from the
founding era, and Martin Diamond ensured that The Federalist
would continue to be taken seriously as theory. Dissertations on
the Madisonian model and on political thinkers of eighteenth-century America became a growth industry during the 1960s and
1970s, and the Bicentennial guaranteed that this renewed interest
in American political theory would continue into the 1980s.
Another consequence of Dahl's book, especially juxtaposed
with Diamond's critique of Dahl, a critique that many scholars
think was successful if not devastating, was to separate this renewed interest in American political theory from empirical analysis. Mainstream political science was given a prominent model
showing that American political theory could be taken seriously
while American political theory focused overwhelmingly on the
founding period that Dahl said rested upon a flawed theory. At the
very least the protopluralist theory that he found had been superseded by more recent thinking and research and thus could be
largely ignored. That the renewed interest in American political
theory of the founding period was grounded at least in part upon
an effective critique of Dahl's analysis served only to deepen the
split between American political theory and mainstream political
science. Yet, as I have argued, this split is based upon a misapprehension, one that we now see grows from an intramural battle of
the 1950s. Further, American political theory is inherently empirical since it rests upon the analysis of experience. In any case, the
end of the 1950s saw political scientists reengaging in political theory but in a way that initially separated it from the mainstream of
the discipline.
Meanwhile, the historians were in the process of undergoing
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their own drastic revisions. First, the consensus" school in history
was beginning to give way to an emphasis upon discontinuities in
American history or else to a more evolutionary view that stressed
change. Second, the perspective that saw Locke as dominant was
replaced by the view that one version or another of republicanism
was dominant during the founding era; J.G.A. Pocock, Bernard
Bailyn, and Gordon S. Wood were major figures in this shift. 23 Pocock argued that American political thought was an eighteenthcentury extension of classical republican theory, with its emphasis
on virtue and the common good. Machiavelli and a host of Renaissance thinkers, it was argued, codified classical republicanism into
civic humanism"; these classical ideals, in their Renaissance synthesis, were passed on to the Americans, said Pocock, through the
republican writings of Milton, Harrington, Nedham, Bolingbroke,
and Trenchard and Gordon. Pocock decisively broke the tendency
to view Locke as dominant, but he still viewed American political
thought as essentially ideological rather than theoretical and as derivative of English thought, although now a different version of
English ideology, one that in Pocock's view was born in a dread of
modernity.
Bernard Bailyn identified five major sources from which colonists drew their political thinking-the writings of classical antiquity, the writings of Enlightenment rationalism, the English common-law tradition, the political and social theories of New England
Puritanism (especially covenant theory), and the writers earlier
identified by Caroline Robbins as being associated with the English
Civil War and the Commonwealth. According to Bailyn, this last
group, the radical English Whigs, generated the perspective that
brought order and synthesis to the other strands of writing and
more than any other source shaped the mind of the American revolutionary generation. Thanks to Bailyn we now had an inclusive,
sophisticated synthesis; Pocock's classical writers, Robbins's Commonwealthmen, and some indigenous American Puritan thought
were all part of the mix. Locke was .also in the mix, although the
irony of his position in the blend went unremarked by reviewers of
Bailyn's book. Bailyn places Locke among Enlightenment thinkers,
but this is surely anachronistic. Members of the founding generation were much more likely to link John Locke with the great English Whig thinker Algernon Sidney, to use their names together
II
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in a mantra of equivalence, which makes Locke a prominent member of the very group, the radical English Whigs, that Bailyn says
shaped the mind of the Revolutionary War generation.
The new "orthodoxy" defined by Bailyn's synthesis is a slippery paradigm to apply. First, those men who wrote the Declaration of Independence and who ran the Revolution had different
needs from those who wrote and adopted the Constitution; a simple citation count has already established that different European
writers in different combinations were used during the 1770s, compared with the 1780s. 24 Nor is it always clear where to place individual thinkers: The contemporary scholar Garry Wills places David
Hume within the Scottish Enlightenment, Lundberg and May consider him a member of the more radical second Enlightenment,
Bailyn does not place him clearly in any category, and many of the
founding generation considered Hume a Tory. 25 Without agreement on a stable set of categories and the secure placement of major writers such as Locke and Hume within them, analysis of the
relative influence of such traditions remains problematic.
Criticism of Bailyn's republican school has led to a modest resurgence of the theory of Locke's dominance, mostly by those
trained in political philosophy, but the single-theorist approach to
American political theory is no longer sustainable after Bailyn's
analysis, regardless of which category is most suitable for Locke or
Hume and no matter which category of thinkers was most influential on the American founding generation. 26 Still, although the
theses of Locke's dominance and of economic determinism of the
1940s have finally been discarded by most historians and political
scientists, the tendency prevails to look to Europe for an American
political theory that seems not to be found in America and to view
the appropriated European thought as an ideology rather than as a
theory. It is in the context of this tendency that Gordon Wood's
work is especially interesting.

The Rediscovery of the Political Class
The impact of Gordon Wood's book, The Creation of the American
Republic, was immediate and lasting; published more than twenty
years ago, it remains fresh and convincing. Still, historians have
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tended to misperceive Wood's book as simply one of the key works
that established the central importance of republican theory for
American political thought. A more careful reading shows that
Wood's work develops a picture of the American founding that is
quite at odds with the classical republican school represented by
Pocock, and the difference is crucial for American political theory.
Pocock sees Americans as the ultimate beneficiaries of a classical republicanism recodified by Machiavelli, but Wood carefully reconstructs the evolution of American political thinking that resulted in a distinctively American republican theory-one that was
not simply appropriated from European origins. Perhaps even
more important, Wood's book brought to fruition a new approach
to the study of American political thought, an approach that had
quietly emerged in the work of historians and mainstream political
scientists but had been largely missed by students of the American
founding in political science departments. Gordon Wood showed
us how to analyze American political theory by using the works of
those writers in the political class rather than the works of those
relatively few writers among the elite. To illustrate the importance
of Wood's book, we need to return briefly to a discussion of assembled texts.
We can identify three broad tendencies in the assemblage of
texts in American political theory. The first and oldest tendency is
to examine the writings of the elite; under a presumption that history is guided by and results from the actions of great men, any attempt to explain historical events would seem to require that we
look at their writings. The collected papers of Thomas Jefferson,
James Madison, George Washington, John Adams, Benjamin
Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, and maybe a dozen others would
appear to constitute the prime assembled text in American political
theory. A further presumption that these men operated within a
symbolic environment defined and dominated by other great
minds leads to our first assembled text including the works of major European thinkers, those writers with even greater minds, in
the context of whose work American elites thought and created.
The elitist assumption thus tends to lead us back to one or a few
European thinkers such as Locke, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Hume, or Rousseau.
A concomitant feature of the elitist approach is that we assume
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the major public documents in American political theory, the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S. Bill
of Rights, were the products of this elite. Those using this methodology openly resist suggestions that Jefferson was merely summarizing the generally held ideas of Americans in the Declaration; or
that James Madison, far from being the father of the Constitution,
was on the losing side of a majority of the votes taken at the Constitutional Convention and on almost all of the votes that were
most important to him; or that the Bill of Rights simply summarized the least common denominator found in state bills of rights
written by large numbers of nonelites.21 These claims may or may
not be correct, but those using the elitist approach to assembling
texts in American political theory are often uninterested in the actual historical record. The strengths of the elitist position lie in its
emphasis on the meaning of history as opposed to a mere recitation of facts, its capacity to generate theories of history that are important and interesting, and its power to remind us that ideas do
have consequences. On the negative side, the elitist approach is
not, strictly speaking, historical, it is subject to ideological distortion, and it can too often lead to the kind of sterile debate that inclines people to put its practitioners, such as historians of ideas
and political philosophers, on the margins of intellectual
discourse .
A second and more recent historical development relevant to
American political theory is the rise of social history. Essentially,
social history attempts to reconstruct the lives of the many people
who are without an explicit historical voice, and one could safely
characterize such history as democratic in its perspective. Earlier
historians were not so much antidemocratic as they were limited
by the lack of data, the expense of collecting needed information,
and the lack of relevant methodologies. An old observation in the
social sciences holds that research tends to use the most readily
available information. Social historians have been extremely inventive in their search for surrogate measures of everyday life in earlier
historical eras, and they have worked diligently to gather, organize,
and analyze their data. The information they have used includes
probate-court records, voting data, newspaper circulation patterns,
census figures, financial and economic data, mortality statistics,
court records, minutes of town meetings, county health records,
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oral histories, autobiographies, diaries, newspaper ads, political
campaign material, and just about any material that can be systematically analyzed. That is, the assembled text used by social historians includes far more than political writings, as these researchers
attempt to give a voice to the many. We have learned much and undoubtedly will learn a great deal more about how various nonelite
ethnic, racial, occupational, gender, religious, and regional groups
lived and what they contributed culturally, socially, and economically; but social history has thus far had relatively little to tell us
about American political theory.
Primarily, because of the nature of the data we usually cannot
discern the actual thoughts of the people, and when we can the
thinking we encounter is at best ideological and not theoretical. We
can find patterns in the political behavior of the many, but if no
one can tell us the thinking behind the nonvoting of today with
any certainty, how are we to recover the theoretical thinking that
underlay the voting behavior in the 1700s, assuming the behavior
was so informed? In effect, social historians must proceed as other
social scientists do; they must theorize about the implications of
the information they have systematically uncovered.
A third approach to the history of the American founding has
been to examine the writing of those people in what might be
termed the political class, and this approach has begun to revolutionize the study of American political theory. The development
has gone almost unnoticed by scholars in history and political science alike, but the potential significance for future research is so
great that we must take the time to consider the implications and
to understand clearly the meaning of the "political class."
Using a variety of methodologies and research settings, mainstream political science has for many years consistently discovered
the presence of a subset within the population that disproportionately affects public policy and political outcomes. In nondemocratic systems this subset does not include many people beyond
the narrow class of elites, but in systems using elections and other
participatory means of popular control this subset, the politically
active class, typically includes between 15 and 20 percent of the
adult population. 28
From this political class are drawn most of those people who
consistently vote in every election, almost all of those who contrib-
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ute to election campaigns, and virtually all of those who work for
political parties, run for office, work for candidates whether partisan or nonpartisan, organize and work for political-interest
groups, write letters to newspapers and government officials, testify before governmental bodies, and write political essays for public consumption. 29 These are the opinion leaders who immerse
themselves in information about issues, candidates, and policies,
and therefore the rest of the population looks to them for cues
when deciding how to think about political matters, what opinions
to hold, and how to vote.
These opinion leaders do not control the political opinions and
actions of those people in the less active political orders but rather
process the information for them, present the alternatives, and
provide important cues. In fact, many or most people not in the
political class use certain members of the political class as negative
cue givers. That is, most people learn to identify those leaders with
whom they do not agree as well as those with whom they agree
and use cues provided by both types of opinion makers in sorting
out their own views. For instance, a citizen who harbors negative
attitudes toward those individuals who oppose the war in Vietnam
might see a number of bumper stickers against the war paired with
bumper stickers opposed to nuclear power. Finding cues in favor of
nuclear power from those opinion makers among the political class
this citizen admires, the person might significantly alter his or her
attitude toward nuclear power to a positive one.
Those scholars who use rationality models to analyze human
behavior would point to this division of labor between the cue-giving politically active class and those people who are less active as
an example of cost-minimizing rationality, whereby the less aware
and active citizens get a relatively free ride upon the hard work and
information-gathering of the political class.
In the context of the American founding, the political class
would express itself most clearly either through popularly approved documents of political foundation such as the Declaration
of Independence, the various state constitutions, and the U.S.
Constitution or through public political statements such as petitions to legislators, newspaper essays, books, and published pamphlets. Other forms of political participation, such as demonstrations, speeches, and informal political discussions, would not
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survive to the present, although speeches were often reprinted in
pamphlet form. In sum, these public documents would have been
written by members of the active political class and would together
allow us to study the intentions, motivations, and theoretical reasoning of this political class. Before such an approach to American
political theory could be used, however, these materials first had to
be made available for study, and then their use had to be sanctioned as appropriate in place of or in addition to the writings of
the political elite.
In the middle 1960s just such material began to be published,
almost simultaneously, by a number of scholars in both history and
political science. Prominent among the former, Bernard Bailyn
published his collection of political pamphlets in 1965 and immediately caught the attention of both disciplines. In the same year
Morton Borden published an edited version of the Antifederalist
papers, and the following year Cecelia Kenyon published her collection of Antifederalist pamphlets. The definitive edition of The
Federalist, which was originally a series of newspaper essays, had
been published by Jacob E. Cooke in 1961. Also in 1965 Frederick
Rudolph published his collection of pamphlets and essays from
the founding era on theories of education. In 1966 Oscar and Mary
Handlin published a large collection of materials, including pamphlets, essays, town convention records, and referenda returns
surrounding the rejected Massachusetts constitution of 1778. Also
in 1966, Leonard Levy published a large collection of eighteenthcentury public documents and essays relating to freedom of the
press in America. 30
Nor were the historians alone, although political scientists
came late to the task. In 1967 Charles S. Hyneman and George W.
Carey reprinted portions of the debates from the first session of the
U.S. Congress, and Herbert J. Storing published an article in 1976
that provided a complete list of pamphlets written in support of
the proposed U.S. Constitution. Then Herbert Storing, with the
assistance of Murray Dry, published a seven-volume collection of
pamphlets, The Complete Antifederalist, in 1981; and Charles Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz published their two volume American Political Writing during the Founding Era: 1760-1805 in 1983. Together
these two collections doubled the number of easily accessible political pamphlets from the founding era. Finally, in 1986 Philip B.
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Kurland and Ralph Lerner published their five-volume collection,
The Founders' Constitution, which contained pamphlets, newspaper
articles, and letters and public documents, among other writings.
By this time more than five hundred political pamphlets and hundreds of other documents or essays had been reprinted, and hundreds more had been identified for easy access by scholars. 31
This outpouring of reprinted materials from the founding era
has had a profound effect on the study of American political theory. First, these collections provided texts, assembled texts, that allowed us to approach the political theory of the founding more systematically and more comprehensively. Second, this material
changed our view of the intellectual currents at work during the
American founding, broadened our perspective, and led to a reading of a much wider range of European political thinkers. Third,
the availability of this material refocused our attention on political
theory as it existed on this side of the Atlantic, including colonial
antecedents. Fourth, we began to take our own political documents
seriously again as texts that could be analyzed for theoretical content, including state documents. Fifth, the material led to the rediscovery of a political class that included but spread well beyond the
relatively few well-known men of the late eighteenth century.
Early in this process of rediscovery Gordon Wood published a
book embodying these changes in our view of the founding that
represented a synthesis of considerable importance. Wood's magisterial work, published in 1%9, was grounded squarely in the
writings of the political class of the founding era. Not only did he
draw upon the writings of the political class, he quoted generously
from their contents so that fully one-fifth of his six-hundred-page
book is composed of passages from these writings. Wood apparently worked assiduously to find precisely the right quote that conveyed either the typical sentiment or a nuance in some variant
opinion. More important, perhaps, is the unstated use of these
writings as equivalent to a social science data base upon which to
securely ground his analysis; his use of the pamphlet literature
constituted a claim that anyone who examined the same literature
would reach the same or similar conclusions. In effect, Wood carefully sampled a data base upon which to rest his analysis and conclusions. The list of ninety-six pamphlets at the end of Wood's Creation of the American Republic and the state and national
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constitutional documents around which they were written were together an assembled text, a carefully constructed sampling of a
broader data base comprising all documents and publications generated by the political class. Gordon Wood's work indicated clearly
the direction for future historical research on American political
theory.
A focus on the political class is an improvement in several respects; for one thing, it allows us to place the writings by political
elites within a realistic, political context that helps us understand
those writings. Since its original settling, America has encouraged
people of genius to compete as members of a broadly defined political class, a class that absorbs, considers, argues about, modifies,
and then transmits to other portions of the public a refined, reduced, yet still competitive set of reasons for acting together in one
fashion or another. That is, the political class includes the elites but
forces the elites to operate within a much broader set of the population than was the case before the United States initiated its "new
order for the ages." The relationship of the elites to the broader political class is complex and bilateral. We study the writings of the
political class to discover the manner and extent to which elite
ideas penetrate and are accepted as well as not accepted. For example, we may find that some individuals among the elite, such as
Hamilton, wanted an elective monarchy but that this idea had no
chance of being accepted by the broad political class that dominated the constitution-making process. We also study the writings
of the political class to discover the extent to which members of the
elite summarize and synthesize the ideas widely held within the
political class. The genius of a great political leader, after all, often
lies not in the creation of new ideas but in the capture and dramatic
codification of widely held but still pretheoretical ideas, for example, Thomas Jefferson's brilliant summary and codification of what
he called "the American mind" in the Declaration of Independence.32In sum, studying the writings of the broader political class
not only includes the writings of the elite but puts those elite writings in context and greatly helps us to understand their meaning.
Also, a focus upon the political class helps us understand the
behavior, and to a certain extent the thinking, of those people in
the broader, nonactivist population. The political class in a political
system based upon popular consent serves on the one hand as the
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cue-giver for mass political behavior-as the part of the population
that defines issues, works up competing responses to problems,
and argues about the reasons for taking one course of action over
another. To the extent that the political class performs the function
of downward transmission, its ideas structure more general public
opinion and political behavior.
On the other hand, many or most people in the political class,
dependent upon support from the nonactivist population to carry
out their political agendas, seek to understand and project upward
the opinions, needs, interests, and ideas of the various members of
the nonactivist population. To the extent that the political class performs the function of upward transmission, it becomes our best
window into the general population and the best way to understand broader political phenomena. Thus, the material that the social historians uncover-as well as the findings of political scientists focusing on mass behavior like electoral politics, public
opinion, and political culture-becomes more accessible through
the study of the political class. This insight becomes not so much
grounds for dismissing mass behavior as manipulated by the political class but grounds for asking how successful the political class
has been in its bidirectional function of transmission and for questioning the extent to which the political class may be engaged in
manipulating the broader population rather than in interpreting
their views.
A focus on the political class also results in an improvement in
methodology. Consider the tendency in the past to base the study
of American political theory on the writings of a relatively few
elites. The elitist approach, regardless of its intention, can be
viewed as a solution to a sampling problem raised by an attempted
causal analysis. Using the U.S. Constitution as an example, the
elitists were proposing a cause that would explain the content of
the Constitution, the significance or meaning of that content for its
readers, and the structured political activity that would result from
that meaning. The content, meaning, and resulting behavior are,
in effect, the dependent variables in the causal analysis. As the independent variable the elitists propose human intention codified
in a theory. In other words, ideas have consequences, and one possible consequence is the structuring of human political behavior
through a constitution that embodies a deductively linked set of
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ideas called a theory. The theory describes the expected pattern of
behavior, explains why it is to be expected, why it is to be preferred, and how the provisions of the Constitution function to produce these results. To this point we have rehearsed the assumptions underlying any constitutional theory.
The difficulty with the elitist approach is that it oversimplifies
the causal analysis by giving a privileged status to the writings of a
very few individuals. That is, the elitists both undersample and
skew their sample; they undersample those writers relevant for
producing political outcomes and skew their sample by using enduring reputation or fame as the basis for inclusion in the sample.
This practice of undersampling requires a bit of elaboration. If the
theory underlying a constitution is to produce the intended pattern of human activity, those people who read the document must
basically agree on its requirements. Even assuming that a few individuals created the theory on their own, a position that cannot be
empirically sustained, unless those people who read the document understand its intentions and the reasoning that justifies the
pattern of behavior the constitution is designed to produce, the
people who are to be bound by the constitution must either be
forced to live by its contents, which is contrary to the rule of consent upon which constitutionalism rests, or else the people must
be manipulated or hoodwinked into accepting the document,
which is also contrary to that rule.
In the ancient world a constitution was handed to a people by
a Solon, a Draco, or a Hammurabi; in modern constitutionalism,
under an assumption of popular sovereignty, the people are not
"handed" anything. The intentions of the few do not constitute
the independent variable. Rather, the independent variable, the
political theory and ideas behind a constitution, is the result of a
self-conscious, reflexive, complicated political process that involves
enough people so that the intent of the constitution can be transmitted downward, just as the preferences of the people can be
transmitted upward. Without the political process, and the political class that is at its center, the elite would lack both the information and the resources to force, hoodwink, persuade, or mollify
anyone. The political class is too large to be represented by a sample of writing from five or six or even ten people, and naturally
there will never be enough famous people to constitute any kind of
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reasonable sample of a political class. Nor is fame necessarily a
good basis for selecting a sample of people relevant to political theory. George Washington was, and continues to be, the most famous person from the founding era, but few people will argue that
Washington has a special importance for the creation of American
political theory.
Why, then, has there been a tendency to use the writings of a
few elites as the basis for American political theory? The best reason may be that until recently their writings were readily available
because of their fame; the writings of the nonfamous were not.
With the availability of a much larger sample of writing from the
political class, the elite can now be read in a broader context, and
because of the nature of constitutionalism and the position of the
political class in a constitutional system, the writings of the elite
must be placed within that broader context.
A further methodological advantage derived from focusing
upon the political class is that in doing so we are pushed away
from the "exchange of paradigms" approach that distorts more
than it illuminates American political theory. As Gordon S. Wood
has suggested in a recent review, historians often construct categories for use in organizing a complicated reality, but the debate over
whether the founders were Lockean liberals, classical republicans,
or children of the Enlightenment results from asking the wrong
question.
The question of which tradition in the late eighteenth century
was more dominant-republicanism or liberalism-is badly
posed. It assumes a sharp dichotomy between two clearly
identifiable traditions that eighteenth century reality will not
support. None of the historical participants, including the
Founding Fathers, ever had any sense that he had to choose
between republicanism and liberalism, between Machiavelli
and Locke. 33
The founders could hold simultaneously and without any
sense of inconsistency principles from several theoretical traditions. Although these principles might appear contradictory from
the viewpoint of European political theory, the political reality inhabited by Americans made the principles perfectly compatible.
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For example, at the Constitutional Convention the competing
views of the English constitution represented by Montesquieu's
separation-of-powers perspective, Blackstone's mixed-government
approach, and Hume's balanced-faction analysis, though mutually
incompatible in the English context, were included in the Constitution that emerged from the convention's deliberations.34
Contrary to the tendency of recent scholars of either the "liberal" or the "republican'' schools anachronistically to invent paradigms into which political writings of the founding era are forced,
American political theory needs to be studied in terms of the categories used by those engaged in developing it. 35 Nor is this approach simply a methodological nicety. American political theory
is distinguished from European political theory precisely because
it rests upon the work of the political class and not on the writings
of an intellectual elite. Any attempt to derive American political
theory primarily from the writings of European intellectuals or to
describe American political theory as dominated by an intellectual
tradition is fundamentally to misconstrue the enterprise. The entire point of American political theory from the beginning was to
replace elite dominance with popular control, to ground politics directly in human experience rather than in philosophical utopias,
and to codify theoretically the ideas and behavior patterns that
emerged from the political process rather than to force the political
process into conformity with an abstraction. The rediscovery of the
political class is a recovery of American political theory as it was
created. As Gordon Wood points out when discussing the emergence of the doctrine of popular sovereignty:
These were revolutionary ideas that had unfolded rapidly in
the decade after Independence, but not deliberately or evenly.
Men were always only half aware of where their thought was
going, for these new ideas about politics were not the products
of extended reasoned analysis but were rather numerous responses of different Americans to a swiftly changing reality, of
men involved in endless polemics compelled to contort and
draw out from the prevailing assumptions the latent logic few
had foreseen. Rarely before 1787 were these new thoughts
comprehended by anyone as a whole. They were bits and
pieces thrown up by the necessities of argument and condi-
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tion, without broad design or significance . But if crystalized by
sufficient pressures they could result in a mosaic of an entirely
new conception of politics to those who would attempt to describe it. 36
European political theory is codified in books written by men
who essentially stood outside the political process, observed it,
and then developed theories for explaining what they saw and
what they wanted; American political theory has proceeded differently. Until recently, and certainly during the founding era, political theory was not written by detached, philosophical observers or
by academic political theorists but by those engaged more immediately in politics. Under conditions of liberty that permitted anyone
who wished to enter the politically active class, the widely shared
assumptions of those people in the political class led to behavior,
hopes, and conflicts that required more explicit codification if the
political class was to be mobilized in a coherent and effective manner. The codification emerged from the evolving reasoned analysis
used to mobilize this class and at some point became widely accepted theory. That is, theory in America followed evolving practice in a manner analogous to the way in which anthropologists tell
us that myth follows ritual. Some members of the political class
saw further and more quickly and thus had a much greater impact
on the codification of theory as well as on extending its implications. These great minds had to work within the shared assumptions and accepted institutional practices of the political class, and
any theoretical innovations they produced eventually had to be ratified and supported by the political class, but there was considerable room for leadership. Nor were these political leaders devoid of
theoretical ideas outside of the political process to draw upon; they
could use any ideas or explanations from European political theory
as long as these fit within the envelope of possibilities defined by
the assumptions and practices shared by the political class. But the
political class would not tolerate a wholesale imposition of a political theory from abroad that did not fit into their presuppositions
and that was not based upon their consent. Thus, an understanding of American political theory, as long as it continues to emerge
from and is ratified by the political class, will require us to use history, especially that of the political class.
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Gordon Wood calls this dynamic relationship between political
leaders and the broader political class "an elitist theory of democracy" and attributes it to the Federalists as distinguished from the
American Whigs of the revolutionary years. 37 But his general analysis of American politics during the 1770s and 1780s is consistent
with a model in which a political class mediates between the elites
and the general population with both an upward and a downward
function of communication; in which elections are used to choose
among policy options, candidates, and theoretical codifications
that are worked out in the political class; and in which a fractured
or plural elite competes for the support of the political class and
thus ultimately for the support of the broader population. With the
rediscovery of the political class by historians comes a fundamental
convergence between historical analysis and empirical political
science.
Although it is true that Americans are not now and never were
intellectual stand-ins for European political thinkers, it is also true
that Americans have used and greatly benefited from European
political philosophy. To say that no one European can be credited
with a decisive or a dominant influence on American political theory does not imply the absence of important influences. The point
I am arguing here is threefold. First, no one European thinker
dominated because Americans read and drew upon many European thinkers. Second, no European intellectual tradition dominated because those philosophers to whom Americans turned
were spread over several "traditions," and the supposed traditions
were themselves mixed, interpenetrating each other, so that individual thinkers can often be simultaneously assigned to several traditions. Third, it is still an open question as to where Americans
found many of the ideas they borrowed to help in the construction
of the melange called American political theory. It is necessary for
those in the discipline to "sample" the European literature more
carefully, and before sampling can occur we need to identify the intellectual universe, a task to which we now tum.

Chapter 5

Intellectual History and
the American Founding

Part of the preface to American political theory includes the history
of how it has been studied in the past, which sheds light on our
current status in the enterprise and how we got here. From such a
review a number of lessons can be drawn on how not to proceed,
including a stricture against the use of intellectual "traditions" to
explain the genesis of American political theory. Therefore, it
might strike some as perverse that immediately after such strong
cautions I am embarking on a discussion of those intellectual
traditions.
Although it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that European
thinkers were read by the founding generation and influenced
American political thinking, it is important to understand who was
read and how. I hope that the discussion will open up the entire

range of European writers relevant to American political theory for
future research and have included as an appendix a comprehensive list of secular authors available to Americans of the middle and
late eighteenth century (see pp. 159-64). These authors and their
works are more or less sorted into "traditions" in this chapter, both
from our point of view and from that of the founding generation.
The point of such a sorting is to suggest who might be read as representative of a particular approach, thus providing the reader
with an initial entree into a literature that is largely unknown today. One result of the discussion is to see an increase in the number of intellectual "traditions" that we must consider relevant; another is to reinforce the previous conclusion that because many
major figures are difficult to place and because some traditions
have problematic definitional boundaries, the utility of intellectual
113
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traditions for describing and explaining American political theory
is severely limited. Finally, just as these European writers stand as
part of the preface to the political theory of the founding, the way
in which the founders appropriated European thinking stands as a
preface to how American political theory has continued to use European sources. That is, Americans appropriated theory from overseas in accord with their own needs as informed by their own experience. Once we understand better the process of such
intellectual appropriation during the founding, the better we will
understand American use of European ideas down to this day.
If American political theory is to become a discipline, those engaged in it must use a greater range of texts and must be more systematic in their use. This means reading more widely in the public
documents, pamphlets, and other writings by Americans in the
political class as well as gaining a wider familiarity with European
thinkers. As a minor example of the insight we gain by doing so,
consider the version of John Locke's "life, liberty, and property"
that Jefferson put in the Declaration of Independence-"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Greater familiarity with the
American pamphlet literature would show that Jefferson's formulation had already appeared in the writings of John Adams, James
Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, George Mason, James Otis, and
Richard Bland, to name a few, and that it did not originate with Jefferson. More important, a wider familiarity with European thinkers would show prior use of the formulation of happiness as an
end of government by William Wollaston, Cesare Beccaria, Jean
Jacques Burlamaqui, and Henry St. John Bolingbroke-including
discussion of the meaning of the term and why it is part of government's job. Since all four of these men were widely read by Americans of the founding generation, exactly how and why the formulation was appropriated becomes an interesting and possibly an
important question. 1
This diverse European literature, and the manner in which
Americans used it, is an important part of the material that students of American political theory ought to know before conducting their own inquiries. The discussion that follows is an attempt
to unravel and identify the various intellectual strands used by the
founders to weave American political thought during the eighteenth century. Perhaps a better metaphor is the peeling back of lay-
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ers, as with an onion; there we shall find the place to begin-underlying the several skins, giving them shape, is the concept that
Americans of the eighteenth century called "experience."
Experience Must Be Our Guide
At the end of The Federalist, Hamilton quotes David Hume. "The
judgments of many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must
guide their labour; TIME must bring it to perfection; and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments. " 2 This statement
serves as a succinct introduction to the most fundamental aspect of
both Federalist and Antifederalist thought, namely, the conviction
that as useful as books can be, politics should always rest upon a
base of human experience rather than upon logical abstractions, no
matter how appealing or moral the abstractions. Americans based
their state constitutions upon their colonial institutions, and their
colonial institutions had evolved from the basis of the colonists'
own experiences in shaping them to meet their needs. The Federalists had in turn built upon the state constitutions as well as on the
Articles of Confederation.
Their colonial ancestors had been largely practical, rather than
theoretical, in their policy, although the Bible had provided them
with a coherent basis for thinking about politics. Covenant theology had deeply informed their earliest constitutions, such as the
Pilgrim Code of Law (1636) and the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639) . Yet secularization gradually had moved the colonists away from direct reliance upon religion to justify their form of
government. The essential test was that on a day-to-day basis their
institutions worked.
Colonial political institutions were generally established in a
single document, a covenant or compact, which functioned as a
constitution; indeed, these people invented the modern written
constitution. The compact in tum rested upon de facto popular
consent, even though no theory of popular sovereignty as yet existed.3 All political institutions were guided by majority rule or by
those elected by a majority. These political practices were considerably different from British precedent. fur example, in England
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property requirements resulted in a distinct minority of adult
males being able to vote, and although a majority of those votes
produced electoral victory, it was never intended that winners actually represent a majority of the population. In America, because
of the availability of cheap land and the absence of an aristocracy
and a gentry, the same common-law property requirements enfranchised a majority of adult males, and thus elections expressed
something closer to true majority rule . Furthermore, unlike in Britain, it was intended that those elected represent a majority. These
practices, then, were of American invention-invention by the
many and adjusted over time on the basis of experience.
The first component of experience, then, was the cumulative
experience on American shores prior to 1776; the second was the
insight that the Federalists had personally and directly gained during their own lives. The drafting of state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation had involved all but a few of them at the
Constitutional Convention, and they had felt the consequences of
these documents. The Federalist is full of explicit and implicit criticism of these earlier documents, not because they were worthless
but because the experiences of many of them, over time, had inevitably uncovered mistakes that needed to be corrected.
A third aspect of experience was history. Federalists and Antifederalists alike viewed human history as relevant experience, although certain historical eras were more useful than others. 4 The
more religious saw the history of the Jewish people in the Bible as
important for understanding republican institutions since it described what they considered to be a Hebraic republic and then
showed God's displeasure when the Hebrews replaced their republic with a king. The Roman republic, classical Athens, Italian
city-states during the Renaissance, and seventeenth-century Netherlands were viewed as particularly relevant.
Above all, the history of England was ransacked for telling examples. A considerable literature grew up that purported to see the
history of England as the story of republican government unfolding. David Hume was most widely read, not for his philosophy but
for his History of England. 5 Other widely read historians were Bulstrode Whitelock, Paul de Rapin-Thoyras, William Guthrie,
Edward Montagu, Oliver Goldsmith, William Temple, James
Ralph, Charles Rollin, Jonathan Swift, and Catharine Macaulay.
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Americans read these English histories avidly and saw in their own
young country the true fulfillment of English promise.
The primary connection Americans had with classical Greece
and Rome was through their historians. The most widely read Romans were Cicero, Livy, and Tacitus; the Greeks were Polybius,
Demosthenes, Thucydides, and Aristotle, although Plutarch's Lives
was easily the most widely read classical work. The Federalist, typical of American political writing in this regard, is filled with historical examples as part of the Federalist dedication to experience as
the fount of wisdom.
The Republican Tradition
The historians taught the founders that a republican form of government was best. These historians were not writing history for academic reasons but to justify the creation of republican government, usually in England. One leg of republican theory stood on
dissenting Protestantism and thus reinforced the impact of religion
on American political thought; the other leg stood on classical political thought, beginning with Aristotle but usually learned from
Cicero and the Romans. Machiavelli was important for rediscovering republican thought and translating it for the modern world,
but Americans actually became most familiar with republican theory as a result of those thinkers writing in the context of the English civil war. 6
Unfortunately, there was no consensus on the components of
a republican form of government; four definitions from the era illustrate the diversity.
Whenever I use the word republic with approbation, I mean a
government in which the people have collectively, or by representation, an essential share in sovereignty. (John Adams in a
letter to Samuel Adams, October 18, 1790)7
Is not the whole sovereignty, my friend, essentially in the
people? . .. Is it not the uncontrollable, essential right of the
people to amend and alter or annul their constitution and
frame a new one . . . [have] annual or biennial elections . . .
and by empowering their representatives to impeach the great-
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est officers of the state? (Samuel Adams in a letter to John Adams, November 20, 1790)8
a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly, according
to rules established by the majority. (Thomas Jefferson in a letter to John Taylor, May 28, 1816)9
We may define a republic to be . . . a government which derives all its powers either directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during
good behavior.10
The first definition, by John Adams, represents a traditional Whig
position that equates republicanism with representation, although
silent allowance" or tacit consent is part of the definition. This
passive element was reflected in the colonies by what is known as
the politics of deference." English Whigs of the Commonwealth
period essentially adhered to this position and viewed Parliament,
not the people, as sovereign authority in the nation state. The second definition reflects the radical Whig position that predominated
among those colonists writing the early state constitutions and
conducting the American Revolution. It emphasized popular sovereignty with direct, active consent as the basis for all facets of government-direct in the sense that the people gave it themselves
and active in that their consent was required frequently, through
means in addition to elections, instead of assuming that consent
was given through passive acquiescence.
Jefferson's definition, though not reflecting his actual preference, embodied the tendency that was popular in some parts of
America to abandon an emphasis upon representation in favor of a
republicanism that stressed what we now call democracy. The
more democratic version would take a firmer hold in nineteenthcentury America as Jacksonian democracy and then later in the
Grange and Populist movements. Madison's definition conveys
precisely the Federalist notion. Basing his view upon the idea that
popular sovereignty only requires the people to rule in an ultimate
sense through their approval of the Constitution, Madison allowed
for those in government to be either directly or indirectly connected
to the people through elections.
11

11
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The juxtaposition of these definitions nicely summarizes how
the Federalists built upon the radical Whigs, utterly rejected pure
democracy, and softened the democratic component of radical
Whig theory, although not to the extent of returning to traditional
Whig parliamentary sovereignty. Since those individuals labeled
"Antifederalist" were in fact American Whigs, one can see that the
Federalists were building upon what had. come before and were
not rejecting entirely the position of their opponents, the Antifederalists, who as a group were committed to a range of radical and
conservative Whiggism. It was this diversity that allowed the Federalists to position themselves successfully during the ratification
debate.
On the one hand the Federalists could claim that they were
more conservative than many Whigs since, for example, they had
backed off from the more radical demands for a directly elected
unitary government; but on the other hand they could claim that
they were more radical than many Whigs since, for example, the
lower house in the new Constitution was to be directly elected and
the legislature under the Articles of Confederation had been
elected by the state legislatures. The Federalists could thus portray
themselves as moderates for seeking a middle position vis-a-vis
the two wings of their opposition-as halfway between the Virginia and New Jersey plans. It is no accident that during the ratification debates the Federalists targeted the middle-of-the-road Antifederalists (or Whigs); therefore it is easy to see how John Adams
and others who shared his moderate or centrist Whig views could
be persuaded to become Federalists.
American Whigs believed they were the heirs of English Whig
theory from the seventeenth-century Commonwealth period in
England. Locke and Sidney, who were viewed by eighteenth-century Americans as Commonwealthmen or Whigs, are sometimes
looked upon today as part of a tradition we now term "liberalism."
That is, many people today read Locke as a defender of limited
government, individualism, natural rights, and laissez-faire economics-Le., government should interfere in the economy only to
enforce contracts and to punish crimes. He was undoubtedly a
contributor to classical liberalism so defined, but one should be
careful not to attribute to him the full-blown, complete liberalism
that finally evolved in the late nineteenth century. He was much
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closer to the republicanism of his age that, although it saw individuals as having natural rights, did not include among these rights
the list of limits we now expect in a typical American bill of rights.
Rather, republican theory as it was understood in late eighteenthcentury America saw government as based upon the consent of
the people, with almost all other rights viewed as civil rights and
therefore susceptible to alienation by a legislature that was supreme. Republican theorists like Locke also saw few limits on the
majority; it took James Madison and later theorists to recognize the
dangers of the tyranny of the majority. Thus it makes a great deal
of difference that Locke was viewed by Americans of the 1780s as a
republican theorist, whether we now agree with their interpretation or not.
Also, remember that the distinction between liberalism and republicanism that we might make today was not made in the eighteenth century, since, among other factors, the words "liberal" and
"liberalism" had not yet been used to describe political ideas. "Republic," on the other hand, was very much in use by Americans after 1776, even though "republicanism" as a term to describe the
theory supporting a preference for republican government had not
yet been coined. Pocock and other historians argue that eighteenth-century republicanism can be traced through the mediation
of Machiavelli to the republicanism of the ancients, but eighteenth
century American assumptions and arguments in favor of a republic more often than not owed considerably more to the fires of
evolving political controversy and to modern political theorists
than to ancient Greece and Rome. Linking American preferences
for a republic with the views of ancient republican theorists is just
one more attempt to attribute American political theory, with its
assembled texts and experientially based constitutionalism, to European sources. "Republicanism" and "liberalism" are terms we
use today to distinguish categories of earlier thinkers; neither
these terms nor the distinctions they imply were part of eighteenth-century America.
Americans thus viewed Sidney and Locke as contributors to
the Whig theory of politics, which supported a form of government known in late eighteenth-century America as a republic. Algernon Sidney (1622-1683), a contemporary of Thomas Hobbes
(1588-1678) and John Locke (1632-1704), was put to death by the
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Royalists for having written Discourses Concerning Government in
support of a republic over a monarchy, even though the manuscript was not published until 1698, well after Sidney's death. The
fact of his execution, plus the radical content of his political tract,
made Sidney famous during the era of the Glorious Revolution. In
America his and Locke's names were likely to be used together as
virtual theoretical brothers, both in support of a republican form of
government.
Algernon Sidney and John Locke reached similar conclusions
and used similar concepts and terminology, but Locke defended a
position closer to the traditional Whig view characterized by John
Adams's definition; Sidney was closer to the more radical position
defended by Samuel Adams. Furthermore, Sidney derived his conclusions from religious premises, copiously citing the Bible and religious authorities; Locke based his on grounds of rationality,
which was more typical of the Enlightenment. Regardless, Americans, including Federalists, were very much republicans in the
Whig tradition, and they learned their republicanism by reading
Sidney, Locke, the historians, and a host of others.11 Moreover, as
with the historians, the Whigs were read in a way to justify and extend the institutions that Americans had already developed. It is
an irony of history that John Locke was used by Americans to justify institutions that Americans had developed before Locke
published.
The English Commonwealth tradition, often referred to as
Whig political theory, was associated with the attempt by Parliament to gain the upper hand over the crown. A powerful ally in
this long struggle with the king was the common-law tradition,
which emphasized the role of law as a restraint or limit on the
crown. Also associated with the democratic tendencies of English
Whig political theory was an evolving view of the world that we
now call classical liberalism, even though it was a development of
modem political theory that had nothing to do with classical
Greece or Rome. Interestingly, Locke is also considered a central
figure in this latter movement. 12
The principles of the movement we now call "liberalism" did
more than support Whiggism; eventually, this tendency within
Whig political theory came to the fore and changed the Whig view
of politics altogether. Among other things, it provided reasons for
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limiting not only the Crown but government as a whole. In some
respects a part of more radical Whig political thought and in some
respects of more traditional Whiggism, liberal political assumptions blended with two other, more modern movements, Enlightenment rationalism and scientific empiricism. The Federalists absorbed all of these ideas, as did the Antifederalists, but the
Federalists would be distinguished by being more in tune with the
Enlightenment, especially the Scottish Enlightenment, and by being much more inclined toward the creation of a science of
politics.

Lawyers and Liberals
An important part of the English common-law tradition was its
emphasis upon law as a restraint on the power of the Crown. The
common-law tradition effectively began with Magna Carta in 1215.
In Magna Carta the barons forced King John to submit to a number
of limits, the most important of which turned out to be Parliament's control of the purse. Magna Carta was ignored for long
stretches of time, but Sir John Fortescue resurrected it with his
compilation of the common law in the fifteenth century. Of much
greater importance was Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke's Institutes of
the Laws of England (published in four parts between 1628 and
1644). Coke's Whiggish treatment of the common law became the
standard work for more than a century, and those Americans with
legal training in the colonies were familiar with Coke, which was
not an unmixed blessing. James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John
Adams, James Wilson, and Alexander Hamilton were just a few
men who were led to speak at some point in their private writings
of their relief that the turgid, almost unreadable volumes by Coke
had been effectively replaced in time for their own study by the
publication of William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England.
Sir John Davies and Nathaniel Bacon, among others, supported Coke's position that the Crown was limited by an "ancient
constitution'' composed of custom "beyond the memory of man''
and the common law built upon such custom. Supporters of the
Crown attacked this notion, but a large number of legal historians
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supported Coke. 13 Finally, between 1765 and 1769 Sir William
Blackstone published his four-volume Commentaries on the Laws of
England.
Blackstone's work represented an important fusion in intellectual history. On the one hand, he summarized and extended the
common-law position of Coke and his supporters among the legal
historians. On the other hand, he synthesized their views with
Newton's vision of the universe and Locke's theories of human nature and political liberty. Just as Newton had found the laws underlying physical processes in nature, Blackstone consciously attempted to reveal the fundamental principles underlying British
legal and political institutions. Implicit in the principles he found
was the Lockean view of rational human nature-the view that all
humans are capable of and inclined to engage in careful, reasoned
calculations concerning their safety, comfort, and interests. In addition to quoting Locke with some frequency, Blackstone's work is
an extension of Locke's ideas.
Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which contained his view of human nature and psychology, was readily
available and widely read in America, but Two Treatises on Government, which contained his political theory, was not as widely read
there 14 • Locke's direct influence was strongest around the time of
the Declaration of Independence, for he wrote profoundly on the
reasons for resisting tyranny and on the basis for founding government .15 Yet he was rarely cited after 1781; instead, Blackstone became the primary, although indirect, means for injecting Locke's
ideas into the debate on the Constitution. After Montesquieu, the
Federalists cited Blackstone most frequently, followed by Locke,
who had relatively little to say about specific institutions or problems of constitutional design. His influence during the constitutional debate resulted from Blackstone's use of Lockean principles
to undergird his own institutional analysis. Although Blackstone's
interpretation of Locke is sometimes open to question, Blackstone
did successfully link the common law with liberal natural-rights
theory. Both Federalists and Antifederalists were, in the end, students more of Blackstone than of Locke.
Locke was also present in the background to Federalist thinking through his contributions to liberalism and natural-law theory.
Locke had a significant influence on the development of liberalism
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through his successful synthesis of the concepts of social compact,
consent, individualism, and political equality. We do not find an
emphasis on any of these concepts in The Federalist, although, with
the exception of individualism, these concepts are central to American political writing generally. Locke influenced the development
of natural-law theory during the eighteenth century through the
works of Jean Jacques Burlamaqui and Emmerich de Vattel, although in this regard Locke was a conduit more than an originator
since he owed his natural-law view of the state to men like Richard
Hooker, Hugo de Grotius, and Baron Samuel von Pufendorf,
whom the Federalists and Antifederalists also cited directly.
The assumptions and principles that came to constitute classical liberalism, and John Locke's particular contributions to this
movement, thus had a general and indirect effect on the founders
through several links-Whig political theory, the common law, natural-law theory, and perhaps most important, the Scottish
Enlightenment.

The Scottish Enlightenment
The Scottish Enlightenment did not really derive from the continental Enlightenment but rather from the traditions of republicanism and liberalism, which it blended, adapted, and in important
respects altered. The Scottish movement had three basic thrusts-a
theory of moral philosophy, a theory of economic progress, and a
theory of history. A key figure in its approach to moral philosophy
was Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746).
Hutcheson argued, contrary to Locke, that the moral sense of
humans was innate rather than the product of reason and that this
innate moral sense ultimately inclined people to sociable and public-regarding behavior. Hutcheson saw self-love as the fundamental force in human nature, much as Newton saw gravity as a fundamental force in nature-self-love defined as the natural desire to
establish one's superior worth. Self-love had two positive effects
on human behavior: First, it led to industriousness, and second, it
led people to be industrious in ways that produced social approval.
Industriousness had its primary outlet in economic activity, and increasing the common wealth was the very definition of political

Intellectual History and the American Founding

125

virtue-seeking the common good. One critical political aspect lay
in the seeking of fame. Why would an individual neglect his or her
economic betterment to work for the common good? Hutcheson's
answer was that the highest social approval to be gained, the most
enduring source of fame, resulted from the industrious seeking of
the common good through the holding of political office. The seeking of fame, a form of self-love, bestirred a person to work for the
common good. Self-love, a kind of self-interest, was thus compatible with virtue defined as pursuit of the common good; indeed, it
was seen as the basis of virtue. Humans, when left alone to pursue
their interests freely, were naturally cooperative, sociable, benevolent, and virtuous.
One can see that Hutcheson's emphasis on sociableness resonated with the communitarianism that formed the core of American experience from colonial times as well as with the Calvinist
emphasis on virtues like industry, frugality, and temperance. Yet
even though Hutcheson saw the moral sense as implanted by God,
his theory of moral sentiments, of the supremacy of sentiment or
innate sense over reason in moral decisions, opened the door to a
completely secular analysis of human virtue and human behavior-a secular analysis that was motivated by the desire to develop
a science of human behavior derived from fundamental principles
similar to Newton's work in physics. An important and thus far unresolved question, then, is to what extent did Publius and other
authors of the founding era write from a rationalist perspective derived from liberals like Locke, and to what extent did they write
from a theory of moral sentiments. The evidence in The Federalist
seems to run in both directions, as, with some notable exceptions
in New England, it did in American political writing generally.
Recent studies have begun to emphasize the importance of the
Scottish Enlightenment for early American political theory in general and for The Federalist in particular. 16 Other names associated
with Hutcheson are David Hume, Henry Horne (Lord Karnes),
Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Hugh Blair, and James Beattie. Among
these, Hume had the the most immediate and important effect.
Hume used both historical and philosophical analysis to explain, justify, and praise the rise of the commercial republic. In
many ways a rejection of Locke, Hume's theory still used much of
Locke's epistemology as well as Hutcheson's theory of moral senti-
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ment in a mix that stood as a primary competitor to the traditional
republican emphasis on virtue. Hume's epistemological realism
emphasized the analysis of factions and actual human behavior as
opposed to republican theory's emphasis on the inculcation of virtues in order to modify human behavior. The republican theorists
saw corruption as the primary source of political instability, but
Hume believed factions to be the chief threat to popular government and the happiness it produced; it is known that Madison
borrowed much of his argument in Federalist No. 10 from Hume. 11
Hume provided a philosophical basis for the economic theories we now associate with thinkers like Adam Smith. He also belonged to a group of men who analyzed the economic basis for material progress in human history, a material progress associated
with and undergirding the rise and spread of liberty. Others in this
group included William Robertson, Adam Ferguson, Lord Karnes,
James Dunbar, Joseph Addison, Daniel Defoe, John Millar, William
Falconer, and Gilbert Stuart. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, echoing the Scottish Enlightenment's philosophy of self-interest and
the economic analysis based upon such a view of human nature,
also contributed to the idea of material, social, and political progress. Smith wrote of the move from "rudeness" to "refinement"
and argued that human social development had a "natural history," much as the biological world did. Associated with Smith's
attempt to develop a theory of political economy were Charles
Davenant, John Law, Josiah Child, William Petty, Dudley North,
James Steuart Denham, and Adam Anderson. Although these
men were read in late eighteenth-century America, they, along
with Adam Smith, had their strongest impact after the turn of the
nineteenth century.
On the one hand, both Hume and Smith rejected Locke's notion of contract, the state of nature, and rational calculation as the
basis for morals. On the other hand, they started with Locke's epistemology found in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding and
worked from the theory of history implicit in Locke. Many Americans saw in Locke's Second Treatise on Government a linear view of
history, an emphasis upon economic development as the driving
force in history, and the idea that history reveals predictable interactions between human needs and human institutions, interactions mediated by reason. Adam Smith reflects these aspects of
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Locke's theoretical reasoning in his Wealth of Nations. Note, however, that Locke's influence through Hume and Smith is not a direct transmission of political ideas and institutions from Locke to
the founding generation. Furthermore, not Adam Smith, but
Hume, Locke's most severe and successful critic, was the most influential of the Scottish philosophers on the founding generation.
Hume's direct criticism of Locke had to have at least as much of a
negative effect on Locke's reputation as Hume's borrowing of certain assumptions from Locke's philosophy resulted in a positive
effect.

The Enlightenment
Terms like "republicanism'' and "liberalism'' were developed years
later by historians as labels for intellectual movements composed
of thinkers who shared a significant number of assumptions,
goals, and principles. The term "Enlightenment," however, was
coined by the people to whom it presumably referred as a self-description, and it was used by later historians as a label for an entire
era. The intent of those thinkers who developed the term was to
distinguish their movement from the dark ages of ignorance and
superstition that preceded them and thereby to provide an implicit
invidious comparison with their political enemies-those people
who defended traditional values, methods, and institutions.
One practical consequence of the political agenda implied by
the term Enlightenment was to include those individuals who rejected or seemed to reject the old ways of thinking, regardless of
their position. As a result, those thinkers associated with the Enlightenment exhibited a melange of approaches, a cacophony of
ideas. Names so appropriated included idealists like George Berkeley, rationalists like Descartes, scientists like Newton, realists like
Locke, and a wild variety of physiocrats, free traders, utilitarians,
classicists, philosophical skeptics, romantics, moralists, atheists,
churchmen, empiricists, mathematicians, liberals, democrats, aristocrats, and just about every other discernible group.
Enlightenment thinkers certainly emphasized human reason
or rationality, and they often emphasized secular as opposed to religious assumptions. This general characterization sometimes
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hides more than it reveals, however. The thinkers like Descartes
who emphasized reason were not especially innovative in this regard, for men like William of Ockham had been rationalists centuries earlier; instead, the modern rationalists were distinguished by
their numbers and by their radical insistence upon rationalist
premises. Since an equally important part of the Enlightenment
was the rise of science and social science based upon empirical reason as opposed to pure reason, however, the Enlightenment as an
intellectual movement was quite diverse in its epistemology. Could
one arrive at truth using only analytical logic along the lines of "I
think, therefore I am," or was truth limited to that which could be
systematically observed through the senses? There was no single
Enlightenment answer to the question.
Also, though a strong antireligious bias was evident in the writings of many thinkers during the era, working from secular, rationalist
premises is not the same as being antireligious. Many famous writers
during the Enlightenment were quite frankly religious both personally
and in their work. Locke may have deemphasized religion, but many
of his readers find God prominent in his political theory. Isaac Newton, after divining the laws of mechanics, spent the last thirty years of
his life studying and writing about the Bible.
In sum, to say that the founders were strongly influenced by the
Enlightenment amounts to saying little more than that the variety of
European thinkers writing between 1670 and 1787 had an impact on
the political theory of the American founding; the triviality of the
statement is matched by its potential for confusing the unwary. The
strategy here, then, is to subdivide the Enlightenment in a way that allows a meaningful and sensible examination of the influences on
American thought beyond those already identified.
One useful method of categorization might distinguish four
"enlightenments": a radical, antireligious strain that tended to
emphasize pure reason; a natural-religion strain that attacked religious orthodoxy but was more interested in updating religion to
be congruent with modern, empirical views of human nature than
in rejecting religion; a moderate, liberal or constitutional strain
that used both rationalism and empiricism and often emphasized
the importance of economics; and a scientific or empirical strain
that took advances in natural science as its model for advancing
human knowledge about social, political, and economic matters.18

Intellectual History and the American Founding

129

As one might expect, even with the mutually contradictory characteristics of these categories, it is often difficult to place a given
thinker cleanly in one or the other groups with any great
confidence.
The first group, which included men like Voltaire, Diderot,
and Helvetius, can be dealt with quickly. Although the works of
these men were certainly known to the best-educated Americans,
they were not widely read and had little if any influence on the
writing of the Constitution.
The second group was in certain respects quite diverse, although their consistent impact was to deemphasize the antagonism between religion and the natural world. This approach allowed religious people to pursue life relatively free from biblical
constraints and to be more concerned with practical effects, which
were generally seen as either outside the moral realm or compatible with Christian morality. Members of this group were proponents of "rational Christianity," who frequently saw self-interested behavior as compatible with religion and tended to limit
religion to devotional practices at certain times of the week. The
group included John Tillotson, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Matthew Tindal, William Paley, Philip Doddridge, John Toland, and
William Wollaston. The impact of these writers upon American
thinking was cumulative and indirect. Certainly a number of
prominent Federalists were Deists, as were a number of writers in
this group. Yet their major influence on Federalist and Antifederalist thinking was to reinforce the notion, pressed from other quarters as well, that the proper analysis of politics did not require reference to God's will or to explicitly religious principles.
Members of the third or "moderate'' group in the Enlightenment
were notable for reflecting explicitly upon political institutions, processes, and assumptions, although often in a piecemeal or specialized
fashion. They also shared an interest in or inclination toward constitutional or liberal democracy, as we now call it. Beccaria, Burlamaqui,
Delolme, Grotius, Mably, Rayna!, and Vattel were prominent in this
category; Rousseau might be placed here or among the more radical
figures, although his work was not widely read and did not have much
influence until after the writing of the Constitution. Americans of the
founding era turned to these moderate Enlightenment figures for
ideas on specific institutions or problems such as checks and balances,
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prison refonn, slavery, methods of holding elections, taxation, free
trade, and for definitions of a republic and of citizenship. Interestingly,
aside from a marked interest in Grotius, the Federalists did not cite
members of this group as frequently as the Antifederalists did.
The fourth group within the Enlightenment was by far the most
influential on the founders' thinking, although it is not always clear
who should be placed in it-certainly Montesquieu and Pufendorf,
probably Locke as a result of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and, although he would not like the company, Hume. Each of
these thinkers could also be placed in at least one other category of influence on the Federalists. Hume is often placed squarely within the
Scottish Enlightenment; indeed, his presence in that group helped
lead to its being called the Scottish Enlightenment, although it is also
called the Scottish Common Sense tradition. Locke is also considered
part of the liberal and republican Whig traditions. Pufendorf is frequently considered a liberal, as is Montesquieu, although the latter is
often thought to be a civic humanist, or republican, as well. Take your
pick. I am here using these categories as a means of identifying the
various Enlightenment influences upon the founders, not as a means
of definitively locating each figure in the history of ideas. Montesquieu
was the author most frequently cited by Federalist as well as Antifederalist; they took from him a number of specific constitutional and institutional ideas. Locke stood as deep background for the Federalists, as
did Pufendorf. The borrowing from Hume with respect to specific institutions was narrow but extremely important since it included the
notion of the extended republic and the method of analyzing factions.
Aside from the borrowing of specific ideas and institutions, however,
this fourth group is important for the entire analysis in The Fedemlist insofar as it linked the Federalists with science and induced in them a desire for a science of politics. This influence is so important, so little appreciated, and so frequently missed altogether that it merits expanded
treatment here as a separate category.

Science and Politics
The seventeenth century saw the rise of modern, experimental
science in the person not only of Newton but also of men like William Harvey and Robert Boyle. Foremost among its proponents
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was Francis Bacon, who extended rational, empirical techniques
to philosophy and the analysis of politics. Newton's discoveries
captured the imagination of the age and, combined with Bacon's
vision of a social science, led many thinkers to hope they could
discover fundamental laws for politics as Newton had done for
physics. Among these men were Montesquieu, Hume, and Pufendorf. In a somewhat less directly observational vein, Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, and Blackstone pursued the discovery of a set of
basic human laws of political behavior-whether based on pure
reason, the shrewd estimation and summary of observed human
behavior, intuition, moral sentiment, or the historical usages of
the common law.
Montesquieu, Hume, and Pufendorf spoke explicitly of a "political science" or a "science of politics," as did Publius. Each was
inclined to survey the entirety of human history, not for the usual
historian's purpose of explaining a given historical phenomenon
by discovering the events leading up to it but to uncover in human
history regularities of behavior from which could be deduced laws
similar to those Newton had deduced from observing the movement of heavenly bodies, Boyle from observing chemical reactions, and Harvey from observing the flow of blood. In each of
these three cases, the scientist began with the observation of regularities, deduced laws to explain them, predicted on the basis of
the laws further phenomena not yet observed but observable, and
then moved to the experimental testing of the predicted
phenomena.
The Federalists tended to be counted among those who saw
the possibility of a science of politics. Hume and Montesquieu
were only two of many writers who contributed to this notion,
but they were easily the most influential. Americans learned from
these men that humans display regularities in behavior that are
compounded of simple, fundamental propensities in their common nature and certain central aspects of their environm~nt and
that political institutions are critical aspects of the total environment. Bacon had worked out the formula earlier, and Hobbes,
Locke, and Rousseau had each developed a philosophically coherent and rhetorically dramatic theory of political behavior based
upon a few simple principles; but Montesquieu and Hume, especially Montesquieu, provided detailed analysis that explicitly
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linked human nature, the human environment, and political institutions with a variety of regularities in human behavior.
When reading The Federalist and other writings from the
founding era, one cannot help but be struck by the appearance of
three widely held assumptions: (1) There is order in the universe,
(2) we can know that order through the use of observation and
reason, and (3) we can use that natural order in constructing our
political institutions. Even ministers reflected these assumptions
in their sermons and were not loathe to cite Newton and Locke as
well as Saints Peter and Paul. The Divine Law, based upon revelation, and the laws of nature, derived from scientific reasoning,
were seen by most ministers of the time to be different reflections
of God's mind and thus in harmony instead of in conflict.
There is also a strong sense in The Federalist and many other
writings of the founding era, both Federalist and Antifederalist, of
each political institution being in the nature of an "experiment"
whose effectiveness will be determined by observation. The concept earlier identified as "experience" amounts to using observation, made systematic by reason, to test an institution, which embodies a hypothesis about human behavior. Many founders
viewed the Constitution as a complex institutional mechanism,
adjustable on the basis of changes in the environment, to overcome flaws revealed by experience. In this context the amendment
process becomes an important part of the Constitution, and we
are led to understand why such a radically new device in constitutional history did not cause controversy at the Constitutional Convention-it simply reflected a deeply and widely held perception
of politics as an experimental science.
The metaphor of constitution as machine or mechanistic device was widely used but intermixed with a more biological or organic metaphor. A "system'' can be clocklike, with gears, wheels,
and levers; but it can also be, just as a human body, a tree, or a solar system, beyond human manipulation. The Federalists saw a
constitution as mixing human invention with natural processes.
Man-made political institutions hemmed in, governed, channeled, directed, or activated natural human inclinations and social
processes, so a political system was simultaneously biological and
mechanistic.
The connection between the natural sciences and the "science
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of politics," as the phrase was put in The Federalist, was a commonplace in political discourse during the entire founding era. For
example, a striking exchange took place between John Dickinson
and James Wilson at the Constitutional Convention on June 7,
1787. John Dickinson, wrote Madison in his notes, "compared the
proposed National System to the Solar System, in which the
States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in
their proper orbits. The Gentleman from Pa. (Mr. Wilson) wished
he said to extinguish these planets." James Wilson replied:
He was not, however, for extinguishing these planets as was
supposed by Mr. D[ickinson]. Neither did he on the other
hand believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun.
Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for
subordinate purposes for which their existence is made essential by the great extent of our Country.
Continuing the next day (June 8, 1787), James Madison said:
Experience has evinced a constant tendency in the states to encroach on the federal authority. . . . A negative was the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these mischiefs. . . . In a word, to recur to the illustrations borrowed
from the planetary System. This prerogative of the General
Government is the greatest pervading principle that must control the centrifugal tendencies of the States; which without it,
will continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the
order and harmony of the political system. 19

The Federalist is typical in being replete with terminology taken
from the Newtonian heritage that Montesquieu and Hume helped
transmit. Often the terminology is used metaphorically as in the
preceding comments, but more frequently words like "tendency,"
"revolution," "balance," "equilibrium," "fulcrum," "system,"
"reaction," "mass," "power," and many other terms derived from
science are used with the precise meaning and intent of a physical
scientist.
There are important consequences for interpreting Madison's
notes on the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist, and thus
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the U.S. Constitution, if we read these terms scientifically. First,
the aspects of the document that are puzzling today become more
comprehensible. For example, the term "balance," as in .checks
and balances, meant a mechanism for regulating the speed at
which a process or an operation takes place. A balance was not a
balance scale but a balance beam, as in a watch, that allowed the
main sprocket wheel to advance one cog at a time. A balance,
therefore, allowed a process to go forward but not at an unregulated rate. The precise use of scientific terminology was also associated with important conceptual advances. For example, political
power had usually been seen as belonging to the sovereign, and
thus, like sovereignty, not divisible. In physics, however, power is
an attribute that can increase or decrease and move from one object
to another; it can also be distributed among several entities. Such a
view of power as a force that can be split and shifted instead of as
an attribute of one entity at a time allowed the Federalists and Antifederalists to see how power could be separated into discrete
amounts among several entities or distributed among several
branches and levels of government.
The mechanistic, scientific strand in the thinking of the founders can be traced to many writers, including Hobbes, Locke,
Hume, and Montesquieu as well as to Bacon, Newton, Priestley,
Harvey, and Boyle. If any aspect of the founders' intellectual heritage has been ignored more than Calvinist Christianity, it is the
contribution of a developing science to American political theory.

Relative Influence
Although there is no sure and easy way to summarize the relative
impact of these various influences on the founders, a count of the
citations in the political literature produced during the founding
era provides a useful overview. The general sample used here covers the period from 1760 to 1805 and includes more than 916 pamphlets, books, and newspaper essays with 3,154 references to 224
different individuals. The sample includes virtually all the pamphlets and essays from the 1780s by Federalists and Antifederalists
concerning the Constitution. 20
Even though the definition of intellectual traditions is not en-
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Table 5.1. Distribution of Citations by Decade (in percent)
Category
Bible
Enlightenment
Whig
Common Law
Classical
Other

1760s

1770s

24
44
32 (21)
18 (11)
10 (21) 20 (27)
4
12
11
8
14
3
100
100
n=216
n=544

1780s

1790s

1800-1805

Total N

34
24 (23)
19 (20)
9
10
4
100
n=1306

29
21 (20)
17 (18)
14

38
18 (17)
15 (16)
20
2
7
100
n=414

34
22 (19)
18 (21)
11
9
6
100
N=3154

11
8

100
n=674

Note: The categorization scheme used here is basically that developed by Bernard
Bailyn.
Source: Donald S. Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth Century American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 78
(March 1984):189-97.

tirely efficacious and granting that the assignment of authors and
citations to a given category will vary somewhat, depending upon
who is doing the assigning, one can conclude that no apparent basis exists for identifying any category of thinkers as dominant or
decisive in its influence on the founders (see Table 5.1). Also, the
members of a given category might be construed as contributing to
one or more other categories. For example, Blackstone supplemented and extended classical liberalism, and at the same time he
saw himself engaged in a quasi-scientific enterprise, much as those
thinkers in the fourth subcategory of the European Enlightenment.
Hume belongs squarely in the Scottish Enlightenment, but he too
was pursuing ends similar to those in this fourth, "politics as a science," group of the European Enlightenment.
If we break Bernard Bailyn's Enlightenment category into the
three subcategories described by Lundberg and May, the results
are not significantly altered. The First Enlightenment, dominated
by Montesquieu, Locke, and Pufendorf, comprises 16 percent of all
citations. The more radical writers of the Second Enlightenment,
men like Voltaire, Diderot, and Helvetius, garner 2 percent of the
citations. The Third Enlightenment, typified by Beccaria, Rousseau, Mably, and Raynal, includes 4 percent of the citations, to
bring the total back to the 22 percent listed on Table 5.1 for all Enlightenment writers. Bailyn's scheme is one of the most prominent
but still subject to controversy. For example, where should Locke
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Table 5.2. Order of Rank by Frequency of Citation (in percent)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Montesquieu
Blackstone
Locke
Hume
Plutarch
Beccaria
Trenchard and
Gordon (Cato)
Delolme
Pufendorf
Coke
Cicero
Hobbes
Robertson
Grotius
Rousseau
Bolingbroke
Bacon
Price

8.3
7.9
2.9
2.7
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Shakespeare
Livy
Pope
Milton
Tacitus
Coxe
Plato
Raynal
Mably
Machiavelli
Vattel
Petyt
Voltaire
Robinson
Sidney
Somers
Harrington
36. Rapin-Thoyras

0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

Source: Lutz, "Relative Influence of European Writers," 189-97.

be placed? Shifting Locke to the category of Whigs, as many or
most of the founders perceived him, changes the percentages to
those in parentheses on the table.
One major conclusion we can draw from this table is that the
impact of religion and biblical sources on American political theory
needs to be examined carefully. Notwithstanding the importance
of separating church from state in our politics, it would appear that
students of American political theory ignore the impact of religion
only at the cost of missing an important influence. The sample
here is designed to illustrate the relative impact of European secular thinkers, and therefore it largely excludes political pamphlets
and tracts that were reprinted sermons, even though at least 80
percent of the political pamphlets during the 1770s and 1780s were
written by ministers. 21 Even excluding the majority of sermons that
had no references to secular thinkers, as we have done here,
Deuteronomy is the most frequently cited book, followed by Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws.
The works of the thirty-six men listed in Table 5.2 drew one
half of the citations, and those of twenty-two more writers virtually
tie for thirty-seventh place and together account for another 10 per-
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cent of the citations. The list of secular authors has more than 180
additional names; those just below the cutoff for Table 5.2 are
Burlamaqui, Godwin, Adam Smith, Volney, Shaftesbury, Hooker,
Burlingame, Hoadley, Molesworth, Priestley, Macaulay, Goldsmith, Hutcheson, Burgh, Defoe, Paley, Ferguson, Fortescue,
Virgil, Polybius, Aristotle, and Thucydides. There is a certain
asymmetry since the first four names in Table 5.2 account for onethird of all the citations attributable to the top fifty-eight names,
which implies that the contributions of these four need to be considered more carefully. Otherwise, the apparent parity among a
large number of names from supposedly different intellectual "traditions" and the almost random mixing of the names reflect the
way we find them in the literature. One does not find references
grouped in a given pamphlet according to republican, liberal, or
Enlightenment categories but scattered over many names in a
seeming haphazard fashion.
An unusual aspect of the list, one that deserves emphasis, is
that Locke's prominence is due largely to reprinted sermons by
ministers. The forty-one sermons that cited at least one secular author amounted to a little less than 5 percent of the items in the total
sample and about 9 percent of the 446 pamphlets in the sample.
These sermons together accounted for almost 20 percent of the citations to secular authors, including just about half of the references to John Locke. If we exclude the references to Locke generated by ministers, his count falls to about 1.5 percent of the total,
which places him between Beccaria and Trenchard and Gordon,
whose positions in the ranking are not affected by dropping the
sermons. The rank of no other name in Table 5.2 is affected by
more than one or two places in the order by excluding the reprinted sermons. One interesting implication is that those defending the importance of Locke will probably also have to defend the
importance of biblically based theology for American political theory during the founding era.
The relative importance of a thinker or a group of thinkers varied according to the time of the founding era in question (see Table
5.3). For example, John Locke was profound on the basis for civil
society and the grounds for breaking with a government but had
relatively little to say about specific institutions; thus it is not surprising that his influence was most direct on those founders writ-
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Table 5.3. Most Cited Secular Thinkers by Decade (in percent)
1760s
Montesquieu
Blackstone
Locke
Hume
Plutarch
Beccaria
Cato
Delolme
Pufendorf
Coke
Cicero
Hobbes
Subtotal
Others
Total

8
1
11
1
1
0
1
0
4
5
1
0
33
67
100
n=216

1770s
7
3
7
1
3
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
25

75
100
n=544

1780s

1790s

14
4
7
11
1
1
1
6
2
1
0
3
3
0
1
3
1
0
2
1
2
1
1
0
29
37
71
63
100
100
n=1306 n=674

1800-1805

Total N

1
15
1
5
0
0
0
0
5
4
1
0
32
68
100
n=414

8.3
7.9
2.9
2.7
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.0
32.4
67.6
100.0
N=3154

Note: The extra decimal point in the last column allows more precise recovery of the
number of citations over the era; all other percentages are rounded off to the nearest
whole number to ease the viewing of the table. The use of Opercent indicates less than
.5 percent of the citations for a given decade.
Source: Lutz, "Relative Influence of European Writers," 189-97.

ing the Declaration of Independence and only indirect on those
writing the Constitution. The Whig historians and theorists were
most directly influential during the time that the early state constitutions were being adopted. The Whigs were joined in importance
and to a certain degree supplanted by Blackstone, Hume, and
Montesquieu by the time the federal Constitution was being
drafted and debated. The earlier influences were still present; but
because each of these three theorists had much to say about specific institutional designs and each had a deep and coherent analysis of republican government in general and the British political
system in particular, they had a special, independent impact upon
the thinking of those who framed the Constitution. 22
One basic point to stress is the similarity the Federalists and
Antifederalists shared in their intellectual heritage. Not only do we
not find the Federalists inclined toward Enlightenment writers and
the Antifederalists away from them, the Federalists sometimes
cited Enlightenment writers only to disagree with them. For example, many Federalists argued against Montesquieu's dictum that re-
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Table 5.4. Federalist and Antifederalist Citations (in percent)

Montesquieu
Blackstone
Locke
Hume
Plutarch
Beccaria
Cato
Delolme
Pufendorf
Coke
Cicero
Robertson
Lycurgus
Mably
Grotius
Temple
Price
Addison
Vattel
Sidney
Subtotal
Other
Total:

Federalist

Antifederalist

Total for 1780s

29
7
0
3
7
0
2
0
0
0
0
0

25

14

9
3

7

6
7

1
2
0
1
2
2

5
5
0

0
0

1
0
4
2
6

1
1
1
0

1

1

0

72

62

28
100

100

n=164

n=364

38

1
1
1
3
3
3

1
1
1
1
1
2

1
1
1
.5
.5
.5
44.5
55.5
100
n=1306

Source: Lutz, "Relative Influence of European Writers," 189-97.

publics must be small and homogeneous if they are to survive, but
the Antifederalists cited Montesquieu with approval. One could
argue that the Antifederalists agreed with Montesquieu on this
point because it expressed the wisdom of the ancients, which they
were more likely to agree with, given their "republicanism," than
the more "modern" Federalists; but in fact Federalist literature was
more likely than Antifederalist writing to cite the ancients. This
tendency and a stronger inclination by the Federalists to use scientific metaphors and to seek a science of politics were the most noticeable differences between Federalist and Antifederalist use of
their common intellectual heritage. Still, the differences were more
in the nature of tendencies than in distinguishing characteristics.
The similarity in the intellectual heritage used by Federalists
and Antifederalists implies two important possibilities. One is that
there was a core to American political theory during the founding
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era that represented a commonly accepted synthesis of the various
strands of thought and of the thinkers available to the founders.
This synthesis would go far in explaining, for example, why the
Antifederalists so quickly turned to supporting a Constitution that
they had so bitterly opposed at first. A second possibility is that instead of deep theoretical differences, the division between Federalists and Antifederalists was based upon more ordinary political
considerations. One might construe the struggle, for example, as
competition between a national, cosmopolitan elite and a set of
state-based, localist elites. This interpretation would make the
ideas and arguments advanced by the many European thinkers
and traditions a coin of the realm to be used in a political debate
where the currency was indeed common and therefore possibly
spendable, or persuasive.
The founders ransacked these various intellectual traditions
for ideas that they appropriated and blended in the service of solving American problems in a manner congruent with their own
constitutional tradition arising from their own experience. In
short, they tended to use history and the history of ideas just as we
do today-sometimes in the service of political or ideological goals
but often in the service of a search for enduring truth about how to
create and maintain a government that has the power needed to be
effective as well as the justice needed to preserve popular consent.

Chapter 6

Prolegomenon

Plato long ago suggested that the first step in the journey to knowledge consists in distinguishing appearance from reality, illusion
from truth. A fork, when placed in a glass of water, may appear to
bend, but a theoretical physics based on the assumption that
"solid objects bend when placed in water'' does not go very far. By
the same token, before one can engage in American political theory it is necessary that certain facts be rehearsed and working assumptions examined, so that even if we do not agree on where to
begin we do not unconsciously or uncritically begin with equivalents to the water-bends-solids premise, such as the assumption
that political theories are only ideologies or that texts in political
theory must always be approached as complete and ideal. A pretheoretical analysis that undergirds, informs, and directs inquiry is
a necessary part of true theoretical thinking; the previous chapters
are designed to contribute to a pretheoretical analysis of American
political theory.
The analysis reveals a number of assumptions that must be examined. How we answer the questions that result from a confrontation with these assumptions will determine how we define the
discipline, and so it is worth our assembling here an overview of
the position that is being offered. To sharpen the discussion, the
position will be presented as a series of premises that read like theorems or settled propositions, although it should be remembered
that the premises are not designed as assumptions to be accepted
as much as they are matters that need to be addressed more
explicitly.
First Premise: Any theory worthy of the name is a claim for some
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truth that transcends not only its historical era but also its culture and the
intent of its creator. I have focused this discussion heavily on the
American founding era because it is the preface to 200 years of
American political events and theoretical analysis. Also, space does
not permit a discussion of American political theory since 1800. Yet
the implications of the first premise include the absolute necessity
that the study of American political theory cover the entire American experience, from 1620 to the present, not just the founding era,
for two reasons. First, a theory that is true can be supported by evidence from any era and in fact must be so if its truth is to be established. It will not do to claim that a certain generation or a certain
group had a special hold on the truth and we must believe what
they say because they said it. Second, the political thinking of the
founding era was grounded in theory that came before it and that
has been confirmed or modified by thinking that came after it. We
do ourselves no favors by pretending that the nineteenth century
was a wasteland in American political thinking or that the twentieth century is only the source of theoretical perversity. A complete
preface to American political theory would include a beginning list
of post-1800 texts worth our attention, a task that has yet to be carried out adequately by anyone.
Just· as we should not seek the intentions of the founders under the assumption that a special genius automatically makes their
theories true, neither should we reject the truth of their theories
based on any personal failings they may have had. It is a logical fallacy to accept or reject an act or an idea because of its source-the
genetic .fallacy. Yet there are those who, with a straight face, indulge in the following logical sequence:
Major premise: A person who does a bad thing cannot produce
anything that is of value or is true.
Minor premise: Person" 1¥..' has done a bad thing.
Conclusion: Person "1¥..' cannot have produced anything of value
or said anything that is true.

If a man proves to be a "womanizer" or a woman a "manizer,"
we, as American political theorists, should be able to distinguish
our dismay and approbation over that person's casual and preda-
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tory treatment of members of the opposite sex or flaunting of marriage vows or both from our estimation of the truth and utility of
that person's political theory. Truth, like beauty, does not depend
upon the intentions or character of the person who offers it; otherwise, we would examine the moral life of Mozart, Einstein, Meryl
Streep, or Billie Jean King before judging whether to appreciate
their music, science, acting, or tennis. The same principle, it would
seem, applies to the political theories of John C. Calhoun, Abraham Lincoln, Herbert Croly, and Martin Luther King.
Similarly, we should treat slaveholding with the opprobrium it
deserves but distinguish our anger and disappointment in this regard from the truth that may be found in the theoretical political
thinking of those people who owned slaves, or who did not own
slaves but failed to condemn it, or who condemned it but failed to
act effectively against it. There are gradations of evil, and slavery
has to rank high on the scale, but logic that is true and useful to humans with lesser failings should not be rejected solely on the
grounds that the theory is generated by someone whose sins are
greater. If the evil in a person's life informs and warps his or her
theory, as has been concluded about Adolph Hitler, we can then reject the theory on its own merits. Our experience has shown that
the political theory underlying the U.S. Constitution was not
warped but has led Americans to inevitable, straightforward conclusions that required the elimination of slavery, the expansion of
the electorate, and the broadening of rights. One does not have to
read very far in the pamphlet literature of the 1780s to discover that
many members of the active political class, north and south, were
perfectly well aware of these deductions. Still, as is often the case,
the theory was strong, but the political will was weak.

Second Premise: American political theory can be defined as the normative, analytic, and empirical study of American political texts, institutions, processes, issues, and values derived from and defined by its constitutional tradition. This working definition of the discipline contains
a number of crucial points. One aspect, the blending of empirical,
11.ormative, and analytic concerns, deserves extended comment.
Political theory properly understood is not opposed to the empirical study of politics but encompasses it. Indeed, American political
theory, because it rests upon the analysis of experience, requires
the development of data-based analysis using sophisticated math-

144

Chapter Six

ematical and statistical techniques. At the same time, because
American political theory engages in the constant evaluation of the
American experiment and aims at improving the capacity of the experiment to achieve its ends, the discipline requires that empirical
study be driven by theory that explains why a given empirical
question is worth studying and that evaluates the results in a context that has normative implications. Empiricists, despite disclaimers, always end up, often covertly, putting their findings in such a
context; and normative theorists inevitably make use of factual
statements if their words are to have any relationship to the world
in which we live but frequently use empirical statements in an unsystematic or unexamined fashion. The tendency by both sides to
view their questions and approach as the only legitimate one rests
ultimately upon a peculiar logic about life.
Imagine a person who spends her day earning a living as an
accountant. Imagine that person coming home and using the same
methodology on the family as at work-calculating the costs and
benefits of spouse and children to see if their "costs and benefits to
the life of the accountant" balance. Imagine now that same accountant going to work and using "family logic'' to sort numbers
on the basis of how she feels about them, preferring, for example,
the number six, to which she has developed an attachment or
fondness, over the number three, which once let the accountant
down by being misplaced. Or imagine a physician using techniques of close textual analysis on his patients or in dealings with
the spouse and kids.
Life does not allow us to use the same approach in every circumstance any more than it presents us with morally perfect
people whose political theories we can then adopt in preference to
those devised by evil people. Life is messy, often lacks logic, and
presents us with a multitude of problems and opportunities that
yield to approaches appropriate to each. Why should we expect
that American political theory will be an exception to life and be
any more susceptible to a single, universally applicable approach?
In order to defend such an exceptional view political scientists of
one persuasion or another inevitably are pushed to the position
that certain questions are "trivial" or "not worth asking"; or, in its
milder form, certain questions are "not very interesting." The
deep structure of such a response, ultimately, is to say that life is
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not interesting, since life presents us with questions, problems,
and challenges that will not yield to a single "nontrivial" or "interesting" perspective.
There are many scholars in political science who see the divisions as being far more than methodological in origin. Some insist
that the normative approach is inherently oppressive since it seeks
to explain or enforce values that can be only personal and idiosyncratic; others insist that empirical research somehow fiddles with
nature and corrupts our moral vision. The arguments here are unlikely to change many of these minds, nor is that the intent.
Rather, the intent is to suggest that the discipline of American political theory requires us to remain open to a variety of systematic
approaches that together reflect our total experience of life. It is the
discipline of architects who cannot ignore the laws of physics that
underlie lines of loadbearing any more than they can ignore the
factual characteristics of each material used in construction or the
aesthetics of design. It is a discipline of integration and synthesis.
A complete preface to American political theory would show
how to link empirical research with analytic and normative concerns. Historical research is one form of empirical inquiry, but
what I have in mind here includes behavioral and aggregate data
analysis using the most advanced statistical and methodological
techniques. In the absence of space to develop a full model one
could point to the work of Calvin Jillson as one of many examples.
Jillson applied factor-analytic techniques typically used in legislative roll-call analysis to examine roll-call coalitions in the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. 1 His systematic empirical
approach allows him to identify voting coalitions, to determine
that there were several realignments during the Convention-each
resulting in a new coalition over a number of issues-and to sort
out the mix of principles and interests that went into the final accommodation. Along the way he puts to rest several puzzles or debates that historians had developed in working with different techniques. Jillson's book, when read together with other studies that
work from close textual analysis of primary theoretical tracts, illustrates how empirical research can be generated and guided by
questions raised through other methodologies and then made to
serve and support textual and historical analyses with quite explicit
normative implications.

146

Chapter Six

Another example of such integrated research might be Christian Bay's The Structure of Freedom, in which the author analyzes the
components of a definition of freedom, conducts a comprehensive
exploration of the empirical literature of the social sciences for evidence relevant to the implications of his analysis, and discusses the
normative implications of his findings. 2
Of course, empirical research is not limited to the use of data
susceptible to statistical analysis. Historical research is an empirical
enterprise that attempts a systematic analysis of data that frequently are not reducible to numerical form. The same is true of legal research, an important component of and contributor to the enterprise being defined here. American political theory has always
worked implicitly from an operational definition of politics based
on constitutionalism. Thus, because of the role of the Supreme
Court in the American constitutional system, the Court has been a
major generator of American political theory since 1800. Therefore,
one major implication of the definition that constitutes our second
premise is that American political theory must devote a significant
amount of its attention to Supreme Court decisions and to their
implications.
These decisions establish a data base that can be used to test
important empirical propositions in American political theory. Together these decisions also serve as a summary of the changes that
American political theory has undergone and of the theoretical positions currently contending for supremacy. An interesting book
by Martin Edelman uses Supreme Court decisions as a data base
for systematic textual analysis and delineates the competing democratic theories that justices have developed through their legal reasoning in a constitutional context. Edelman's book provides a good
example of how analytic, normative, and empirical concerns overlap in American political theory, how they need to be addressed
using a variety of appropriate methods, and how a constitutional
context provides a useful focus for distinguishing theoretical positions that would otherwise be abstract and amorphous. 3
The nature of constitutionalism and its importance for American political theory require that our enterprise blend normative,
analytic, and empirical research, which leads us to the next
premise.
Third Premise: To define American political theory in terms of consti-
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tutionalism means that the empirical study of human behavior in light of
popularly approved ends and process stands at the center of the enterprise.
Although this premise has already been discussed, it is worth considering the assumptions that underlie it. The idea of constitutionalism, properly understood, assumes (1) that humans can together
design a binding, mutually acceptable political process based upon
reflection and choice, (2) that constitutions define the political process and the general ends that have been so chosen and accepted,
(3) that constitutions and the laws derived from them generate collective human behavior with predictable patterns, and (4) that this
behavior ought to be congruent with the ends and process consented to by those humans whose behavior is being structured.
Among those scholars who study constitutions a tendency exists to treat them either as a set of philosophical principles that establishes prescriptive goals or as a set of legalistic doctrines that
can be used as trump cards in resolving political controversy. The
first tendency belongs to those whose training is in the more traditional political philosophy; the second is typical of those who
teach in law schools. Neither tendency is perverse, but together
they still add up to an inadequate understanding of constitutions.
Constitutions summarize the relationship that experience and
reflection have thus far shown to exist between institutional design
and the resulting patterns of political behavior. For example, bicameralism does not rest upon a free-floating philosophical principle but upon a set of ideas connected theoretically, which experience has shown results in a certain pattern of legislative behavior.
To the extent that the institutional design is viewed as causing a
pattern of behavior, to that extent it also provides an explanation
for it. In this sense the set of constitutional rules that define an institution stand as a prediction, as an empirically testable hypothesis, that a certain pattern of behavior will result. Institutions that
remain stable over time imply that the resulting behavioral pattern
is more or less in line with expectations, and they also imply continuing approval for the predicted pattern of behavior-that we
choose this pattern as preferable to any other known alternative.
Therefore, in order to understand the normative prescriptions
in a constitution, we need to do more than focus on the more obviously normative statements such as those in a bill of rights. Until
and unless we understand the predicted patterns of behavior con-
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tained in the institutions defined by the constitution and the manner in which these patterns interact, we will not understand which
behavior is preferred and thus which precept is normatively
sought.
By the same token, to treat constitutional provisions merely as
trump cards is to focus upon winning an argument rather than
upon understanding the extent to which political behavior is congruent with predictions or preferences or both. The trump-card approach also is inclined to view the trumping passage in isolation
from the rest of the constitution and thus to read it out of context.
Constitutions are made up of interlocking institutions and therefore of interacting patterns of behavior; any piece of the pattern
must be understood as part of a whole.
Finally, the constitutional approach puts empirical political scientists on notice that their methodology is critically important because the predicted behavioral patterns mediate between the normative, philosophical theorizing and the use of constitutions as
the trump card. Without the behavioral understanding to connect
them, the normative and legal aspects float free. At the same time,
the constitutional approach imposes upon empiricists the responsibility to investigate the important as opposed to the trivial and to
conduct research in such a way that operational definitions are
compatible enough to result in cumulative knowledge. Until or unless empirical political science becomes part of a larger project that
brings it greater coherence, it too will tend to float free. The centrality of constitutionalism to American political theory results also
in the next premise.
Fourth Premise: The constitutions, documents, and writings upon
which American political theory is built require that we construct complete texts that cannot be studied the same way as philosophical texts. How
we assemble a text and the use we make of the text we assemble are crucially affected by the attitude we bring to it. The implications of this
premise have been discussed in chapter 3, but one implication in
particular deserves a little more explication. The analysis shows
that the authors of constitutions and other writing designed for
public understanding and approval must consider the meaning
that would be supplied by an active citizenry. That is, the meaning
of a political text in a system based upon popular control is a function of the interplay between the author's intended meaning, the
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words as written, and the citizens' appropriation. Analysis of texts
in American political theory thus cannot meaningfully proceed
from the stance of an indifferent philosopher but must proceed instead from the stance of an interested, educated citizen. Since a citizen's education results prominently from participation in politics,
the manner and extent of citizen participation takes on particular
importance in American political theory. Finally, then, American
political theory inherently involves analysis of democratic and republican theory.
In other words, American political theory inevitably involves
itself with questions concerning a string of concepts that, when
properly understood, lead inexorably to each other. One can conceive of such a string of concepts beginning with the concept most
fundamental to democratic theory, popular sovereignty, followed
by political participation, political equality, majority rule, individual and minority rights, the common good, political virtue, representation, deliberative processes, procedural fairness, effective institutional design, liberty, and a government that combines justice
with power. Although the list is not meant to be exhaustive, it does
set forth basic concepts that lie at the core of our concern.
That these concepts are central to American political theory explains and justifies our continuing interest in the study of such
matters as electoral behavior, legislative process and behavior, public-policy evaluation, interest-group behavior, the operation of political parties, the status and treatment of minorities, public law
and judicial behavior, and so on. To put it most clearly, our concept
of modem political science is the direct result of American political
theory defining what subjects are worth our study as well as
strongly inclining us to use systematic empirical methods. European political science differs in its methods and objects of study
precisely to the extent that it is not guided by American political
theory; the extent to which overlap exists between American political science and political science elsewhere results from others
adopting the research agenda that has been defined by American
political theory.
Opposition to the integrated, constitutional approach that is
distinctively American rests ultimately upon European perspectives that are in some sense hostile to American political theory.
One such European perspective, which is based upon the extreme
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logical positivism developed by the Vienna Circle, supports American empiricism but neglects or rejects the assumptions that underlie American commitments to liberty, the organization of a free
people for collective political ends, and the evaluation of those
ends by standards that are not merely ideological, irrational, or
grounded in psychological self-interest. The other European perspective, which has its roots in the European idealist tradition,
supports the American commitment to a higher law and the insistence upon a value context for political activity, but it is hostile to
American insistence that political theory be grounded in experience and built upon the consent of the many as opposed to the imposition from above of an agenda developed by a few great minds
who are more able to understand the requirements of reason. The
former European-derived position defines the extreme empiricist
wing; the latter defines the extreme philosophical wing in the
study of American politics. The former tends to deny the relevance
for politics of any human experience that is not clearly reducible to
a statement of fact, and the latter tends to deny the relevance of experience that is not conformable to a coherent theory developed by
a great European mind. Each position, for its own reasons, sees the
study of history as worthless at best, if not pernicious. Each brings
its own a~titude to the analysis of a political text, the first to reject
the text as worthy of study, the second to enshrine the t~t. Not to
be confused with these positions are the extreme left and right
ideological perspectives in American political theory derived from
European Marxist or Nietzschean sources.
On the other hand, American political theory, as we have seen
in the earlier discussion on the origin of the Bill of Rights and in
the analysis on American use of European political writing, suggests a different operating premise.

Fifth Premise: American constitutionalism, and thus American political theory, although resting in part on English and other European
sources, is grounded most importantly in American experience, American
needs, and thus in American history, which makes the study of history an
essential part of American political theory. The peculiar relevance of
American history for American political theory results from the
very nature of our political culture. Our theoretical thinking rests
upon our own experience, our collective experience of living together as a people, and our experience in self-government. Too
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many students who begin their academic lives in philosophy fail to
appreciate how central this last point is. Because Americans have
been a self-governing people, their history is the story of their own
attempts at collective self-definition, and thus their story cannot be
appropriated to the theory of some philosopher who has not had
their experience; instead, philosophical theories must be appropriated by them to their experience. Americans, after reflecting upon
their experience, write public documents that embody their collective, agreed-upon sense of selves; the reflection is deepened by
other writing surrounding and explaining these documents. The
history of these documents and their ancillary writings thus becomes the very stuff of American political theory.
If the job of history is to help us recover the meaning of these
writings for those who wrote and read them, the job of American
political theory is to help us decide what the meaning in those documents signifies for us today. Obviously, the former must precede
the latter; thus American political theorists in political science departments often seem to be historians. Historians explicitly do not
wish to work on the latter task, however, and it is at this point that
we become political theorists.
The continued appropriation of a meaning by citizens over
generations makes an idea or a theory timeless. Political theorists
look for regularities and enduring patterns; historians seek an explanation for events that are viewed as discrete, independent, and
unrepeatable. In looking for these stable patterns, political theorists make use of history in a way that historians cannot and will
not. History is for American political theory the repository of data.
In this sense, behavioral research by political scientists is a form of
history since it establishes facts that can be reflected upon as well
as examined for enduring patterns, and thus all empirically oriented political scientists are contemporary historians.
Still, the key point is that although those scholars working in
American political theory can study and in some small way contribute to the enterprise, since American political theory is
grounded in the experience of a people who are self-governing, in
the end American political theory is defined by the people. Americans tell their own story, define their own values, create their own
institutions, and establish their own political theory in the documents that they together approve. There is no evidence that Amer-
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icans decide which European political philosopher to adopt wholesale as their own; instead, members of the political class work up
competing theoretical syntheses that are presented for approval. A
theoretical position is not accepted on the basis of philosophical
niceties but because it meets the needs of most of the people, for
which we can read "interests," and is part of a self-conception,
part of a story about themselves, that they approve.
Sixth Premise: American political theory is grounded in, conditioned by,
and ultimately approved by a self-governing, self-defining people. This premise raises questions about the function of those individuals who work
in a discipline of American political theory if the enterprise belongs to
the people. Essentially we play a multifaceted yet specialized role
within the active political class. Through our writing we assist historians in the recovery of original meaning, offer interpretations of the
American experience, suggest extensions or alterations in the theory
that take into account changing circumstances, and pass this on to others in the politically active class. We teach our students how to read
texts for original meaning, how to systematically reflect upon the
American experience, how to interpret this experience (as well as introduce them to the major interpretations currently in contention), and
perhaps most important we teach our students how to become members of the politically active class, which brings us to our final premise.
Seventh Premise: The study of American political theory would be
best served by focusing more broadly on the writing and activities of the
active political class. Premise seven is required by the sixth premise.
If a people are self-governing and their self-government is embodied in an evolving set of public documents that rests upon
their consent, then it would seem perverse to focus American political theory upon a study of writings by a tiny elite. A portion of
the population plays a disproportionate role in the design, operation, and analysis of the American political system. Far too numerous to be called an elite, the political activist class interprets
and organizes politics for the rest of the population and interprets
and organizes the needs and demands of the broader population
for presentation to those in government. These people together
carry in their heads American political culture. From the ranks of
this active political class come the people who engage in the process of self-reflection that we call American political theory.
The juxtaposition of the two preceding sentences highlights a
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final aspect of American political theory that must be addressed in
this preface-the relationship of political theory to political myth
and the difficulties that result when both are the product of the
same part of the population. First we must speak a bit about political culture.
There are basically three ways in which humans learn: directly, indirectly, and symbolically. If I strike a match and put my
finger into the flame, the experience of heat and pain is a direct
one that leads me to avoid putting my finger in a flame again. If I
watch someone else put a finger in the flame and observe the response, I learn indirectly that I should not put my finger in a
flame. If, however, I avoid putting my finger in a flame because
my parents or others have used language to tell about the pain, I
have learned symbolically.
Language is a shared system of symbols that must be taught
to the next generation if continued symbolic learning is to take
place. Indeed, since culture may be defined as the shared symbol
system that is passed from generation to generation, language is
the primary cultural artifact. Culture produces a collective orientation or set of attitudes toward various aspects of human experience and the world around us, and therefore political culture refers to the shared orientation or set of attitudes of a people toward
the basic elements in their political system that is passed symbolically across generations.
Culture makes society possible, and political culture makes
the political system possible. Note that since political culture as a
subpart of general culture rests upon the language used to transmit it, the meaning of words and concepts can have a profound
effect on how a political system is perceived, evaluated, and operated. At a deeper level, although it is possible to develop a political institution or practice before a word or concept exists to describe it, that institution or practice will require a name if it is to be
passed successfully to future generations. Therefore, the creation
of new words and concepts and the control of their usage can
have a profound effect on politics. In fact, much of politics involves a struggle over the meanings of words and the evaluation
of their referents. That is, much if not most of politics is a symbolic struggle or negotiation among people who share a political
culture. 4
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The struggle, in its most fundamental form, proceeds at either a mythic or a theoretical level. We need briefly to discuss
myth in order to distinguish it from, and then to relate it to, theory. Contrary to the loose usage common in ordinary language,
"myth" does not refer to a story or belief that is false or perhaps
made up. As one student of myth puts it:
A myth, I suggest, is an interpretation of what the mythmaker rightly or wrongly takes to be hard fact. It is a device
men adopt in order to come to grips with reality; and we can
tell that a given account is a myth, not by the amount of truth
it contains, but by the fact that it is believed to be true and,
above all, by the dramatic form into which it is cast. 5
A myth, then, refers to a shared story or narrative that provides a common understanding of a civil society's origin, its longterm goals, the justification of its institutions, and some sense of a
connection with transcendent value or values shared by a people.
The mythic form was more formally codified in earlier times, but
modern nations have their myths as well. Myths are generated for
the simple reason that a political culture must be passed to the next
generation, and the mythic form is a highly efficient and effective
way of doing this. Although a myth is usually based on facts or actual events, the significance that people give to the facts and
events, the meaning they derive and then believe, is the key to
myth. The commonly understood meaning, which is the core of
the myth, is inevitably an important component of the political culture that is passed on.
Furthermore, as Eric Voegelin suggests, political analysis
should begin with the study of a people's attempt at self-definition
or self-interpretation. 6 At some point, if a political system is to endure, a people must constitute themselves as a people by achieving a
shared psychological state in which they recognize themselves as
engaged in a common enterprise and as bound together by widely
shared commitments, values, interests, and goals. Essentially a
people share symbols and myths that provide meaning for their
existence and link them to some transcendent order. Far from being the repository of irrationality, these shared symbols and myths
are the basis upon which collective, rational action is possible.
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Voegelin says that these shared myths and symbols can be
found in embryonic form in a people's earliest political expressions
and in "differentiated" form in later writings. By studying the political documents of a people, we can watch the gradual unfolding,
elaboration, and alteration of the myths and symbols that define
them. For example, the "American Dream," the idea that people
migrated to American shores in order to improve their condition,
to pursue and achieve happiness, is part of .our political myth that
can be found expressed embryonically in colonial documents, and
then in differentiated form in our Declaration of Independence.
The narrative quality of myth, and the place it has in politics,
is nicely summarized by David Carr.
A community exists wherever a narrative account exists of a
"we" which has continuous existence through its experiences
and activities. When we say that such an account "exists," we
mean to say that it gets articulated or formulated, perhaps by
only one or a few of the group's members . . . and is accepted
or subscribed to by the other members. It is their acceptance
that makes them members. Where such a community exists it
is constantly in the process . . . of composing and recomposing its own autobiography. Like the autobiography of an individual, such a story seeks a unifying structure for a sequence
of experiences and actions. . . . A community at any moment
has a sense of its origins and the prospect of its own death as it
seeks to articulate its own coherence and integrity over time.
Such articulation involves an interplay of formulation and acceptance on the part of the participants. It may also take the
form of a kind of negotiation among participants or even between parties to different versions of the group's story.7
"Negotiation" may not be the best word. Since attempts to formulate a new myth, alter an old one, or force acceptance of the current myth may threaten the existence of individuals, minorities, or
the entire community, these political "negotiations" are often
highly charged or conflictful. Much of politics is quite symbolic
and proceeds at the mythic level. Examples abound. Characterizing the founders as "Founding Fathers" is part of a mythic narrative that can be threatened by those people who oppose the capi-
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talization as needless deification or who oppose "fathers" as too
gender specific. The television series "Roots," like the book, can be
seen as an attempt to make Americans of African heritage more explicitly a part of the American story-an alteration in the myth. The
addition of Labor Day, Martin Luther King Day, Veterans' Day, and
St. Patrick's Day to our national celebrations, official or otherwise,
reflects alterations in our national autobiography. What material to
put in American history textbooks is not simply an academic matter, since these texts are a means for passing on our mythic autobiography to the next generation.
Political myth is both related to and clearly distinguishable
from political theory. Both seek to explain who we are as a people,
what we hold in common, what we should and should not do politically, and so on. Political theory, however, tends inherently to
undermine the existing political myths. First, political theory
works from a careful, systematic study of history, and the factual
nature of events is carefully uncovered and insisted upon. Almost
no political myth, no matter how factually grounded, will meet the
rigorous tests imposed by historians simply because the meaning of
an event has priority in myth over factual content. Furthermore,
political theory, built upon history, attempts to extract meaning
that is rational, logical, and removed from the logic of myth.
To a certain extent the same disjunction obtains between all
political activity and political science. Those people engaged in political activity rely on what Abraham Kaplan calls "logic-in-use";
political science in any form uses a "reconstructed logic. " 8 Logicin-use tends to be oriented toward problem solving, has a severely
limited time horizon, and operates in the context of ambiguity,
contingency, conflict, and ignorance. On the other hand, political
science tends to isolate questions or problems in ways that those
engaged in politics cannot do, imposes an orderliness and consistency that is usually not possible in day-to-day life, and can eliminate the distractions of conflict. Political science in general, including political theory, abstracts itself from the logic and reasoning
used by those people who are engaged in politics. It then attempts,
through systematic study, to clarify the events, actions, motives,
and implications of the political process. Political theory is suspicious of the thinking offered by political actors and is always seeking a more adequate, logical explanation-one that can be general-

Prolegomenon

157

ized. Political logic-in-use in general, and political myth in
particular, rarely measures up to the factual accuracy demanded by
history and empirical political science or to the logical coherence
and depth of meaning sought by political theory.
A reconstructed political logic inherently threatens political
logic-in-use by calling into question the latter's adequacy. By so doing, political theory, which is a reconstructed logic, threatens to
undermine the political myth upon which the political system is
built; this is part of the age-old conflict between the polis and political philosophy.
What happens when a self-governing, self-defining people
find themselves with a politically active class that is at one and the
same time (1) disproportionately influential in the ongoing political process, (2) the primary manipulator and defender of political
myth, and (3) the generator of political theory? The resulting tension constantly calls the political myth into question, dilutes political theory, and confuses or conflates myth and theory.
A nation in which there is a coherent elite allows for the possibility that those who largely run the political system can do so
based upon a theory that is understood. The elite can use the theory as they alter the political system to meet changing circumstances. The unifying political myth, which the elite control, can
be gradually altered to support needed changes in the political system and can be maintained in such a way as to support the political
theory. That is, the political myth, which structures the behavior of
the many, can be made supportive of the ends of the political theory, which the many do not understand. Elitists often cite this coherence as a strength of elitism.
In the United States, however, although there may be elites,
the open, relatively democratic system makes them part of a
broader active political class, which is fragmented and fairly porous from below. The inclusion of new members from new groups
leads the active political class to alter the unifying political myth accordingly. Yet since political theory is also generated by members
of this class, theory is often appropriated for political purposes,
sometimes in the service of maintaining or altering the myth,
sometimes in the service of undermining the myth. The conflation
of theory and myth simply worsens the confusion between theory
and ideology. It also has the often unrecognized effect of injecting

158

Chapter Six

into a consensual political myth the logical imperative of theory,
which too often results in a politics of perfectionism or fanaticism.
Fanaticism is, at its heart, the attempt to create perfection on
earth, to eradicate the illogical or the imperfect or both. Part of the
task assigned to American political theory is to remind us of the
difference between a theory that explains political actions and the
logic-in-use that produces political action. The ability to distinguish the two, to use theory to advance political reasoning without
collapsing one into the other, defines the peculiar mental discipline
of American political theory. It is a discipline sorely needed by a
system of popular control, in which the active political class has a
double role and is large, diverse, and open.
Those of us who pursue American political theory must attempt to be rational and objective, but we must also try to be responsible. Responsibility entails maintaining a constant vigil
against the imperfections of the political logic-in-use, but it also
means avoiding the destruction of that common logic, whether by
undermining the shared political myth completely or by destroying the morale of those people who must use political logic to
achieve the ends needed for the common good.
Finally, if American political theory is to become whole again,
we will need to ignore those people who cannot resist the more extreme forms of the natural human inclination to think that whatever they do is the most important or the only activity worth pursuing. There are issues that separate students of American politics
and theory, and these issues are real enough and important
enough for us to treat them seriously through a continuing discussion, no matter how heated. Perhaps the one quality most needed
for our discipline to thrive, the last element in a successful preface,
is a continued dedication to truth in its various guises, coupled
with humility.
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of Europeans such as Francis Bacon, David Hurne, and Baron de Montesquieu, but the receptiveness of twentieth-century American political science
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to empirical, statistical, and science-imitating approaches cannot be explained
by the presence of these ideas among European thinkers.
29. The Federalist by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay
is often considered our greatest political text, but as we will see in the next
chapter it is an assembled text, not one written as a piece as Tocqueville's work
was, and thus is handicapped when compared to the great European thinkers. John C. Calhoun's Disquisition on Government is not an assembled text, but
its depth suffers from its brevity. Herbert Croly's The Promise of American Life
physically resembles a great text but is too particularistic to be so categorized.
Other candidates spring to mind, but they are not read by anyone; thus Hamilton and Madison, Tocqueville, Calhoun, and Croly would seem to have written the most recognized theoretical texts we have .
Chapter Two: American Political Texts and Their Analysis
1. See, for example, Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).
2. For a detailed development of this position see Donald S. Lutz, The
Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1988).
3. The position being developed in this section is my own, but a significant debt is owed to the work of others whose interesting and sensible analysis is particularly appreciated. See, for example, Wayne C. Booth, A Rhetoric of
Irony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); E. D. Hirsch, Jr., The Aims
of Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Wolfgang Iser,
The Act of Reading (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978);
Frank I<ermode, The Genesis of Secrecy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1979); Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of
Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976); Walter J. Slatoff,
With Respect to Readers (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970); and Conal Condren, The Status and Appraisal of Classic Texts: An Essay on Political Theory, Its Inheritance, and the History of Ideas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1985).
4. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
5. William Shakespeare, The Merchant of ~nice, Act 2, scene 1, and Sir
Walter Scott, Redgauntlet (Edinburgh: Constable, 1824), ch. 11.
6. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock have edited and contributed to an important book that provides interesting and telling examples from the history
of American political theory. See their Conceptual Change and the Constitution
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988).
7. For a discussion indicating that "common good" meant precisely this
in eighteenth-century America see Lutz, Origins of American Constitutionalism,
esp. 28-30, 76-77, and 89-90.
8. For an accessible discussion of cognitive psychology see the book
from which this example was taken-Morton Hunt, The Universe Within: A
New Science Explores the Human Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
9. See Bernard Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press, 1967), and Herbert Storing, ed., The Complete
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Antifederalist, 7 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). Storing
went further and suggested a list of pamphlets written by other Federalists
that should be collected to supplement the collected essays by Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay, but he died before he could publish them. See Herbert
Storing, "The 'Other' Federalist Papers: A Preliminary Sketch," Political Science Reviewer 6 (1976): 215-47. A listing of other assembled texts published before 1983 can be found in Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, American
Political Writing during the Founding Era, 1760-1805, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983), 1:392-93, as well as an annotated bibliography of more than
five hundred items beyond the seventy-five published in this collection. The
highly regarded collection edited by Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, The
Founders' Constitution, 5 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987),
also proceeds on the premise of assembled texts.
Chapter Three: Toward a Complete Text on the Bill of Rights
1. I have relied upon the texts as found in Richard L. Perry, ed., Sources of
Our Liberties (New York: Associated College Presses for the American Bar Association, 1959), 11-22, 73-75, and 245-50.
2. See, for example, ibid., pp. 23-24. For a lucid description of the development of English common law in general and the position of Magna Carta in
particular, see Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Indianapolis: Liberty Press/Liberty Classics, 1988), and also T. F. Plucknett, A Concise History of
the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956).
3. See Bernard Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the Bill
of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 197; Irving Brant, The
Bill of Rights: Its Origin and Meaning (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company,
1965), esp. chs. 5 and 6; William Nelson, The Americanization of the Common
Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1975); Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and
Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire
and the United States, 1607-1788 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986);
and Shannon C. Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1990).
4. Annals of Congress, 12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1804), 1: 436.
5. The most accurate and accessible source for these ratifying convention records is Merrill Jensen, John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino et al.,
eds., The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1976-).
6. The state constitutions and their respective state bills of rights can be
found in Francis N. Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions, 7 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907), and also in William F.
Swindler, ed., Sources and Documents of the United States Constitutions, 10 vols.
(Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1973-1979). Swindler published a
second series of three volumes in 1982 that contains documents relating to the
national Constitution.
7. Thorpe, Constitutions (Maryland), 1686-91, (Massachusetts), 1889-93,
and (New Hampshire), 2453-57.
8. Ibid. (Virginia), 3812-14, and (Pennsylvania), 3082-84.
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9. These documents are widely scattered, but many can be found in the
two series of volumes by Swindler cited inn. 6 as well as in Thorpe. Those
not found in these volumes may be located in Donald S. Lutz, Documents of
Political Foundation Written by Colonial Americans (Philadelphia: ISHI Press,
1986).
10. See Lutz, Documents of Political Foundation, 435-42, 403-10, 359-62,
309-14, 255-302, and 189-94.
11. The argument being made here is fully developed in Donald S. Lutz,
The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988).
12. There is a distinctively Protestant quality to the sort of religiosity that
is here being summarized. To pursue further the relationship of religion to
American political theory see Ellis Sandoz, A Government of Laws: Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990); J. W. Smith and A. L. Jameson, Religion in American Life, 4
vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961); Anson Phelps
Stokes, ed., Church and State and the U.S. (New York: Harper and Row, 1950);
Cushing Strout, The New Heavens and New Earth : Political Religion in America
(New York: Harper and Row, 1974); E. Brooks Holifield, The Covenant Sealed:
The Development of Puritan Sacramental Theology in Old and New England,
1570-1720 (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1974); and Lutz, Origins
of American Constitutionalism, chs. 2 and 3.
13. It is not easy to study English common law directly in America; the
mass of original documents is not available even in the best American libraries. The main secondary source used by colonists was Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, 4 vols., originally published in London between
1628 and 1644 and now available in most libraries in one of its reprinted versions. Otherwise see James C. Holt, ed., Magna Carta and the Idea of Liberty
(Malabar, Fla.: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1982); J. C. Holt,
Magna Carta (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); Stephen D.
White, Sir Edward Coke and "The Grievances of the Commonwealth," 1621- 1628
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Indianapolis: Liberty Press/Liberty Classics, 1988);
and J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1961).
14. These documents can be found in varying combinations in the volumes cited inn. 9.
15. Thorpe, Constitutions (North Carolina), 2788.
16. Ibid. (Maryland), 1687.
17. Ibid. (Massachusetts), 1891.
18. Ibid. (Pennsylvania), 3083
19. John Phillip Reid, The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). See also the work of J.C.
Holt cited in n. 13.
20. Thorpe, Constitutions (Pennsylvania), 3082.
21. Ibid. (Massachusetts), 1889.
22. Ibid. (Pennsylvania), 3082.
23. Ibid. (Massachusetts), 1889.
24. Algernon Sidney, a contemporary of John Locke and in the same political faction, was tried and executed in 1683 for treason against the king. His
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conviction was based on his writings in an unpublished manuscript entitled
Discourses on Government, which laid out the case for popular sovereignty, representative government, and natural rights. Published in London in 1698, the
book had considerable overlap with Locke's Second Treatise on Government, and
in revolutionary America the two men were frequently referred to as theoretically interchangeable. In fact, Sidney was the more radical of the two . Locke
supported legislative supremacy, but Sidney defended the more radical popular-sovereignty position in language that was closer to American views. Sidney's book has been most recently reprinted (1990) by Liberty Press/Liberty
Classics of Indianapolis.
25. See Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist
(Indianapolis: Modern library, 1937), 555-61 .
26. These and other documents can be found in various combinations in
the previously cited volumes by Thorpe, Swindler, and Jensen et al. and in
Lutz (Documents).
27. The position is more fully developed in Lutz, Origins of American
Constitutionalism. A detailed analysis of the rise of individualism in American
political and legal thought and the implications of this change for our political
system can be found in Lawrence M. Friedman, The Republic of Choice: Law,
Authority, and Culture (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1990).
28. For an extended and interesting discussion on this point see Akhil
Reed Amar, "The Bill of Rights as a Constitution," Yale Law Journal 100 (1990):
1111-90.
29. The approach used here, although somewhat different, is derived

from Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1990).
30. For a good introduction to the growing literature on this topic see
John Kincaid, "State Court Protections of Individual Rights under State Constitutions: The New Judicial Federalism," Journal of State Government 61 (Sept./
Oct. 1988): 163-69.
31. For further discussion on this point see Donald S. Lutz, "Protection
of Political Participation in Eighteenth Century America," Albany Law Review
53:2 (Winter 1989): 327-55.

Chapter Four: Use of History in American Political Theory
1. Benjamin Barber nicely summarizes the antipolitical inclination of
modern philosophy, and thus of contemporary political philosophy, in his
Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). The indifference (at best) of philosophy to political philosophy is exemplified by Hao Wang's summary of contemporary philosophy, in which political philosophy is mentioned only four times, and the
fourth mention is dry, terse, and dismissive-"political philosophy, an area
not in the center of current academic philosophy." See Hao Wang, Beyond Analytic Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 210.
2. See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). Although in many ways typical of the philosophical literature, it is also among the best of its kind.
3. Andrew C. McLaughlin, Foundations of American Constitutionalism
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(New York: New York University Press, 1932), and Charles M. Andrews, The
Colonial Period of American History (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1936).
4. Frederick Jackson Turner did not publish much during his lifetime,
and his famous thesis was presented in a paper entitled "The Significance of
the Frontier in American History'' at the 1893 annual meeting of the American
Historical Association. Charles Beard's most influential work was An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Macmillan,
1913), and Vernon L. Parrington is best known for Main Currents in American
Thought, 3 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927-1930).
5. See Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), and Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic
Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). See
also, Lee Benson, Turner and Beard: American Historical Writing Reconsidered
(New York: Free Press, 1960). The post-Beardian socioeconomic literature is
quite large. Interesting and useful examples include Robert E. Brown, Middle
Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780 (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1955); Van Beck Hall, Politics without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791 (rittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972); Jackson
Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1965); and Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage
from Property to Democracy: 1760-1860 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1968).
6. See, for example, Carl L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922), and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955).
7. For a fuller discussion of the orthodoxy and its demise from a historian's viewpoint see Robert E. Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis:
The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 29 (1972): 49-80.
8. Charles Mcilwain, The American Revolution (New York: Macmillan,
1923); Arthur M. Schlesinger, New Viewpoints in American History (New York:
Macmillan, 1922); Charles E. Merriam, A History of American Political Theories
(New York: Macmillan, 1903); Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of
the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1913); Allan
Nevins, The American States during and after the Revolution, 1775-1789 (New
York: Macmillan, 1924); and Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940).
9. Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols.
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937); Jonathan Elliott, ed., The
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,
5 vols. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1901); Paul Leicester Ford, ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1888; reprint,
New York: Da Capo Press, 1968); and Francis N. Thorpe, ed., The Federal and
State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United States,
7 vols. (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1907).
10. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, 286.
11. Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988).
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12. As distant as the 1940s' perspective seems to us now, historians and
social scientists still have the task of explaining why most of our high school
texts today use the Beard/Locke approach as their primary explanation for the
genesis of the Constitution. Even a number of college-level texts fail to reflect
the impact of the past forty years of scholarship.
13. Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959); Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of
the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1963); and Douglas Adair,
"'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science': David Hume, James Madison,
and the Tenth Federalist," Huntington Library Quarterly 20:2 (June 1957): 34360.
14. Caroline Robbins, "Algernon Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government: Textbook of Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 4 (1947):
267-96.
15. See Brown, Charles Beard, and McDonald, We the People.
16. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who
Made It (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of
American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); and Hartz, Liberal Tradition in America.
17. The most recent republication of this classic work is Arthur F.
Bentley, The Process of Government, ed. Peter Odegard (1908; Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).
18. The discussion here is based upon Dorothy Ross, The Origins of
American Social Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp.
chs. 8 and 9.
19. Charles E. Merriam, "The Present State of the Study of Politics,"
American Political Science Review 15 (May 1921): esp. 174-77.
20. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2d ed.
(New York: Harper and Row, 1947).
21. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1956). The book has been in continuous print for thirty-five
years now and shows no sign of disappearing. It is one of the few books that
one can assume has been read by almost every political scientist alive today,
regardless of specialization.
22. Martin Diamond, "Democracy and The Federalist; A Reconsideration
of the Framers' Intent," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959): 5268.
23. J.G.A. Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," William and Mary Quarterly 3d ser., 22
(1965): 549-83; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1975); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1967); and Gordon S.
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1969).
24. Donald S. Lutz, "The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late
Eighteenth Century American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 78 (March 1984): 189-97.
25. Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
(Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1978); D. Lundberg and H. H. May, "The En-
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lightened Reader in America, " American Quarterly 28 (special issue, 1976):
262-93.
26. See, for example, Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of uxke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and

Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth Century England and
America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Richard Matthew,
" Liberalism, Civic Humanism, and the American Political Tradition," Journal
of Politics 49:4 (December 1987): 1127-53.
27. The first claim is made by Jefferson himself. See Paul Leicester Ford,
ed. , The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 10 vols. (New York: G . P. Putnam's Sons,
1904-5), 10: 343-44. The second claim is made by Forrest McDonald, Novus
Ordo Sec/arum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1985), 205-9. The third claim was first made by Bernard
Schwartz, ed., The Roots of the Bill of Rights, 5 vols. (New York: Chelsea House
Publishers, 1980), 5:1204-20.
28. See Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kirn, Participation and
Political Equality (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1978), for a useful
comparison of participation in seven nations, including the United States. See
also Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kasse et al. , Political Action: Mass Participation
in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage, 1979); Giuseppe Di
Palma, Apathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Societies (New York:
Free Press, 1970); and Marvin E. Olsen, Participatory Pluralism: Political Participation and Influence in the United States and Sweden (Chicago: Nelson-Hall,
1982).
29. The discussion here is based most heavily upon Verba, Nie, and
Kirn, Participation in America; Harry Holloway and John George, Public Opinion: Coalitions, Elites, and Masses, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986);
and James A. Stimson, "The Paradox of Ignorant Voters but Competent Electorate," in Donald S. Lutz and Kent L. Tedin, eds., Perspectives on American and
Texas Politics, 2d ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company,
1987), ch. 4. See also Lester Milbrath and M . L. Goel, Political Participation, 2d
ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977); Mary Crisey Kweit and Robert W. Kweit,

Implementing Citizen Participation in a Bureaucratic Society: A Contingency Approach (New York: Praeger, 1982); Gerald M. Pomper with Susan S. Lederman, Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics, 2d ed.
(New York: Dodd, Mead, 1980); and Gerald M. Pomper, Voter's Choice: Varieties
of American Electoral Behavior (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1975).
30. In the order in which they are mentioned these collections are
Bernard Bailyn, ed., Pamphlets of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass. :
Belknap Press, 1965); Morton Borden, ed., The Antifederalist Papers (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1965); Cecelia Kenyon, ed., The Antifederalists (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist
(Cleveland, Ohio: Meridian Books, 1961); Frederick Rudolph, ed., Essays on
Education in the Early Republic (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press, 1965); Oscar
Handlin and Mary Handlin, eds., The Popular Sources of Political Authority
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); and Leonard W. Levy,
ed., Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson : Early American Libertarian Theories (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). Other collections of documents and
pamphlets published by historians include Jack P. Greene, ed., Settlements to
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Society: 1607-1763 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975); Merrill Jensen, John P.
Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino et al ., eds., The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, a multivolume effort that is still being expanded
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976-); Keith W. Kavenaugh, ed.,
Foundations of Colonial America: A Documentary History (New York: Chelsea
House, 1973); Merrill Jensen, ed., Tracts of the American Revolution, 1763-1776
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978); and William F. Swindler, ed., Sources and
Documents of the United States Constitutions, 10 vols. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Oceana Publications, 1973-1979).
31. Charles S. Hyneman and George W. Carey, eds., A Second Federalist
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1%7); Herbert J. Storing, "The 'Other'
Federalist Papers," Political Science Reviewer 6 (Fall 1976): 215-47; Herbert J.
Storing with Murray Dry, eds., The Complete Antifederalist, 7 vols. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981); Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz,
eds., American Political Writing during the Founding Era, 1760-1805, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983); Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., The
Founders' Constitution, 5 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
Other collections of relevant materials include Donald S. Lutz, ed., Documents
of Political Foundation Written by Colonial Americans (Philadelphia: ISHI Press,
1986); Irving Mark and Eugene L. Schwaab, eds., The Faith of Our Fathers: An
Anthology Expressing the Aspirations of the American Common Man, 1790-1860
(New York: Octagon Books, 1976); Saul K. Padover, ed., The World of the Founding Fathers (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1977); J. R. Pole, ed., The Revolution in
America, 1754-1788: Documents and Commentaries (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1970); Ralph A. Rossum and Gary L. McDowell, eds., The
American Founding: Politics, Statesmanship, and the Constitution (Port Washington, N.Y.: I<ennikat Press, 1981); Wilson Smith, ed., Theories of Education in
Early America, 1655-1819 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973); Stephen L.
Schechter, ed., Roots of the Republic (Madison, Wis.: Madison House, 1990);
and Schwartz, ed., Roots of the Bill of Rights. These supplemented a number of
earlier collections, most of which were reprinted during the late 1960s and
1970s, including John Almon, ed., A Collection of Papers Relative to the Dispute
between Great Britain and America, 1764-1775 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1971);
Elliott, ed., Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution; Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention of 1787; Peter Force,
ed., American Archives: Fifth Series, A Documentary History of the United States of
America (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1848); Ford, ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution
of the United States; Merrill Jensen, ed., American Colonial Documents to 1776,
vol. 9 in the multivolume series English Historical Documents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955); John Wingate Thornton, ed., The Pulpit of the
American Revolution (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1860); and Thorpe, ed., Federal and State Constitutions.
32. For a fuller discussion of this point see Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of
American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1988), ch. 9.
33. Gordon S. Wood, "The Virtues and Interests," a review of Isaac
Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth Century England and America, New Republic, Feb. 11, 1991, 32-35 (quote
from 34). Wood argued this position earlier, but Michael Kammen made the
point with equal force in his People of Paradox: An l11!fuiry Concerning the Origins
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of American Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1972). Kammen, in this and later
writing, has also been an important contributor to historical analysis using
the political class as a focus, although he is more interested in detailing the origin and nature of the shared mental states, or culture, that underlie the attitudes of the political class than he is in detailing the political struggles of that
class. These are far from the only historians using such a focus, since recourse
to the pamphlet literature and a wider base among original sources have become common over the past two decades, but special note might be made of
Jack Greene's work. His Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the
Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1986) is notable for exploring the fissures within
the Anglo-American political class that resulted in a de facto system of federalism in the British imperial constitution prior to 1776.
34. See McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 209. Notably, despite the obvious major differences that distinguished these theories, Americans were justified in also seeing some important areas of commonality-for example, the
identification of human nature with the body and its instincts, senses, and
passions; a conviction that human beings are in conflict with nature; and a belief that government is a contrivance to achieve human ends.
35. Gordon Wood criticizes Kramnick's book as an example of the tendency to argue anachronistically over which paradigm dominated the founders' thinking, but Wood also points to J.G.A . Pocock as a major offender in
this regard (seen. 23 for some of Pocock's major work). However correct Wood
may be, one must remember that those scholars engaged in developing theory, during the founding or other eras, may or may not have seen the implications (or even the contradictions) of the categories they used. They may have
preferred ambiguities but relied on arguments that-if driven to fundamental
assumptions-might give a decisive advantage to one or another of the later
interpretations. In this sense, one would have to go beyond the ostensible categories of the logic-in-use during the founding era to understand a position
completely. Still, the place to begin is with the logic-in-use, not with some
prepackaged European model.
36. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 389.
37. Ibid., 517.
Chapter Five: Intellectual History and the American Founding
1. Locke uses the phrase "pursuit of happiness" several times in ch. 21,
book 2 of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, so the term, if not Jefferson's formulation linking it with life and liberty, can be found in Locke. Happiness as the end of government is a proposition that can be traced back to
Aristotle, but the modem formulation in Jefferson and the other writers mentioned here-the pursuit of happiness-implies that either there is no summum bonum or that it is unattainable. A discussion of the various possible
sources of Jefferson's phrase can be found in Herbert Gantner, "Jefferson's
'Pursuit of Happiness' and Some Forgotten Men," William and Mary Quarterly
2nd ser., 16 (1936): 558- 85.
2. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist, C. Rossiter, ed. (New York: Mentor, 1961), no. 85, 526-27.
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3. A somewhat different but compatible position can be found in Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England
and America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988).
4. H . Trevor Colboum provides a complete review of this literature in

The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American
Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965).
5. The books written by the authors mentioned in the text are listed in
the Appendix (see pp. 159-64).
6. For a complete review of this literature, its context, and its impact, see
J.G .A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment : Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1975),
and Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge,
Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1959).
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